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1. Introduction 
1.1 The research questions 
In 2001, the Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU) came into effect, marking the demise of 
the former continental intergovernmental organisation, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). 
The AU was meant to signal a new start for Africa. Apartheid had ended in South Africa with its 
first democratic elections of 1994—realising a key aim of the former OAU. Many former one-
party dictatorships had fallen across Africa during the 1990s, bringing into political power a new 
crop of African leaderships whose relationships with one another had helped the entry of the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) into Rwanda to end the genocide, also in 1994. 
 Given these new African leaderships, the Constitutive Act could and did set out stronger 
normative standards on democracy, human rights and the rule of law for Africa as a whole. These 
included new limitations on state sovereignty and an end to non-intervention on the commission 
of international crimes (crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes). 
 The first few years of the new millennium, therefore, saw numerous legislative, policy and 
institutional advances by and within the AU. Its human rights architecture evolved with the 
creation of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights to complement the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Its peace and security architecture also evolved, driven by the 
Peace and Security Council (PSC) and its Panel of the Wise, decisions from which are, in theory, 
implemented through relevant regional economic communities (RECs). Economically, continental 
integration remained the goal, to be realised through the fast-tracking of the full monetary 
integration of each of the RECs. And Africa’s relationship with the rest of the world was intended 
to be on the basis of the exchange envisioned in the New Partnership for African Development 
(NEPAD)—with Africa addressing its own governance challenges through the African Peer 
9 
 
Review Mechanism (APRM) in return for more substantial external investments in African 
development. 
 But the import and meaning of these advances at the continental level within AU member 
states has varied. The effects are perhaps most easily assessed in countries on the verge of, in or 
emerging from conflict—and in which international crimes are being committed. For it is in such 
countries that the AU’s professed new will and true capacities to generate ‘African solutions for 
African problems’ can be seen. 
 Kenya has always had an uncertain attitude to these advances. While Kenya has 
traditionally played the role of an anchor state for east Africa and the Horn, it has been sceptical 
of ideological commitments to pan-Africanism and pragmatic in its dealings with the continent as 
well as the rest of the world. It did not therefore, as it arguably could have, join the five or so 
African countries leading the changes within the AU or driving the NEPAD. 
However, with respect to conflict resolution, Kenya has always played a leading role within 
the REC of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)—responsible for responses 
to conflicts in the Horn such as those in Somalia and the (former) Sudan—now South Sudan and 
Sudan. This role is equally pragmatic, however, given Kenya’s borders with these countries and 
its hosting, until recently, of the bulk of the Somali and South Sudanese refugee communities 
generated by these conflicts. Similarly, given the expansion of Kenyan professionals and the 
Kenyan private sector into east Africa and the rest of the Horn, it has become fully engaged in 
developments within the REC of the East African Community (EAC)—whose integration process 
has reached the stage of customs union. 
More recently, however, Kenya’s attitude to the AU has changed. In 2008, the violence 
that followed the 2007 General Elections left over 1,000 people dead and half a million internally 
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displaced. The AU’s response was uncharacteristically efficient and swift. Against the wishes of 
the political party that had controversially claimed the Kenyan presidency, the AU intervened 
through the appointment of a Panel of Eminent African Personalities headed by former United 
Nations (UN) Secretary-General Kofi Annan to mediate a political settlement to end the violence. 
Equally uncharacteristically, the rest of the international community placed its full weight behind 
the Panel—providing not just financial and technical support for its deliberations but also the 
requisite ‘carrots and sticks’ to ensure that political parties first sat down at the negotiating table 
and then reached a political settlement in the form of power-sharing. 
Domestic pressure and substantive contributions from Kenyan civil society and the private 
sector eventually ensured a comprehensive set of mediation agreements. These exceeded the 
political settlement of power-sharing between the two political parties, also addressing the 
electoral failure and the subsequent violence as well as long-standing demands for constitutional, 
electoral, security sector and judicial reforms. The Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation 
(KNDR) thus stands today as one of the AU’s success stories—for reaching a political settlement 
that ended the violence as well as for covering, through its Road Map, agenda and agreements, not 
only the trigger for the violence that ensued from the electoral conflict but also its proximate and 
more structural causes. 
But the KNDR also marked the beginning of a new engagement by the Government of 
Kenya (GoK) with the AU. The GoK was taken aback by the continent’s response to what it had 
tried to portray as a manageable electoral hiccup, and determined to avoid a similar situation in 
future. It has since sought to restore and more actively play its role as eastern Africa’s anchor state. 
It has involved itself in the effort against piracy along the Somali coast and in the internationally 
backed African counter-terrorism and peacekeeping effort within Somalia. The latter began in its 
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surprise military offensive in Somalia against the jihadist al Shabaab—an offensive later endorsed 
by the AU with the Kenyan Defence Force (KDF) joining the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). 
It has also sought to use the AU to challenge the cases of the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
against the current President and Vice-President concerning the violence resulting from the 
electoral conflict of 2007-8. And while implementation of the mediation agreements proceeded 
from 2008 to 13, it became clear that neither the proximate nor structural causes were being 
addressed in the manner intended, becoming pro forma and technical rather than political. 
Taking the AU’s intervention through mediation in Kenya’s 2007-8 electoral conflict as a 
case study, the key or primary research questions have to do, therefore, with determining the 
conditions under which supranational institutions intervene in member states, thereby limiting 
sovereignty, in order to realise their normative commitments, critically examining the nature and 
consequences of such interventions. Additional research questions here have to do with 
determining what provides leverage in respect of such interventions. 
 It could be argued that the questionable presidential results of 2007-8 amounted to an 
unconstitutional change of government—prohibited by the AU’s Constitutive Act. In addition, the 
Constitutive Act enabled AU intervention in Kenya given that the violence resulting from the 
electoral conflict was ultimately deemed to amount to crimes against humanity. In practice, 
however, it is unlikely that AU concerns about democratisation or even the responsibility to protect 
(R2P) were the primary motivations behind the AU’s intervention through mediation given the 
economic consequences of the violence on transit trade and AU member states within the 
hinterland such as Rwanda and Uganda. In any case, the AU itself had little capacity to intervene 
through mediation in Kenya’s electoral conflict of 2007-8, as well as little material leverage to 
ensure that parties to the electoral conflict both submitted to the intervention through mediation in 
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the first place and then reached a political settlement in the form of power-sharing. Thus Kenya 
could have ignored the AU’s intervention through mediation but chose not to.  
 Why then did the AU intervene through mediation? And what made Kenya comply? Was 
it the international backing of the AU’s Panel? Partially. But key long-standing bilateral partners 
also had little material leverage over Kenya. Before the 2007 General Elections, Kenya had 
registered a seven per cent economic growth rate—ensuring the financing of 95 per cent of its 
recurrent budget and 50 per cent of its development budget through Kenyan taxpayers alone. 
Overseas development assistance (ODA) could be done without in a pinch. Further, key new 
bilateral partners to whom Kenya had turned for infrastructural investment, such as China, tend to 
retain more traditional notions of state sovereignty and treat matters of democracy, human rights 
and rule of law as being solely internal. 
 While ‘carrots’ could have been offered by the rest of the international community, what 
was left as leverage therefore to key older bilateral partners seems to have been the ‘sticks’ of 
individual, personalised and targeted sanctions—together with the risk of Kenya’s credit ratings 
falling as a result of the symbolic stopping of some ODA payments. This was combined with 
domestic pressure from Kenyan civil society and, more importantly (to the GoK), the Kenyan 
private sector. Economic growth and its assumed enabling of ‘trickle-down’ had arguably placed 
the GoK in a position of relative autonomy from the region and the rest of the international 
community, while needing to manage domestic demands. Threats to continued economic growth 
may therefore have been viewed as critical. Thus, the hypothesis is that it was the combination of 
regional with international and domestic pressures that ensured the ‘success’ of the AU’s 
intervention through mediation. This is particularly so given that the KNDR found a political 
settlement in the form of power-sharing that nominally satisfied demands all round for political 
13 
 
power—and that, importantly, wasn’t unusual as it was not the first but the third ‘elite pact’ in 
Kenya’s political transition and process of democratic consolidation. 
That said, it has been clear since 2008 that the GoK intends to ensure such coalescing of 
domestic, regional and international pressures cannot occur again in the same way. Hence the new 
alacrity with which Kenya is now engaging with the AU. Given the nature and purposes of that 
engagement, the secondary set of research questions has to do with critically examining the 
meaning of ‘African solutions for African problems’, as well as the intended and unintended 
impacts of the same. In addition, domestically, the political settlement in the form of power-sharing 
lauded as a ‘success’ was actually the third in a series of ‘elite pacts’ in Kenya—and thus ultimately 
gave rise to the same contradictions and dilemmas of the two previous ‘elite pacts’. The hypothesis 
here is that, consonant with predictions of the ‘liberal peace’, the political settlement in the form 
of power-sharing itself, in the medium-to-long term, contributed to undermining implementation 
of the KNDR agreements with respect to addressing proximate and structural causes of the 
violence—undermining democratic consolidation and mitigating against accountability. 
 
1.2 The significance of the research questions 
The AU’s intervention through mediation in Kenya’s 2007-8 electoral conflict is taken as a case 
study for several reasons. First, the number of electoral conflicts within Africa is rising yet the 
AU’s intervention through mediation in Kenya’s 2007-8 electoral conflict was one of its first. The 
case thus illustrates not only the AU’s right to intervene and the challenges thereof—such as 
sovereignty and capacity—but also considers the questions of how, by whom, to what intended 
ends and with what intended and unintended consequences.  
14 
 
Second, by demonstrating both why the AU intervened and why the intervention was 
deemed a ‘success’, the case study will contribute to understanding both the conditions under 
which an intervention does occur and factors contributing to its ‘success’. These include here a 
productive relationship between the AU and the UN with respect to preventive diplomacy and the 
alignment of regional with international and domestic actors and interests.  
Third, the case study will contribute to critically assessing measures of ‘success’—
including here the contradictions and dilemmas posed by political settlements that amount to ‘elite 
pacting’, ultimately to the detriment of the ability of even a comprehensive set of mediation 
agreements to address the medium- and longer-term proximate and structural causes of electoral 
conflict, democratisation and accountability. This is in line with predictions of the ‘liberal peace’. 
 
1.3 The structure of the thesis 
This introductory chapter spells out the research questions, their significance and how the thesis is 
structured to address them.  Chapter Two explains the research methodologies used: the case 
study; the literature review; semi-structured elite interviews; and archival materials and research. 
It also highlights the limitations of the research methodology— both those inherent to the chosen 
research methodologies chosen and those experienced during fieldwork—and how the researcher 
tried to address them. 
 Chapter Three is a background or contextual chapter. It situates the political settlement 
reached as a result of the AU’s intervention in Kenya’s electoral conflict of 2007-8 in the context 
of previous political settlements reached in Kenya’s history of democratisation. It does so first to 
explain why the General Elections of 2007 triggered an electoral conflict and to highlight the more 
fundamental proximate and structural causes of that electoral conflict. Second (and more 
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importantly), Chapter Three highlights the problems inherent in previous political settlements in 
Kenya to lay the ground for a later assessment of the extent to which the KNDR did (or did not) 
definitively address these problems. Thus, focused on the political transition of 2002, Chapter 
Three reviews the factors enabling that transition as well as factors that ultimately mitigated 
against its ability to be truly transformative. Again, this is to enable the later assessment of the 
KNDR’s intention and impact.  
 Chapter Four focuses on the case study—the AU’s intervention in Kenya’s electoral 
conflict of 2007-8. The research findings are used to explore the trigger to the conflict as well as 
its proximate and structural causes. They are also used to explain how the intervention was agreed 
to as well as the content of the intervention. The roles played by different actors, internal and 
external, are detailed in relation to both realising the intervention and informing its substantive 
content. Particular attention is paid, internally, to the roles of non-political actors and, externally, 
to the AU. Finally, the outcomes and impact of the intervention are detailed, in both the short and 
the medium-to-long term, highlighting what enabled those impacts and what gives rise to caution 
about their being termed a ‘success’. 
 Chapter Five is another background or contextual chapter. It focuses on the transition of 
the OAU to the AU as well as the political, economic and institutional imperatives for and 
expectations of that transition. It spells out the normative and institutional differences between the 
OAU and the AU, preparatory to assessing the effectiveness of the new AU. This assessment is 
done by using the research findings on the implications for (electoral) conflict resolution arising 
from the AU’s intervention in Kenya’s electoral conflict of 2007-8. 
 Chapter Six goes on to explore and problematise the notion of ‘African solutions for 
African problems’. Using the research findings, it shows the different ways in which the AU’s 
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intervention in Kenya’s electoral conflict of 2007-8 is understood as being an ‘African solution’ 
(or not). It explains factors that led, in practice, to a decision by the AU to intervene as well as 
what makes a member state agree to such an intervention. It outlines the objectives, model and 
advantages of such interventions and surfaces determinants of an intervention’s ‘success’, or 
otherwise, as well as measures of such ‘success’. It also explores the evolving relationship between 
the AU and the UN concerning conflict resolution in Africa. 
 Chapter Seven presents the conclusions of this thesis, referencing back to the original 
research questions and their hypotheses. It summarises the conditions under which supranational 
institutions decide to intervene and what provides leverage for such interventions. The two key 
conclusions here are the importance of a domestic base to legitimise and give real meaning to an 
external intervention and the importance of domestic and international actors for regional actors’ 
interventions to occur and to ‘succeed’. Chapter Seven also, however, critically analyses the nature 
and medium-to-long-term consequences of such interventions, noting that political settlements 
inevitably mitigate against addressing—in full—the proximate and structural causes of conflict 
and accountability. It therefore challenges the notion of any ‘African solutions’ predicated on 
political settlements. The thesis ends with a bibliography and the list of respondents for the 
research.   
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2. Methodology 
2.1 Introduction 
Using the case study of the AU’s intervention in Kenya’s electoral crisis of 2007-8, the key or 
primary research questions this thesis seeks to answer are to determine: 
• the conditions under which supranational institutions intervene in member states; 
• the nature of such interventions; 
• what provides leverage for such interventions; 
• the measures of such interventions’ ‘success’ or ‘failure’; 
• the determinants of ‘success’ or ‘failure’; 
• the short-, medium- and long-term consequences, intended and unintended, of such 
interventions; 
• how those consequences correspond to the measures of ‘success’ or ‘failure’. 
The thesis then extrapolates from the case study to critically examine the AU’s model for 
addressing (electoral) conflict as well as the meaning of its ‘African solutions for African 
problems’. 
 
2.2 The case study 
Case studies can be selected: on the basis of variance with respect to an independent or dependent 
variable; randomly; to fit a given theory; or with respect to representivity. The AU’s intervention 
through mediation in Kenya’s 2007-8 electoral conflict is selected here to illustrate an AU 
intervention through mediation in an electoral conflict. While it proved difficult to establish a 
counterfactual, the hypotheses associated with the research questions are tested against other case 
studies referenced (although not in the same depth) to make generalisations through both semi-
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structured elite interviews and archival materials/research. These situate the case study within a(n 
incomplete) range of possible case studies including those where the AU has intervened in an 
electoral conflict and not been deemed ‘successful’ (testing here the variables enabling success). 
That said, it is not the intention of this thesis to be either fully comparative or quantitative—
the latter in the sense of being able to definitively infer from the case study findings applicable to 
the entire field of possible case studies. The purpose of the above interrogation is to be merely 
indicative of the fact that alternative hypotheses could and do exist for both: 
• what enabled the AU’s intervention in Kenya to be deemed ‘successful’ in the immediate or 
short term (or what ‘x’, independent or explanatory factors enabling ‘success’, best correlates 
with ‘y’, the dependent or response ‘success’); and  
• what explains the intended and unintended consequences of that intervention through 
mediation in the medium-to-long term (what ‘x’, factors complicating implementation, best 
correlates with ‘y’, non-implementation). 
 
2.3 The literature review 
The literature addressed relates to: (Kenyan) democratisation and political transition; (African) 
regional integration; delegation, state sovereignty and intervention under regional governance 
systems and their growing place in and in relation to global governance systems; the ‘liberal peace’ 
and electoral conflict resolution. 
As concerns the case study, literature on democratisation in Kenya is focused largely on 
political transition, the political instrumentalisation of ethnicity during electoral periods and the 
consequences of this for conflict. While some literature has developed in relation to the role of the 
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AU in the 2007-8 crisis, there is a lack with respect to how the same addressed (or rather, did not 
address) historical continuities that have always hindered structural reform. 
In addition, the literature on political transition has not yet sufficiently engaged with the 
intended and unintended consequences of conflict resolution on the process of democratic 
consolidation and accountability. While there has been some critique of the negative impacts of 
the KNDR on Kenya’s democratic consolidation process and accountability, that has not yet been 
placed within the critical literature about the ‘liberal peace’. 
As concerns the notion of ‘African solutions for African problems’, earlier literature on the 
OAU focused on realist, liberal institutionalist and structuralist challenges to African regional 
integration. However, current literature on the AU is underdeveloped and largely liberal-
institutionalist, focused more on whether or not the AU will be able to address the economic and 
institutional rationales for its transition. There is a lack of realist and, in particular, structuralist 
analyses which re-focus on whether the AU will be able to address the political rationale for the 
transition, including its normative shift from state to human security and how best to realise that 
through its ability to intervene. There is also a lack of critical analyses of the AU’s peace and 
security architecture which problematise its notion of, approach to and models for ‘African 
solutions for African problems’. 
Finally, the liberal-institutionalist literature on delegation is largely focused on the 
European regional integration project (or the federation of the United States). Analysis of the 
African integration project provides different or new insights into the theory’s applicability and 
relevance outside Europe—as well as different or new insights into, in particular, the AU’s 
institutional arrangements. 
 
20 
 
2.4 Semi-structured elite interviews 
Semi-structured elite interviews were carried out for this thesis with representatives of the 
following groups. 
• The AU (in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia): 
o relevant political and professional staff during the period and at present; 
o the lead mediator of the Panel of Eminent African Personalities. 
• The RECs (in Nairobi, Kenya): 
o mediators in other conflict situations. 
• Kenyan domestic actors (in Nairobi, Kenya): 
o parties to the electoral conflict (members of the negotiating teams for both sides); 
o relevant public ‘insiders’ (professional staff of Vision 2030); 
o relevant civil society actors (engaged academics; the two key civil society umbrellas at the 
time; the women’s umbrella); 
o relevant private-sector actors. 
• The UN and the development, defence and diplomatic community (in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 
and Nairobi, Kenya). 
A list of interviews is included at the end of this thesis. 
As the elite interviews were semi-structured, sets of guiding questions rather than formal 
and strict questionnaires were used, and these differed for each category of respondent. For 
external actors (related to the AU, the RECs and the UN), interviews covered the AU’s intervention 
in Kenya’s 2007-8 electoral conflict (its impetus, the respondent’s engagement or involvement, 
their interests, their assessment of the short-, medium- and long-term consequences and analysis 
or interpretation thereof). For domestic actors, in addition to the above, questions also covered the 
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links between the AU’s intervention in Kenya’s 2007-8 electoral conflict with Kenya’s 
democratisation process (analysis or interpretation of Kenya’s political transition of 2002, its 
achievement and failures and continuities through implementation of the KNDR agreements). 
The interview notes were typed by the researcher while speaking to the respondents. 
Quotations from the interview notes used in the text are therefore close to verbatim, but not entirely 
verbatim (accounting for the clipped nature of some of the quotations). 
 
2.5 Archival materials and research 
The Panel of Eminent African Personalities, when winding down at the end of 2013, following the 
first General Elections under the new Constitution of Kenya, compiled and donated almost all its 
materials to the Kenya National Archives in Nairobi. In addition, the researcher already had a 
fairly comprehensive collection of press statements, position papers and articles and non-academic 
reports generated by domestic and external actors from 2008. These grey materials were reviewed 
to extract data relating to the interests and demands of all categories of actors at the time to 
determine their reflection (or not) in the KNDR agreements. Data was also reviewed for any 
predictions made at the time with respect to intended and unintended consequences weighed 
against whether or not those predictions came to pass. 
 
2.6 Methodological limitations 
Access to some of the elite respondents presented some difficulties, even though the researcher 
had been involved in the mediation process as a key civil society actor and thus had a political and 
professional relationship with most of the intended informants, enabling her access. For example, 
Dr Salim Ahmed Salim, the former Secretary-General of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) 
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had granted an interview but the researcher was unable to go to Tanzania to conduct it at the time 
when he was available. Similarly, Raila Odinga, Principal of one of the parties and Prime Minister 
under the Grand Coalition Government, had granted an interview but his schedule made it difficult 
to meet, despite repeated scheduling attempts. Negotiators from the other party remained hostile 
and unresponsive throughout—although the researcher did finally manage to interview one of their 
negotiators who subsequently became Minister for Justice under the Grand Coalition Government. 
Finally, all heads of Northern/Western diplomatic missions who played critical roles at the time 
had since been deployed elsewhere. While the Dutch Ambassador at the time had also granted an 
interview, her movements made it difficult to schedule the same. 
The quality of data collected through elite interviews can be affected by memory and recall 
problems, the dominance of ‘official’ narratives over time, and problems of subjectivity and 
representivity. These problems were (somewhat) mitigated by the fact that, in the main, the guiding 
questions concerned a landmark event for all categories of actors at the time. All data collected 
was cross-referenced and triangulated with respect to questions of fact. However, the purpose of 
this thesis is to determine different subjective opinions and understandings of the same landmark 
event—including over time. In addition, the data collected from the semi-structured elite 
interviews was also assessed against contemporary grey materials generated by most of the 
categories of actors, and included in the researcher’s personal archive.  
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3. Kenya’s political transition of 2002: background to the General Elections of 2007  
This chapter is a background or contextual chapter. It situates the political settlement reached as a 
result of the AU’s intervention in Kenya’s electoral conflict of 2007-8 in the context of previous 
political settlements reached in Kenya’s history of democratisation. It does so, first, to explain why 
the General Elections of 2007 triggered an electoral conflict and to surface the more fundamental 
proximate and structural causes of that electoral conflict. Second (and more importantly), this 
chapter highlights the problems inherent to previous political settlements in Kenya to lay the 
ground for a later assessment of the extent to which the KNDR did (or did not) definitively address 
these problems. Focusing on the political transition of 2002, this chapter reviews the factors that 
enabled that transition as well as those that ultimately mitigated against its ability to be truly 
transformative. Again, this is to enable the assessment below in this thesis of the KNDR’s intention 
and ability to transcend the latter set of factors. 
 
3.1 Concepts and theory 
A political transition refers to the interval between one political system and another. In a transition, 
old political elites can be newly legitimised or new ones can take power.1 Thus, any transition is 
unique, its process can be non-linear and both its process and its outcomes can be uncertain.2 
Agency matters in the sense that ruling political parties’ internal dynamics and political actors’ 
strategic choices can affect both the process and outcomes of a given transition.3 But structure and 
institutions matter too. Structural and institutional constraints as well as international conjuncture 
                                                          
1 Brown, Stephen (2004) ‘Theorising Kenya’s Protracted Transition to Democracy’, Journal of Contemporary 
African Studies 22:3 September 2004, p 325. 
2 O’Donnell and Schmitter, cited in Brown (2004), p 325. 
3 Brown (2004), p 331. 
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can set the stage for a transition.4 Conversely, the exercise of agency, more often than not, only 
temporarily suspends structural constraints,5 such as economic conditions and international 
conjuncture.6 
In Africa’s neo-patrimonial political systems, factors influencing transitions include 
divisions within ruling political parties—as well as between ruling and opposition political 
parties—based on who is inside and outside patronage networks as well as the combination of 
domestic and international pressure.7 African transitions since the 1990s have thus been more 
about authoritarian breakdown than democratic consolidation, whether the latter is considered in 
minimalist terms—as the conduct of ‘free and fair’ elections—or in broader terms.8 That said, the 
process and outcomes of political transitions and democratic consolidation have not been entirely 
separate either.9 
 
3.2 Background to and context for the political transition of 2002 
Until 2002, Kenya was considered to be ‘one of Africa’s most notorious cases of stalled democratic 
transition’.10 Amendments to its independence Constitution of 1963 had limited freedoms, 
replaced devolution with centralisation, created de jure one-party rule under the ruling Kenya 
African National Union (KANU) and weakened the parliamentary system by concentrating powers 
in the presidency. With no separation of powers, checks and balances or accountability, this had 
led to personalised rule and patronage, prevented the establishment of a meritocracy within the 
                                                          
4 Brown (2004), p 339. 
5 Guilhot and Schmitter, cited in Brown (2004), p 339. 
6 Brown (2004), p 339. 
7 Brown (2004), p 325. 
8 Brown (2004), p 326. 
9 Brown (2004), p 328. 
10 Ndegwa, Stephen N (2003) ‘Kenya: third time lucky?’ Journal of Democracy 14:3 July 2003, p 145. 
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civil service and heightened systemic discrimination along ethnic lines that dated back to the 
colonial era.11 
In 1991, however, then President Daniel arap Moi ceded to domestic pressure and repealed 
Section 2A of the Constitution, ending de jure one-party rule and enabling the return of political 
pluralism.12 A further constitutional amendment set a limit of two five-year terms for the 
presidency.13 
But opposition political parties lost the General Elections of 1992 and 1997—both of which 
resulted in presidential wins for Moi and parliamentary majorities for KANU.14 Given the 
distribution of the presidential and parliamentary vote (with the presidential candidates of 
opposition political parties accruing, collectively, more votes than Moi), this was attributed in part 
to lack of unity among opposition political parties. However, the constitutional, legal and political 
context was still incompatible with competitive politics, all characterised by a lack of access, 
equity and transparency.15 Of specific concern were laws dating back to the colonial era, when 
they were used to contain and repress anti-colonial political activity. These laws limited the 
freedoms of expression (the Public Order Act and provisions on sedition in the Penal Code) and 
association (the Preservation of Public Security, the Chiefs’ Authority and the Societies Acts).16 
They enabled security to be invoked to inhibit political activity (emergency regulations as well as 
the Outlying and Special Districts, Administration Police and Vagrancy Acts). And they 
                                                          
11 Cottrell, Jill and Ghai, Yash Pal (2007) ‘Constitution-Making and Democratisation in Kenya (2000-2005)’, 
Democratisation 14:1, p 3. 
12 Brown (2004), pp 326-7. 
13 Brown (2004), p 329. 
14 Brown (2004), p 327. 
15 Ndegwa, Stephen N (1998) ‘The Incomplete Transition: the constitutional and electoral context in Kenya’, Africa 
Today 45:2 April-June 1988, p 193. 
16 Ndegwa (1998), pp 198-202. 
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specifically spoke to elections and political financing (the National Assembly and Presidential 
Elections, Electoral Offenses and Public Collections Acts).17 
In addition, gerrymandering and Moi/KANU’s control of the electoral management body 
as well as the public broadcaster continued to ensure an uneven playing field, tilted in favour of 
Moi and KANU. Politically instigated, so-called ‘ethnic cleansing’, particularly at the Coast and 
in the Rift Valley—Moi’s backyard and KANU’s stronghold—occurred as voter registration began 
prior to the General Elections of both 1992 and 1997 in an attempt to create ethnically and assumed 
politically homogenous voting blocs.18 Voter intimidation and ballot-box stuffing was 
widespread.19 Thus, resistance from Moi/KANU—together with external support of the status quo 
in 1992 and 1997 by external endorsement of sub-standard elections—mitigated against a win by 
opposition political parties.20 
That said, opposition political parties had broken from civil society and negotiated with 
Moi/KANU what became known as the Inter-Parties Parliamentary Group (IPPG) reforms before 
the General Elections of 1997—despite the fact that KANU controlled the House and could shape 
even the IPPG reforms in its favour.21 The IPPG reforms included omnibus legislation amending 
or repealing of some of the legislation mentioned above and resulting in the Constitution of Kenya 
Amendment Act and the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission (CKRC) Act.22 
Coming too late to make a difference to the 1997 electoral process and outcomes, however, 
the IPPG reforms were thus also not comprehensive and undermined public momentum for 
                                                          
17 Ndegwa (1998), p 197. 
18 Ajulu, Rok (1995) ‘The Left and the Question of Democratic Transition in Kenya: a reply to Mwakenya’, Review 
of African Political Economy 22:64 June 1995, p 232; Brown (2004), p 327. 
19 Brown (2004), p 327. 
20 Brown (2004), p 338. 
21 Ndegwa (1998), p 202. 
22 Ndegwa (1998), p 203. 
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comprehensive constitutional reforms. They did not affect presidential powers, including on 
appointments under the CKRC Act, 1997. 
In reaction, civil society, under the leadership of the Ufungamano Initiative, had set up the 
People’s Commission of Kenya.23 Professor Yash Pal Ghai, appointed by the President as Chair 
of the CKRC, had accepted that appointment on condition that the two initiatives be merged. 
Through his mediation, they eventually were, under the Constitution of Kenya Review Act, 2000 
(amended in 2001) with representation from both on the CKRC.24 
The CKRC had been tasked to seek views from the public on comprehensive constitutional 
reforms and prepare a draft Constitution for consideration by a representative National 
Constitutional Conference (NCC) of 629 members in total—all of parliament, district and political 
party representatives and members of civil society. The draft negotiated by the NCC was then to 
be enacted by parliament, led by the Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC) on the Constitution.25 
The CKRC proceeded to collect public views by opening up a process of public 
submissions, convening constitutional hearings in each of the 210 constituencies and establishing 
a coordinator and library in each of the 74 districts. It received over 37,000 submissions, in addition 
to reports from the 201 constituency hearings.26 Instructively, the response of political parties was 
insufficient, with their submissions being ‘late... poorly conceived and thin in terms of ideas’.27 
The response of the women’s movement, in contrast, was coordinated and united, seeking to secure 
gains regarding political representation and land rights.28 
                                                          
23 Cottrell and Ghai (2007), p 5. 
24 Cottrell and Ghai (2007), p 5. 
25 Cottrell and Ghai (2007), p 6. 
26 Cottrell and Ghai (2007), p 9. 
27 Cottrell and Ghai (2007), p 10. 
28 Cottrell and Ghai (2007), p 11. 
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As Kenya headed to the General Elections of 2002, the CKRC had begun the convening of 
the NCC. The results were a presidential win for Mwai Kibaki of the National Rainbow Coalition 
(NARC) and a parliamentary majority for NARC as well. The stalling was deemed over as political 
transition had finally occurred, significant in that the incumbent President had retired, respecting 
the presidential term limits secured in 1991. A political party which had governed Kenya for over 
four decades was out of power and opposition political parties had gone into the General Election 
united under NARC.29 
 
3.3 Factors enabling the political transition of 2002 
3.3.1 Agency 
Domestic and international pressure was consistent in 2002. The public had benefited from civic 
education conducted as part of the CKRC’s mandate30 and the political participation its process 
engendered. Civil society had brokered initial discussions on opposition political party unity and 
come out publicly in support of the NARC. The security services had made clear their preferences 
regarding Moi’s need to respect the presidential term limits and retire,31 as had bilateral and 
multilateral organisations, including the international financial institutions (IFIs).32 However, the 
strategic decisions of individuals and political parties mattered,33 with three factors being of 
particular significance: the handling of succession within KANU; the achievement of opposition 
unity; and KANU’s diminished ability to instigate political violence. 
                                                          
29 Murunga, Godwin R and Nasong’o, Shadrack W (2006) ‘Bent on Self-Destruction: the Kibaki regime in Kenya’, 
Journal of Contemporary African Studies 24:1, p 2. 
30 Brown (2004), p 328. 
31 From conversation with Sally Kosgei, then head of the civil service, during the first review conference of the 
Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) in Geneva, Switzerland, referring to the convening of a 
farewell party for former President Daniel arap Moi by the heads of the Kenya Defence Forces and other security 
services and the messaging conveyed by the same. 
32 Cottrell and Ghai (2007), p 4. 
33 Ndegwa (2003), p 147. 
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The handling of succession within KANU34 
Political party formation in Kenya has historically reflected two tendencies. First, restrictions 
dating back to the colonial era limited political activity to what were then ethnically homogenous 
areas. Second, formation was around political party leaders who offer financial (as well as 
intellectual) patronage, with a founding core linked by personal ties—family, clan, ethnic and 
otherwise—using ethnicity as a basis for the political party’s reach.35 
This results in ‘unbounded politics’—that is in political parties and their alignments being 
easily formed and equally easily abandoned on the basis of whether those political parties and 
alignments advance the interests of the leadership and the founding core, as well as those of the 
ethnic communities they ostensibly serve.36 Critical factors in the capturing and retention of power 
are thus the electoral (numerical) weight of the ethnic community involved as well as the ability 
of the political party’s leadership and founding core to craft alliances and coalitions.37 This has 
been apparent since de jure one-party rule came to an end in 1991. 
Going into the 2002 General Elections, given domestic and international pressure to respect 
presidential term limits, Moi’s strategy was to retain the chairmanship of KANU as well the loyalty 
of those within KANU with presidential ambitions, while expanding KANU’s political support 
base.38 He had tried to woo the Gikuyu back into KANU by nominating Uhuru Kenyatta, the son 
of Kenya’s first President, Jomo Kenyatta, into parliament despite his having lost the parliamentary 
election in 1997 and then appointed him into the Cabinet as Minister for Local Government. He 
                                                          
34 Ndegwa (2003), p 150; Steeves, Jeffrey (2006) ‘Presidential Succession in Kenya: the transition from Moi to 
Kibaki,’ Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 44:2, pp 211-233. 
35 Ndegwa, Stephen N (1997) ‘Citizenship and Ethnicity: an examination of two transition moments in Kenyan 
politics’, The American Political Science Review 91:3 September 1997, p 604. 
36 Steeves, cited in Steeves (2006), p 215. 
37 Steeves (2006), p 215. 
38 Steeves (2006), p 216. 
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then turned to the Luo.39 Raila Odinga’s National Democratic Party (NDP) was absorbed into 
KANU in three stages: an initial stage of ‘cooperation;’ a second stage of ‘partnership’ in August 
2001;40 and a third and final stage of ‘merger’ in March 2002.41 
Kenyatta had neither credibility, given his previous loss at the polls, nor experience. Yet, 
Moi unilaterally selected Kenyatta as his successor, without a political-party process. Personally, 
Moi may have believed Kenyatta was guidable—and that, given his family, he would share Moi’s 
concerns regarding protection from prosecution and wealth protection.42 Politically, as the Gikuyu 
are the majority ethnic group, he may have believed that Kenyatta’s presidential bid would 
effectively divide the Gikuyu vote between Kenyatta and Kibaki.43 However, he both over-
estimated Kenyatta’s appeal and under-estimated the alienation he created within KANU itself.44 
Odinga united all potential presidential candidates within KANU under the Rainbow 
Alliance.45 When it became clear that Moi would hold his ground on Kenyatta as his designated 
successor, the Rainbow Alliance left KANU to form the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP),46 
ultimately enabling a decisive re-configuration of political party alliances and coalitions.47 
Odinga’s ‘strategic moves... brought the KANU regime to an end. Indeed, Odinga is the mirror 
image of the unbounded politics leader’.48 For KANU had changed from a ‘deeply divided party 
to an eviscerated one. Moi’s key ethnic coalition... designed to sweep KANU back into power had 
collapsed.’49 
                                                          
39 Ndegwa (2003), p 150. 
40 Steeves (2006), p 215. 
41 Steeves (2006), p 217. 
42 Brown (2004), p 330. 
43 Brown (2004), p 332. 
44 Brown (2004), p 331. 
45 Steeves (2006), p 219. 
46 Brown (2004), p 331; Ndegwa (2003), p 150. 
47 Brown (2004), p 336. 
48 Steeves (2006), p 229. 
49 Steeves (2006), p 220. 
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The achievement of opposition unity 
Given Moi/KANU control over the electoral process, the lack of opposition unity may have been 
overstated as cause for its 1992 and 1997 defeat.50 However, in 2002, the winning presidential 
candidate had a larger share of the presidential vote than in 1992 and 1997 and Kibaki’s share was 
above that of all opposition presidential challengers in 1992 and 1997. In this sense, ‘2002 was a 
victory ten years delayed’.51 
Civil society had laid the ground for opposition unity in 1992 and 1997 and it finally 
brokered and mediated the same in 2002.52 There had been some learning within opposition 
political parties from 1992 and 1997.53 In addition, there was external encouragement of the 
same—but the challenge of agreeing on a single presidential candidate remained.54 However, the 
September 2002 KANU-NDP merger finally provoked a response—the National Alliance of 
Kenya (NAK) was formed, settling for Kibaki as its presidential candidate on agreement that he 
would assume office for only one five-year term.55 In October 2002, following the exodus of the 
Rainbow Alliance from KANU and the formation of the LDP, the LDP merged with NAK under 
the NARC, again settling for Kibaki as the presidential candidate on agreement that he would 
assume office for only one five-year term. In addition, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 
was drawn up between LDP and NAK promising, within the context of the comprehensive 
constitutional reforms process, to create the position of Prime Minister for Odinga and share 
                                                          
50 Brown (2004), p 331. 
51 Ndegwa (2003), p 148. 
52 Ndegwa (2003), p 152. 
53 Ndegwa (2003), p 152; Steeves (2006), p 218. 
54 Brown (2004), p 331. 
55 Brown (2004), p 331; Ndegwa (2003), p 151. 
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Cabinet positions between LDP and NAK.56 And NARC’s constituent political parties all agreed 
to field only one NARC candidate in each constituency.57 
The NARC rolled out its campaign with a message presenting Kenyatta as continuity from 
Moi—‘Uhuru na Moi’—and itself as change.58 Civil society and the media provided an enabling 
environment for the public’s reception of the message.59 In the end, Kibaki achieved—given the 
proxy votes for him from the ethnic communities represented within the NARC’s ‘Pentagon’ of 
political party leadership—62.2 per cent of the presidential vote over Kenyatta’s 31.3 per cent.60 
 
KANU’s diminished ability to instigate political violence 
Relative to the General Elections of 1992 and 1997, the General Elections of 2002 saw much less 
politically instigated violence and at lower levels. The extent to which political violence would 
have decisively and negatively affected NARC’s estimated two-to-one lead over KANU in opinion 
polls may have been minimal.61 At a mass/public level, it may be that the elections were ‘de-
tribalised’ given that the Gikuyu vote was split and, overall, ethnic/political divisions were less 
clear.62 More tellingly, however, the LDP included former KANU ‘hardliners’ who were allegedly 
most responsible for previous political violence.63 Thus, their exodus into the NARC effectively 
ended KANU’s monopoly over organised political violence,64 especially as the security services 
had already discreetly made their preferences known and were unlikely to intervene at the behest 
                                                          
56 Brown (2004), p 332. 
57 Ndegwa (2003), p 149. 
58 Steeves (2006), p 221. 
59 Steeves (2006), p 223. 
60 Murunga and Nasong’o (2006), p 17. 
61 Brown (2004), p 332. 
62 Brown (2004), p 333; Steeves (2006), p 225. 
63 Brown (2004), p 332. 
64 Brown (2004), p 336. 
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of Moi/KANU.65 In addition, it may be that a Kibaki presidency was not, ultimately, deemed 
threatening to the KANU ‘hardliners’ who remained within KANU.66 In the end, both Kenyatta 
and Moi accepted the election results.67 
 
3.3.2 Structure and institutions 
Moi/KANU’s neo-patrimonialism may have been somewhat reduced by structural changes 
introduced by the IFIs under structural adjustment from the 1980s onwards. But additional 
structural changes arose from the incremental democratisation conceded to by Moi/KANU from 
the 1990s on. Notable here were the institutional constraints of presidential term limits, the 
invocation of the same by opposition political parties, civil society and external actors and Moi’s 
decision, eventually, to abide by them.68 In addition, the institutional re-structuring anticipated 
under the process of comprehensive constitutional reforms and their perceived direction—
particularly the inclusion in the CKRC’s draft Constitution of the position of Prime Minister—was 
important in helping NARC agree to support Kibaki as its presidential candidate.69 Finally, the 
assertion by the Electoral Management Body (EMB) of its enhanced independence under the IPPG 
reforms and the change in electoral law requiring counting at each polling station helped guarantee 
the integrity of the vote.70 
 
3.4 From the political transition to the lack of democratic consolidation 
                                                          
65 Brown (2004), p 333. 
66 Throup, cited in Brown (2004), p 333. 
67 Brown (2004), p 333. 
68 Brown (2004), p 328; Ndegwa (2003), p 153. 
69 Ndegwa (2003), p 154. 
70 Ndegwa (2003), p 154; Steeves (2006), p 223. 
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Agency, structure and institutions all account for the political transition. The NARC came into 
power accompanied by ‘enthusiastic euphoria... captured in the chants ‘Yote yawezekana bila Moi’ 
(everything is possible without Moi)’.71 Public expectations were of a break with authoritarian, 
kleptocratic and personal rule, ushering in a new consensus-based politics.72 
Cautionary notes were, however, sounded as to the NARC’s potential longevity, given the 
presence within it of ex-KANU politicians expected to be at odds with the NARC’s purported 
agenda.73 For the NARC’s agenda to move from ‘transition’ to ‘transformation’,74 the NARC 
would need to keep its eyes on the prize and maintain its cohesiveness, despite the trade-offs 
required within it, particularly on questions of accountability.75 The House would need to perform 
and civil society to remain both critical and engaged.76 Given the difficulties of meeting these 
requirements, the cautious predicted that the transformative agenda would stall and ethnicity would 
re-emerge as leverage both within and outside the NARC.77 
 These predictions did, in the end, come to pass. The ‘enthusiastic euphoria’ was ‘replaced 
by disappointment and despair over the performance of the new regime which, within a short 
period of two years, had lost both national popularity and goodwill’.78 Although civil society’s 
leadership had been depleted as it was initially co-opted into the NARC,79 the NARC failed at 
inclusive politics, including within the coalition that had brought it to power, failed to conclude 
the constitutional reform process and allowed new ‘grand corruption’ to occur within its ranks.80 
                                                          
71 Murunga and Nasong’o (2006), p 1. 
72 Murunga and Nasong’o (2006), p 2. 
73 Brown (2004), p 334. 
74 Kalu, Kelechi cited in Ndegwa (2003), p 156. 
75 Ndegwa (2003), pp 156-7. 
76 Ndegwa (2003), p 158. 
77 Ndegwa (2003), p 156. 
78 Murunga and Nasong’o (2006), pp 1-2. 
79 Brown (2004), p 335. 
80 Murunga and Nasong’o (2006), p 5. 
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The prediction that the negotiated compromises made to form the NARC and agree on 
Kibaki as its presidential candidate were ‘Machiavellian’ and made in bad faith for the short term, 
postponing difficult decisions and confrontations, was soon borne out.81 The MoU agreed upon 
between NARC’s constituent political parties, the LDP—which had broken away from KANU 
under Odinga’s leadership—and Kibaki’s NAK, specified creating the position of Prime Minister 
for Odinga, reducing presidential powers and sharing Cabinet positions. All this was disrespected 
from almost the moment that Kibaki was sworn into office.82 The political exclusion of the LDP 
was increasingly understood as being grounded in ethnicity,83 given the emergence and 
ascendency of what became known as the ‘Mount Kenya mafia’ within NAK.84 By July 2004, 
Odinga’s responsibilities had been trimmed, LDP Ministers demoted and new Ministers appointed 
from the political opposition of the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD)–People 
and—incredibly—KANU.85 It had also become clear that, contrary to the initial NARC 
agreements and despite internal opposition, Kibaki intended to stand for a second presidential 
term.86 
The NAK’s about-turn once in office was also evident within the constitutional reform 
process. The CKRC had convened the National Constitutional Conference (NCC) to negotiate the 
draft Constitution, with the intention of Parliament then enacting it, led by the PSC on the 
Constitution.87 But the NCC became anarchic, Ministers boycotted it and the NAK side of NARC 
walked out—again over the proposals to create the position of Prime Minister and reduce 
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presidential powers.88 In June 2004, the NAK put forward a Bill to amend the Constitution of 
Kenya Review Act to enable Parliament to amend the draft Constitution with a 65 per cent 
majority—effectively seeking to enable Parliament rather than the more participatory and 
representative NCC to assume control over negotiating and finalising the draft Constitution. The 
Bill passed but was not assented to by Kibaki on the basis that it was unconstitutional. In December 
2004, a revised Bill was put forward allowing for amendments to the draft Constitution by simple 
majority. It was passed and assented to, further to which a ‘consensus’ draft Constitution was 
approved in one sitting. That draft Constitution was published by Amos Wako, then Attorney 
General, and became known as the ‘Wako’ draft. It was put to referendum in November 21, 2005 
and rejected.89 
The referendum, understood as being ‘a popular vote of confidence in the government... 
[was] also a heavily ethnic vote, with only Kibaki’s own ethnic group, the Kikuyu, voting in 
favour’.90 The goings-on within the NARC, the NAK’s disrespect of the LDP, its disregard of civil 
liberties, corruption and disrespect of rule of law91 lay behind the public’s rejection of the ‘Wako’ 
draft. As did the NAK’s failure to account for previous political violence92 and ensure truth, justice 
and reconciliation about the same93 in a manner that provided recognition and restitution for 
survivors and victims.94 
Going into the 2007 General Elections then, Kenya was still deemed only a procedural 
democracy.95 Given the failure to usher in the long-awaited new Constitution, structural 
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transformation of the state, the economy and society had not occurred to the extent anticipated.96 
And the NARC itself, by failing in its transformative agenda, had been deemed as ‘bent on self-
destruction’.97 
 
3.5 Factors behind the NARC’s failure to realise its transformative potential 
3.5.1 Agency 
The composition of the actors, their alliances and coalitions 
The immediate: the nature of NARC itself 
One explanation for NARC’s disintegration focuses on its leadership—and particularly that of 
Kibaki as its presidential candidate and then President and leader of the NAK.98 Contrary to views 
that lauded Kibaki as being a consensus-builder of integrity and an economist able to build and 
lead a professional and political team,99 this explanation notes the importance of seeing Kibaki 
and the rest of NAK’s leadership in historical perspective. Kibaki did not leave KANU until 
relatively late in the game and, given his fence-sitting, what he stood for was unclear.100 In 
addition, the team he built around him—through appointments to the Cabinet, the civil service and 
parastatals101—was, in effect, ‘recycled KANU’.102 Some of those who became known as the 
‘Mount Kenya mafia’ were past retirement age and their political and civil service experience 
dated back to the first Kenyatta and Moi regimes. Mostly Gikuyu and representing the class of 
capital and property, they were invested in continuity and maintaining the status quo—sharing the 
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spoils of power, not transforming it.103 In this sense, the NAK could engender only a ‘revival of 
tribalism and patrimonialism and a continuation of many of the discredited practices characteristic 
of the Kenyatta and Moi eras’.104 Political tribalism105 remained intact, with the only changes 
being: first, the shift from the Kalenjin elite back to the Gikuyu elite, now referred to as the ‘Mount 
Kenya mafia’106; and, second, a new competition for spoils between the children of old money 
(old money being almost exclusively Gikuyu).107 
The NAK was not alone in its continuities from the Kenyatta and Moi regimes. The LDP 
too included Moi/KANU hardliners—‘KANU in Diaspora’ who had stayed with Moi until the 
fallout provoked by his appointment of the first Kenyatta’s son as his successor.108 In this sense, 
the LDP and NAK merger was a ‘Faustian bargain’.109 
These continuities from the Kenyatta and Moi regimes within both the LDP and the NAK 
would have made it difficult for newer politicians in the NARC who moved from civil society into 
the NARC and were supposed to represent generational change and achieve transformative change 
as the ‘New Young Turks’.110 But the ‘New Young Turks’ also failed to perform as anticipated 
given the ‘contradictory nature of civil society and the complex interpenetration of civil and 
political societies’.111 Some ostensibly civil society members had, in fact, represented individual, 
family or sectarian interests,112 viewing civil society as an avenue to politics and uniting solely in 
opposition to Moi/KANU.113 Thus the ‘New Young Turks’ were not homogenous. They also did 
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not necessarily share and were not necessarily committed to a transformative agenda, as quickly 
became evident in the expediency with which they reversed previously stated positions, for 
example, on the content and process of constitutional reform, their own entanglement in new 
‘grand corruption’ and nepotism,114 justified as their right to reward115 and contributing to NARC’s 
internal disputes and the re-constitution of NARC into ‘ethnic enclaves’.116 
 
The long-view: civil society and political interaction and interpenetration from the colonial 
period on 
A supplementary explanation not for NARC’s disintegration but for its inability to stay the course 
with respect to achieving the transformative agenda, however, focuses on civil society and its 
political interaction and interpenetration from the colonial period on. This explanation posits that 
the impetus for transformation has always come from a small group within civil society—termed 
with both some accuracy and some inaccuracy the ‘left’ or the ‘progressives’. The ‘progressive 
left’— identified loosely with Marxism and socialism but using the tenets of liberal democracy to 
advance a social democratic agenda—exists largely outside political parties. However, being 
numerically small and organisationally weak, it has never been able to mass-mobilise and organise 
autonomously from political parties,117 ‘perhaps because politicians are more willing to introduce 
and exploit ethnic issues’.118 
The sole exception was during the period from the late 1930s to the early 1950s. Organised 
labour, drawing on leadership from veterans of World War II, did then mass-mobilise and organise 
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among the urban semi-proletariat and petty traders, with support from the rural landless and 
smallholders. This group successfully held the 1947 general strike in Mombasa and proceeded in 
1951 to capture the leadership of the Nairobi branch of the Kenya African Union (KAU) through 
the Clerks and Commercial Workers Union (CCWU) and the Transport and Allied Workers Union 
(TAWU). 
The response by the colonial government effectively ended the ability of the ‘progressive 
left’ to mass-mobilise and organise. It detained the leaders of the 1947 general strike in Mombasa, 
banned the ‘radical’ East African Trade Union Congress (EATUC) in 1950, formed the moderate 
Kenya Federation of Registered Trade Unions (KFRTU) instead and then declared a state of 
emergency in 1952, leading to more detentions and arrests. 
Thus, KANU emerged in the early 1960s as an alliance of class forces but with leadership 
from the emerging indigenous bourgeoisie—the class of capital and property referred to above. 
Following independence in 1963, what remained of the ‘progressive left’ was evicted from the 
backbenches of Parliament and retreated first to labour under the Kenya African Workers Congress 
(KAWC) and then to the political party of the Kenya People’s Union (KPU). In 1969, however, 
the Kenyatta regime banned the KPU. 
The ‘progressive left’ re-emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s among the ‘radical’ 
University of Nairobi (UoN) academics and students associated with the remnants of the former 
political opposition of the KPU, many in exile. However, the 1982 coup d’état and the state 
response to it forced another retreat.119 The ‘progressive left’ emerged again only in the late 1980s, 
this time as the intellectuals and human rights workers—civil society—associated with the 
constitutional-change movement.120 From 1991 onwards, the ‘progressive left’ made common 
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cause with professional (legal) associations, the few independent trade unions that remained, 
religious organisations and—finally—opposition political parties.121 In the 1990s, the opposition 
political parties represented the class of capital and property, with the Gikuyu bourgeoisie divided 
between the Democratic Party (DP), which had been aligned to both the Kenyatta and Moi regimes, 
and FORD-Asili, which was not aligned to the Moi regime. The Luo bourgeoisie, together with 
the ‘progressive left’, represented by the so-called ‘Young Turks’, were in FORD.122 
That said, civil society and opposition political parties had different motives. As mentioned 
above, like the political opposition, some of civil society (apart from the ‘progressive left’) was 
ethnically motivated and shared the desire of the opposition political parties merely to (re-)capture 
power and not transform it. 
Thus, ‘the unanimity that seems to characterise the reform groups and to bring them 
together around a common agenda was deceptive’.123 This began to be clear from 1997, as the 
political opposition chose to negotiate the IPPG reforms with the incumbent Moi regime. For this 
regime and the opposition in fact shared a conception of leadership and state-society relations124—
a conception distinct from that of the ‘progressive left’ within civil society.125 This distinction 
became stark when the NARC took power with respect to the constitutional reform process. 
Civil society, with popular support, had been prominent in pushing for comprehensive 
constitutional reforms. However, as soon as the official reform process began, the vested interests 
of the politicians mitigated against its desired outcomes, especially with respect to curtailing 
presidential powers.126 In summary, ‘although the impetus for reform came from civil society... 
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and had a major influence on the goals and design of the review, the process was eventually taken 
over by political parties (who had both common and divergent interests—but reform for the sake 
of a better constitution was not among them)’.127 
 
The actors’ strategic choices 
Arising from the above, it is clear that an explanation of the NARC’s disintegration and failure to 
achieve its transformative agenda that rests solely on strategic choices of the political actors within 
the NARC is insufficient. It is true that it was cobbled together in reaction to KANU and that its 
focus was on winning the 2002 General Elections within a short time-frame. It is also true that this 
may have hindered discussion of the contradictions and tensions within it, including those arising 
from the inclusion of ex-KANU politicians.128 However, in one sense, most of NARC’s members 
were ex-KANU, necessarily reducing discussions to ‘elite pacting’ and horse-trading on an ethnic 
and regional basis.129 
 However, a more comprehensive explanation is grounded in the historical relationship 
between civil society and its political interactions and interpenetration. In the early 1990s, the 
‘progressive left’ had considered whether it should participate in the democratisation process, 
while calling for defiance of the Moi regime by all means necessary and the convening of a 
National Convention.130 In response, it was noted that the only alternative to participation was 
observation,131 and that, given the history of the ‘progressive left’ in Kenya, it should focus on the 
content of democratisation,132 building momentum for democratic attainment and consolidation 
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and building both civil society and the political opposition to create the conditions within which 
the social democratic agenda of the ‘progressive left’ could be realised.133 
In 1992, the ‘progressive left’ failed to engage with the call of former KPU leader, Oginga 
Odinga, for a National Convention under FORD as it was then still largely underground.134 By 
1997, however, it was clear that civil society, now above-ground, had largely achieved the above 
through its work on democratisation through the content, process and support for comprehensive 
constitutional reforms.135 It convened no fewer than three National Convention Assemblies 
(NCAs) on comprehensive constitutional change, in April, August and October 1997,136 together 
with mass mobilisation and organisation in the form of civic education, demonstrations and strikes 
nation-wide, enabled by its engagement with religious organisations and the political opposition 
and responded to increasingly violently by the Moi regime. 
Yet, the experiences of both 1997 and 2002 showed the difficulties inherent to civil 
society’s strategic choice to engage with the political opposition. In 1997, the political opposition 
effectively ceded democratisation to civil society by opting for electoral competition with KANU 
under the IPPG reforms137—the first ‘elite pact’.138 The difference in understanding of the IPPG 
reforms by civil society and the political opposition was instructive. Civil society saw the IPPG 
reforms as ‘facilitative’, while the political opposition saw them as ‘minimal’.139 Civil society saw 
them as a means to a ‘maximising’ end, while the political opposition saw them as a ‘satisfying’ 
end in and of themselves.140 
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Civil society’s perspective was borne out by the political opposition’s failure to capture 
power through the 1997 General Elections and new engagement re-started, again focused on the 
need for comprehensive constitutional reform under the CKRC process. There was initial 
consensus between political and civil society organisations on both the required method 
(participatory) and desired outcomes (a democratic culture).141 The CKRC process began in 
November 2000 and was initially intended to end in two years. The second ‘elite pact’—that 
resulting in the NARC’s formation—intervened. The NARC did win the 2002 General Elections 
but, although it had promised conclusion of the comprehensive constitutional reform process 
within 100 days, it too began to stall for the reasons outlined above. The NCC did not reconvene 
until the end of April 2003 and had to adjourn whenever Parliament met. It was bogged down by 
numerous procedural disputes and court actions, including one preventing submission of its report 
and draft Constitution to the Attorney General. The NCC was also hindered by its own members 
and delegates enjoying the ‘gravy train’ of allowances and salaries that a drawn-out process 
enabled.142 Finally, the NAK managed to draw the process away from the NCC and back to 
Parliament. With that, ‘the initiative had passed from the people to the politicians’.143 In November 
2005, as outlined above, the ‘Wako’ draft was rejected at referendum.144 
Thus, while the strategic choices of politicians within the NARC explain NARC’s own 
disintegration, a more compelling explanation for NARC’s failure to achieve its transformative 
agenda rests in the difficulties inherent in civil society’s strategic choice to engage with political 
actors. Civil society faces the dilemma posed by its need to engage versus its capacity to manage 
the consequences of ‘elite pacting’ that inevitably excludes civil society and its concerns. 
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3.5.2 Structure and institutions 
The players determining the playing field and rules of the game 
Another explanation of the NARC’s failure to achieve its transformative agenda has to do with 
politicians’ self-interest145 and the lack of structural and institutional constraints on the same. From 
1990 to 2002, Moi and KANU had no interest in electoral-system reform beyond the short term. 
As its long-term considerations were premised on ethnic voting,146 gerrymandering remained a 
key Moi/KANU strategy, with little attention paid to how the electoral system itself could be re-
structured to cater for the legitimate fears of majoritarianism that also partially underlay 
gerrymandering.147 Moi and KANU also had no interest in a comprehensive constitutional reform 
process that would focus on ‘truth and justice’ with respect to past ‘grand corruption’ and gross 
and systemic human rights violations.148 They wanted to retain power as well as ensure continued 
impunity and thus determined to resist and sabotage all pressures—domestic and external—for 
comprehensive constitutional reforms.149 Their strategy included state-sponsored violence for the 
purposes of gerrymandering, effectively disrupting popular momentum and pressures for the same 
through the IPPG, and appointing to the CKRC ‘non-entities’ without constitutional knowledge 
and keen to service politicians.150 
The NARC then came to power on the basis of an agreement for Kibaki to lead given the 
NAK’s MoU with the LDP on the positions of Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, given 
the on-going constitutional reform process.151 But, once in power, Kibaki and the NAK also proved 
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to have no interest in fundamental state re-structuring either under the MoU with the LDP or 
through the Constitution.152 The MoU was disrespected153 and Kibaki showed no further 
enthusiasm for curbing presidential powers, diminishing the provincial administration or 
preventing and dealing with new ‘grand corruption’.154 Perhaps to satisfy popular expectations, 
Kibaki commenced legal, policy and institutional reforms in the absence of over-arching 
comprehensive constitutional reforms—most notably with respect to the NARC’s ‘radical surgery’ 
of the Judiciary and its upgrading of the independent regulatory authorities responsible for both 
corruption and human rights.155 The Judiciary did not want further investigations of itself and thus 
allowed the use of court actions to stall the comprehensive constitutional reform process under the 
CKRC, including through obtaining an interim injunction preventing discussion of the 
Judiciary.156 Within the NCC, when not motivated by ethnic considerations—along LDP and NAK 
lines—parliamentarians found it ‘difficult to hold any sort of party line... concerned only with their 
personal advantage’.157 They did not support provisions in the draft Constitution on popular recall, 
restrictions on their terms of office, not being able to be Ministers or provisions for a second 
chamber of the House. 
In short, the momentum to realise structural and institutional change was inhibited by the 
fact that those with the remit to realise it were able to inhibit it—politicians’ personal and political 
interests inevitably prevailed over the public interest.158 Constitution-making is political, with high 
stakes for politicians as it affects their gateway to power and ability to retain it. 
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Competing notions of citizenship, political participation and land rights 
A more profound explanation of the NARC’s inability to achieve its transformational agenda goes 
beyond politicians’ self-interest and the lack of structural and institutional constraints on the same. 
This explanation has to do with what may legitimately lie behind politicians’ perceived self-
interest and focuses on why rational individuals respond to ethnic mobilisation. The argument is 
that citizenship is not single, relating to a single political community—it is multiple and can be 
both transnational and sub-national.159 
In Kenya, politicians respond to different and competing forms of citizenship rooted in 
both their ethnic communities and the state. These two forms of citizenship inspire not just 
different loyalties but different forms of loyalties—and result in differing and competing 
perceptions of democratic and liberal institutions. Ethnic or republican citizenship, dating back to 
the colonial era and persisting in the postcolonial era, is not coherent or monolithic.160 It is socially 
constructed and relates to the satisfaction of both non-material and material needs through the 
moral economy and ritual—real, invented and re-invented. State or liberal citizenship, however, is 
legally constructed and relates to democratic accountability through the practice of authority. With 
republican citizenship, participation is required and rights are acquired by fulfilling obligations—
while liberal citizenship qualifies individuals to participate, with rights residing in individuals to 
be guaranteed.161 Republican citizenship shapes politicians’ preferences and makes the state an 
arena in which to fulfil obligations. Thus, ‘the new state elite is essentially an ethnic elite; its sphere 
of authority extends to the territorial limits of the state, but its sphere of obligation is limited to the 
sub-national group able to extract obligation (prebends) from its sons and daughters’.162 And, in 
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majoritarian electoral systems, majority ethnic communities can vote as republicans but expect to 
benefit as liberals with more rights and responsibilities.163 
This argument holds that Kenya’s stalled transition was and is due to 
conflicts/contradictions between republican citizenship rooted in Kenya’s ethnic political 
communities and liberal citizenship rooted in Kenya’s national political community—evidenced 
in the conflicts/contradictions over structure and institutions dating back to the immediate pre-
independence era between Kenya’s majority and minority ethnic communities. 
Independence in 1963 was preceded by three constitutional conferences held in London in 
1960, 1962 and 1963 respectively.164 The debates during these three conferences were, in effect, 
related to the ethnic nature of the political alliances and coalitions that participated in them, and 
revealed fundamental disagreements over democracy itself and appropriate democratic institutions 
for independent Kenya.165 
KANU represented the majority ethnic communities of the Gikuyu and Luo. The Kenya 
African Democratic Union (KADU) represented the minority ethnic communities of the Coast, the 
Kalenjin, the Maa and the Somalis. 
To assure itself of political participation and protection from majoritarian domination,166 
KADU’s proposals focused on regionalism or ‘majimboism’ (self-determination for minority 
groups), calling for a two-chamber Parliament and decentralisation in seven regions, each with its 
own Legislature and Executive.167 KADU’s proposals also focused on communal land rights for 
ethnic groups in these regions, under the regional governments.168 
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As the transfer of political allegiance to the national political community was not 
threatening for majority ethnic communities, allowing for the stance that ‘tribalism’ endangered 
the integrity of state, however, KANU’s proposals sought to reduce minority protections and 
regional powers, retaining a single civil service and police force and enabling constitutional 
changes without majority votes from two Houses but a two-thirds majority at referendum. Given 
that land scarcity was worse for majority ethnic communities where colonial appropriations had 
taken place, KANU’s proposals were for individual land rights for all, with only Native Reserve 
lands under the regional governments and Crown and Scheduled lands under the central 
government.169 
Thus, the independence Constitution ‘validated ethnic citizenship in autonomous regional 
governments and strove for a national, liberal citizenship within central government 
institutions’.170 However, post-independence, regionalism was undermined by KANU’s pressure 
for constitutional change. KADU dissolved into KANU and KANU ‘became a Kikuyu hegemony’ 
in 1964. Post-1964, all land fell under the central government. ‘[The initial] arrangement assured 
minority groups that their land would not be taken by the majority tribes, but it gave them little in 
the way of reclaiming or of limiting non-indigenous settlement on or commercialisation of their 
ancestral land, especially in the Rift Valley... The subsequent dominance of KANU enabled it to 
apportion land, disproportionately favouring its core groups, especially the Kikuyu. This conflict 
over land persisted in post-independence politics and [was] recurrent alongside ethnic violence 
that erupted during the transition to multiparty democracy in the 1990s.’171 
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Fast-forward to the 1990s and the so-called ‘second liberation’, and the same 
miscommunication and misunderstanding seems equally apparent between the incumbent KANU 
and the political opposition of the FORD—with a turning of the tables. In the 1990s, the FORD 
represented the old KANU in terms of its leadership, its middle-class/urban base and its ethnic 
mobilisation in the regions while KANU represented the old KADU with its rural base.172 
Like the original KANU, the FORD and civil society called for liberal citizenship under a 
unitary state with majoritarian institutions,173 with parliamentary nominations previously intended 
for ethnic balancing to go to professional associations and individual land rights for all.174 
Difference was to be masked, recognised only in associational terms, not ethnic terms.175 
Like the original KANU, the new KANU presented the democratisation process and the 
constitutional change movement as being the Gikuyu and Luo majority ethnic communities 
fighting back, calling for an expert-led constitutional reform process rather than a participatory 
one that majority ethnic communities could control.176 KANU also called for federalism or 
‘majimbo’ again, referencing ethnic or republican notions of citizenship with respect to both 
political participation and ancestral, communal land rights and ‘zoning’ in the regions.177 
In this sense then, ‘the debate between KANU and the liberal democracy coalition [was] 
not simply one between an anti-democratic incumbent regime and progressive democrats. It... 
involved fundamental differences regarding (1) the preeminent political community in a multi-
ethnic state (national versus ethnic); (2) the political institutions appropriate to govern such a state 
and, therefore, the kind of constitutional reforms required to arrive at such institutions; and (3) the 
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process of formulating constitutional reform.’178 The politically instigated so-called ‘ethnic 
clashes’ before the 1992 and 1997 General Elections and following the 2007 General Elections 
were in part therefore ‘an extension of the discourse on citizenship and democracy in Kenya, with 
land once again an arena as well as the object of contest’.179 
 
3.6 The quest for accountability continued 
As Kenya prepared for the 2007 General Elections, therefore, it was clear that the political 
transition of 2002 had failed to lead to the democratic consolidation anticipated. Agency could be 
said to account largely for the political transition—the handling of succession within KANU, the 
achievement of opposition unity and KANU’s diminished ability to instigate political violence. 
But agency could also be said to account partially for the failure of democratic consolidation—the 
composition of the actors, their alliances and coalitions and the nature of NARC itself: ‘the original 
NARC was dead. It had died on the anvil of ethnic assertiveness by President Kibaki and the Mount 
Kenya mafia and the unwillingness of a fraction of the political class to countenance any loss of 
presidential and central government power... Now Kibaki and his associates face a unified 
opposition movement in the [Orange Democratic Movement] (ODM), whose leaders have 
indicated their intention to stand united in the 2007 elections to rid Kenya of yet another 
unresponsive regime.’180 
 However, agency mattered more from a historical perspective—given civil society’s 
political interaction and interpenetration from the colonial period on and the actors’ strategic 
choices as determined by the same. Similarly, structure and institutions partially enabled the 
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political transition—not just the introduction and respect of presidential term limits but the context 
of the protracted movement towards comprehensive constitutional change. What proved decisive 
in confounding democratic consolidation—and yet remained unchanged as the 2007 General 
Elections loomed—was that the players continued to determine the playing field and rules of the 
game, in addition to the persistence of competing notions of citizenship, political participation and 
land rights.  
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4. The AU mediation of the 2008 Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation  
 
This chapter focuses on the case study: the African Union’s intervention in Kenya’s electoral 
conflict of 2007-8. It explores the trigger as well as the proximate and structural causes of the 
electoral conflict, and explains the content of the intervention and how it was agreed. The roles 
played by different actors, internal and external, are detailed as concerns both ensuring the 
intervention happened and also informing its substantive content. Particular attention is paid to, 
internally, the roles of non-political actors and, externally, the AU. Finally, the outcomes and 
impact of the intervention are detailed, in both the short and medium-to-long terms, with the focus 
on surfacing both what enabled those impacts and what gives rise to caution about their being 
termed a ‘success’. 
 
4.1 Concepts and theory 
4.1.1 Electoral conflict 
While ‘elections alone do not a democracy make’, elections are important in the context of Africa’s 
democratisation. The right of citizens to stand as and elect their representatives as well as 
participate in public life through regular elections is enshrined not just in the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR) and related human rights treaties, but in the African Charter on Human 
and People’s Rights (African Charter), all African Constitutions,181 as well as in the new norms 
and standards for democratic governance in the Constitutive Act of the AU, the African Charter 
on Democracy, Elections and Governance, 2007182 and the NEPAD’s APRM.183 
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Yet key causes of conflict in Africa continue to be political contestation, inclusion (or 
exclusion), succession and transition—all of which come to a head during elections. Africa’s 
‘weak political institutionalisation in relation to social mobilisation increases the chances of 
instability’.184 Elections, being competitive, stress political institutions, calling into question the 
rights to the freedoms of association and expression, the professionalism and neutrality of the 
security services and the independence and impartiality of the Judiciary.185 
Electoral conflict and ‘protest politics’ are especially likely to occur under first-past-the-
post, winner-takes-all electoral systems when the electorate is divided, the elections are closely 
contested186 and are perceived of as flawed or failed.187 This is particularly so when past 
exclusionary political practices188 have given rise to grievance over domination and the 
electorate’s readiness for mobilisation.189 Both liberal and Marxist theories of the economic causes 
of conflict—relating to economic inequality and relative deprivation on the one hand and the social 
contradictions of capitalism on the other hand—are of relevance to electoral conflict in Africa in 
that they explain the presence within the electorate of ‘willing protestors’.190 Thus political and 
economic causes of conflict interact to enable electoral violence. 
In addition, while the advent or return of multipartyism and political pluralism in Africa 
can give positive political accommodation and expression to ethno-regional and religious 
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identities,191 ‘under a “prebendal” polity, individuals, groups and communities seek state power in 
order to control the country’s resources and benefit from them... In the context of stiff competition 
for power, candidates and parties employ... ethnic, regional and religious sentiments in order to... 
gain or maintain power. This has the tendency to transform political competition into sectarian 
struggles.’192 
Electoral conflict discourages candidates and voters, undermines electoral outcomes and 
democratisation, reduces public confidence in elections as a means of the peaceful transfer of 
political power, damages societal relations and can be a precursor to civil war.193 The paradox is 
that elections remain important in post-conflict situations to restore legitimacy through the 
transformation of parties to the conflict into political actors to ensure their use of ‘ballots rather 
than bullets’ in the struggle to capture or maintain political power.194 This is sometimes used to 
justify the persistent impunity granted to instigators and perpetrators of past electoral conflicts. 
Yet the failure to arrest and prosecute the same, also given state incapacity or corruption, not only 
prevents redress for survivors and victims of electoral violence but also fails to prevent future 
electoral conflicts.195 
Although electoral conflict is increasingly common in Africa, there has, to date, been more 
of a focus on determining its patterns, scope, causes and consequences than on how to manage or 
resolve it.196 The critique is that measures increasingly taken to manage or resolve electoral 
conflict—such as enhancing regulation of political activities, instituting commissions of inquiry 
and mediation—continue to fail to address its political and economic causes.197 
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4.1.2 Mediation as a form of electoral conflict resolution 
Conflict can be avoided by either preventing parties to a given conflict from disruptive conflict 
behaviour or addressing or removing the source(s) of disruptive conflict behaviour through 
settlement. Settlement can be reached in one of three ways. Negotiation involves direct discussion 
between the parties to the conflict to resolve their incompatible positions. Arbitration involves a 
third party hearing of and rendering a decision or judgement on the parties’ incompatible 
positions—this is a judicial or legal process in which the parties agree in advance to abide by the 
arbiter’s decision or judgement. Finally, mediation involves a third party’s proactive intervention 
between the parties to catalyse their ‘collaborative negotiation’—this is a political or extra-legal 
process of compromise and there is no agreement by the parties in advance to agree to the 
settlement. However, compromise through a third party is sometimes easier to accept as remedies 
are more face-saving and flexible.198 
Electoral conflict is usually constitutionally and legally subject to arbitration. However, 
where arbitration is not accepted by a party to the electoral conflict, mediation can be used to 
achieve political settlements: ‘rolling bargains between powerful actors and the dynamic 
renegotiation and compromise that characterises these bargains’.199 Mediation aimed at achieving 
political settlements of electoral conflict needs to be inclusive to maintain legitimacy.200 
Participation beyond the parties to those indirectly affected by the electoral conflict is important,201 
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including of women as mediators and negotiators as well as of civil society and other 
stakeholders.202 
 
4.2 International and regional norms enabling and concerning intervention through mediation 
as a form of electoral-conflict resolution 
Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UN is enabled, on resolution by the UN Security 
Council, to authorise or take coercive or military measures to maintain or restore international 
peace and security. To date, Chapter VII has not been invoked by way of UN Security Council 
resolutions with respect to electoral conflict in Africa.203 
However, under Chapter VI, the UN also has a mandate for preventive diplomacy with 
respect to the peaceful settlement of disputes.204 Preventive diplomacy lies between conflict-
prevention and peacekeeping,205 and can include the authorisation or taking of economic, political 
and military measures against any ‘threat or use of force’ that is neither in self-defence nor 
involving engagement by regional arrangements or agencies. 
Article 52(2) of Chapter VIII further calls upon member states to ‘achieve pacific 
settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies 
before referring them to the Security Council’.206 As no definition of regional arrangements or 
agencies is provided, practice to date has been flexible, with the UN Security Council recognising 
both treaty-based regional organisations as well as groups of member states in a given region acting 
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collectively on specific issues of common concern such as mutual defence and security or 
economic and development cooperation.207 Thus, the UN also has no formal division of labour or 
relationship with any regional organisation. However, in practice, there is increasing recognition 
that ‘regional organisations have a comparative advantage... within their regions’.208 In addition, 
‘regional action as a matter of decentralisation, delegation and cooperation with [UN] efforts... 
lighten[s] the burden of the [Security] Council but also contribute[s] to a deeper sense of 
participation, consensus and democratisation in international affairs.’209 
The AU is the primary regional organisation in Africa. And Article 4(h) of the Constitutive 
Act of the AU provides for ‘the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a 
decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and 
crimes against humanity’.210 Electoral conflict in Africa may not always meet this threshold for 
intervention. However, depending on the nature of the electoral conflict in question, this right of 
intervention can be interpreted proactively and preventively. 
This is particularly so given that the AU’s right of intervention is considered to embody 
the emerging international norm on the R2P. R2P posits that, when a state is either unable or 
unwilling to protect its citizens from or is involved in international crimes (that is: crimes against 
humanity, genocide and war crimes),211 the international community (including Africa) has a 
responsibility to prevent or react to the same and rebuild after the fact through diplomatic, 
economic, legal or military means. R2P is considered, therefore, either to undermine state 
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sovereignty or to re-define it to make it dependent on a given state’s ability and willingness to 
uphold human rights.212 
In conducting ‘preventive action’ in Africa, currently the UN takes a ‘four-pronged 
approach’ involving developing regional stakeholder partnerships, building contact groups 
including with neighbouring member states to the member state of concern, working with the 
RECs that are the building blocks of the AU’s peace and security architecture and investing in the 
same for prevention.213 
 
4.3 Kenya’s 2007-8 electoral conflict 
4.3.1 The trigger: the announcement of the supposed presidential results and swearing-in 
The electoral framework and architecture can contribute to electoral conflict. Relevant provisions 
of the Constitution and electoral laws that define the electoral system and ensure the EMB214 are 
independent of Executive (and other) control with respect to its administration and finances and 
the non-partisanship of its officials.215 
Kenya has a majoritarian electoral system, under which political parties and alliances are 
formed along ethnic lines, political patronage is used to maintain loyalty and support from ethnic 
bases within the electorate, and ethnicity is mobilised politically.216 Thus ‘the principle fault lines 
in politics follow ethnic divisions’ and the electoral conflict became ‘a political crisis with ethnic 
manifestations because politics in Kenya is organised ethnically’.217 
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In addition, contrary to the 1997 IPPG agreement on consultation between political parties 
on appointments to the EMB, the President had unilaterally appointed new Commissioners to the 
Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) just before the 2007 General Elections.218 Further concerns 
were posed by an unprecedented administrative decision within the ECK to give Commissioners 
responsibilities for their own regions, the ECK’s rejection of an offer to install an electronic results 
transmission system, and the use of casual staff provided by Commissioners instead of ECK staff 
in the national tallying centre.219 The ECK lacked cohesion, was unable to resist political pressures 
and could not credibly manage the counting and tallying process and disputes about the same.220 
This was starkly emphasised by the ECK Chair’s own admission that there were problems with 
the presidential returns.221 
The political participation of candidates and the electorate can also contribute to electoral 
conflict. Conflict is less likely when candidates can stand and campaign freely and when the 
electorate can freely register to vote, cast their ballots freely and have their free vote respected by 
the counting and tallying process.222 
Kenya has had persistent problems with the delineation of constituencies, distorting the 
principle of one-person-one-vote and weighting the vote differently in different parts of the 
country. The incumbent Party of National Unity (PNU) made use of public resources in 
campaigning, illegally and to the disadvantage of the ODM.223 There was differential access by 
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candidates to different parts of the country because of informal ‘zoning’, maintained by pre-
election messaging appealing to ethnicity and inciting ethnic fears and hostilities.224 
Polling and the addressing of electoral grievances also contribute to electoral conflict. Civil 
conduct during polling, maintaining the non-coercive nature and secrecy of the balloting process 
is as important as the EMB’s public information management in the context of the electorate’s 
access to and use of new communication technologies, its timely announcement of results and the 
prompt adjudication of any electoral disputes. 
Kenya’s 2007-8 electoral conflict was triggered by the announcement of the supposed 
presidential results and the hurried swearing-in of the PNU’s Kibaki as President on December 
30, 2007 with a supposed lead of 232,000 votes.225 In the lead-up to the 2007 General Elections, 
all opinion polls had shown the ODM’s Odinga in the lead. While polling day was relatively 
peaceful, the initial speed of the return of results soon slowed, with unexplained delays in returns 
from PNU strongholds. The announcement of partial results raised suspicions about possible 
tampering with the counting or tallying process, given the unsatisfactory conduct of the same and 
the lack of an independent verification process within the national tallying centre.226 Odinga’s 
initial lead began to diminish during the counting and tallying, amidst disagreement in the 
national tallying centre between ODM and PNU party agents. Against the backdrop of the loss of 
parliamentary seats of half of the incumbent PNU’s Cabinet members and the gain of 99 
parliamentary seats for ODM as opposed to 43 for PNU, Kibaki was oddly declared the winner 
with a 2.5 per cent margin.227 Finally, adjudication of the electoral disputes through the judicial 
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process post-facto was not accepted given the low political and public confidence in the 
independence of the Judiciary.228 In short, public perceptions were that the integrity of the 
presidential results had not been maintained—and that there was no way to challenge the process 
through the courts: ‘Kibaki saved the country but he’s also the one that caused it all’.229 
With the benefit of hindsight, although polling day was deemed to have proceeded 
smoothly, tensions had begun to mount even then. Some polling stations had not opened on time 
and people in constituencies deemed supportive of the ODM had not found their names on the 
voter register. Many of those people’s surnames begin with ‘O’, as many Luo surnames do—and 
ODM’s presidential candidate, Odinga, was a Luo. In short, ‘it was a perfect set-up for what 
happened thereafter’.230 
 Tensions mounted even higher during the counting and tallying that followed. ODM 
seemed set to win as Odinga was initially in the lead at the presidential level and the parliamentary 
outcomes for the PNU seemed to indicate its fall across the country: 
Watching tallies, the ODM far ahead, slaughter of the PNU. All losing. The first 
results coming in, parliamentary results, telling a picture: that the pillars of the 
Kibaki administration are being taken away. ODM had a one million lead, clear this 
thing was gone.231 
 
Suddenly, however, the counting, tallying and announcement of results slowed. The PNU 
remained confident:  
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Had seen how national tally going, Odinga leading. Somebody asked me: are we 
going to lose? Said we’re not thieves, if they win, we’ll handover. But confident 
that Mount Kenya votes hadn’t yet come in.232  
 
But that confidence was not common across the board:  
 
Somewhere down the line, the fiddling starts, can feel this tension, no information 
is coming forward, then the results are announced late.233  
 
There was this trouble with counting. Not demands for re-counts but that counting 
couldn’t be completed in 24 hours and voting had ended within statutory times. Or, 
if completed, didn’t know results.234  
  
The pattern of results from that point changed, creating more disquiet: 
The patterns of results didn’t make sense. I screamed: ‘they’re stealing the election 
from ODM’. Other constituencies announced with PNU taking the lead in 
constituencies where one would not have expected PNU to take the lead. I could 
see ourselves getting into a crisis engineered by the state, violence as a result of 
disputed elections. Was clear the incumbent wasn’t winning.235 
 
Returning Officers (ROs), particularly from constituencies deemed supportive of PNU 
disappeared. Media correspondents and reporters also disappeared, ensuring there was no parallel 
announcement of results by the media: 
Talking to [Joseph] Odindo, who was Group Managing Editor, because the Nation 
[Media Group], the media, didn’t have the results. We’d always had our own tally. 
Odindo confessed his own reporters and correspondents went black on him, he 
couldn’t find them when trying to trace results for certain areas. They only came 
up for air after the ECK had declared results. People had been influenced, operating 
against imperative to relay results, in competition with everybody else, 
undermining institutional and professional objectives. People got compromised. 
They infiltrated the media to the extent that not possible to determine what’d 
happened.236 
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  An Administration Police (AP) officer went public about the AP’s partisan role in the 
electoral process: ‘Clear tense, the Administration Police being caught, the role of the state, 
supporting Kibaki.’237 ODM and PNU representatives engaged in a review of results at the national 
tallying centre, while incidents of violence began to be reported, particularly in low-income areas 
of Nairobi and the north Rift Valley, both ODM-dominated provinces. 
 In Nairobi, the import of the incidents of violence began to sink in: 
My sister used to live right in Kibera [a low-income area of Nairobi], dawns on me 
have a problem in our family, call her, she’s whispering, they’re surrounded by 
slums, have a high wall, there are people trying to scale the wall to come and attack 
them, they’re lying under the beds.238 
 
On the 29th, just before the announcement of the results, driving on Ngong road, 
was attacked by mob of people, had a small child in the car, don’t think these were 
protesters, think opportunistic. Managed to get away.239 
 
Was living adjacent to Kibera and things happening were a harbinger of trouble. 
The second or third day after the elections, driving out of my gate, found a young 
man who’d been forcibly circumcised,240 tried to get him to hospital, when got him 
to hospital, [it] refused to attend to him until a deposit of funds had been made. 
Unfortunately, he died. So already a climate of violence even before the results. 
Almost like anticipating a certain outcome. 
 
The person helping me with housework at the time also from Kibera and said one 
morning had no place to go as Mungiki241 was taking over and there were retaliatory 
gangs. Told her to move in with her children.242 
 
 In Nyanza province, people had already begun to stream in from Rift Valley Province and 
the main highway through the country had been shut down there: 
Roadblocks have appeared, people burning things. Realise can’t leave Kisii [in 
Nyanza province] because there are roadblocks on the border with the Kipsigis in 
Kericho [in Rift Valley province]. Tea workers, a large number Kisiis, start trekking 
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back, telling tales of how attacked. People coming back on foot, no public transport, 
had to leave in a hurry, no money. The composition of the town’s changed, there 
are a huge number of people running away from Kakamega, Kilgoris. Kikuyu and 
Kisii are spread all over, every available space in town, in anguish. Unbelievable 
scene.243 
 
In Rift Valley province itself, people were desperate: 
My shop steward in Naivasha had called me in the morning, saying this place is 
bad, I might not be alive. Told him you’ll be OK. That night the shop steward called 
me and said people are being massacred on my plot, they are almost in my room. 
Said what do you mean? While I’m on the phone, hear him saying don’t kill my 
children, hear the wife crying, the boy crying. That was the end.244 
 
Several civil society leaders and public officials, aware of the growing numbers of 
incidents of violence tried to intervene with Samuel Kivuitu, the ECK’s Chair, to urge him to take 
his time to verify the results before moving to announce: 
On 31st December Martha [Karua, PNU] called me and said let Kivuitu announce 
the elections results. Told her it’s dangerous, let Raila be there, let Kalonzo 
[Musyoka] be there to verify and announce together. Told her the country’s going 
to go on fire. Tried calling Kivuitu to say don’t announce, the country’s going to 
go on fire.245 
 
Am on the phone with Kivuitu, he starts saying he can’t find his Returning Officers. 
Said to him: ‘don’t announce’. Too messy to announce, explain need time to verify 
results, as long as process of re-tallying is transparent, we’ll give you the time. Buy 
time. He says yeah, announces and the violence starts in a concerted way, protests, 
other things.246 
 
Don’t know if you ever saw Kivuitu’s interview about people on the phone with 
him, Willy [Mutunga] and Chief [Maina Kiai]. Kivuitu was Willy’s pupil master, 
Chief was head of the [Kenya] National [Human Rights] Commission (KNCHR). 
Message was that shouldn’t proceed and announce results, causing more harm than 
good. As soon as clear even Kivuitu had capitulated, became a question of how 
soon does Kenya collapse.247 
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The closure of the national tallying centre, the announcement of Kibaki as the winner and 
a late afternoon swearing-in immediately following took the incidents of violence to a new level: 
‘Hell broke loose thereafter’.248 
Was sitting at home, watching the results on [television] (TV). Then saw those guys 
march in, teargas the place [the national tallying centre], close it down, put Kivuitu 
in a car and this is not part of the script. These numbers popped up on the screen, 
didn’t make sense. Told my wife, let’s stock up, she said why. Said this place is 
about to blow up.249 
 
 The security services tried to respond to get those assumed to be PNU supporters at risk 
away from Rift Valley province: 
Got to the Officer Commanding Station (OCS) and he’s giving me his assessment 
that people attacked in other places and felt Kisii safe. A large number of buses 
come, clearly the government’s been at work, all these buses that operate towards 
Central province, the idea is to get Kikuyus to Nairobi and Central province. Met 
long convoy of people being transported to Nairobi. At the head of the convoy is a 
police group with huge show of force, guns everywhere, police vehicles 
strategically between. Kisiis from Western province said would find their level as 
belong to Kisii. Eventually, another evacuation to Nairobi and joined convoy with 
family, brought to Bomet by the police and see police, where Narok started, turning 
around. That’s when hits me that the Masaai are not in this war as have been taken 
through Kipsigis country. That’s how I got to Nairobi.250 
 
However, the security services soon realised they lacked the capacity to contain the 
spreading violence:  
Called the Director of Operations, [David] Kimaiyo, in police headquarters. He was 
frank, told me we’re overwhelmed.251 
 
The security services were also responding in a politically partisan way, with violence 
themselves, particularly in Rift Valley, Nairobi and Nyanza provinces:  
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Even as having conversations around elections, a competing crisis around safety of 
life and limb. Remember reports from Moi Referral [Hospital in Eldoret] and 
Kisumu, people saying a public health crisis as too many bodies in the streets.252 
 
 Some were surprised at the turn the country had taken, having not anticipated ODM’s 
refusal to turn to the courts for redress or the turn the protests had taken or the insufficient and 
unacceptable responses of the security services:  
The institutional route normally available, ECK, had made its pronouncement and, 
once done, all ends there. Loser had decided not going to use institution available, 
the Judiciary. Two things hand in hand: what happened with elections, who was 
winner, but also what’s unfolding right in front of you.253  
 
Had a sense all not well. But expected to be intermittent, isolated, usual kind of 
thing. When [the] opposition said won’t accept elections, became clear things were 
not going to be OK.254 
 
 ODM itself seemed unsure how to proceed:  
We were trying to make sense of it. The first meetings with the party leadership 
around the 31st—or the 30th—when it became clear violence had broken out and 
the elections had been stolen.255  
 
PNU, on the other hand, seemed to have anticipated some sort of post-announcement 
arrangement with ODM, and proceeded accordingly:  
Walked into a room where akina Raila, the Pentagon [ODM’s leadership], [Peter] 
Anyang [Nyong’o was] telling me we need to talk. Remember saying since when 
were results negotiated? Said let talks be after announcement.256  
 
What it hadn’t, however, anticipated was the violence:  
President sworn in. He names a few ministers, including myself, 17 out of the 34. 
Stubbornly just named half. Somebody calls me to say people have been burnt in 
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Kiambaa church. Rushed to State House, discussed plan to put things down but 
never followed.257 
 
 For academics and civil society, however, PNU had acted on faulty intelligence, analysis 
or scenario-planning: 
Talking to Gikuyu establishment-type people, was struck by fact that surprised 
them, they did not expect those consequences at all. While obvious to me that that 
would precipitate violence, didn’t know what magnitude or character, but 
absolutely certain wouldn’t go down quietly. Amazed by how many average, 
middle-class people didn’t understand their country and its political character. They 
did not see such a rupture from a small thing like an election: I mean, it’s only 
Raila. We steal an election from Raila, we’ll have rioting in Kibera and Kisumu. 
That was their intelligence. Didn’t see Rift Valley coming, rapid regionalisation 
and even internationalisation. That whole escalation.258 
 
 In effect, the supposed outcome of the presidential elections had served as a trigger for the 
violence. Not because the presidential race had been tightly contested but because of the handling 
of the final stages of the process, which placed into question the supposed outcome:  
Kibaki sworn in, the country shut down. The reason go to elections is [to] get leaders 
that come into power. That wasn’t [the] case, no way of telling one person had won 
over the other.259  
 
Would understand why. A heavily contested election, the outcome didn’t seem fair, 
the process was definitely flawed and whenever process flawed, obviously people 
disgruntled, so process is as important as outcome.260 
 
Four distinct patterns of violence emerged: protests in areas dominated by ODM that took 
different forms depending on the area, and which quickly became more organised than 
spontaneous; responses to those protests by the security services; responses to those protests by 
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armed groups or militia linked to or supportive of PNU; and, finally, gender-based and sexual 
violence (GBSV) that cut across all the other forms of violence. 
 
4.3.2 The proximate and structural causes: the failed political transition of 2002 
The political transition of 2002 had, over time, revealed anti-democratic and neo-patrimonial 
continuities in executive, parliamentary and judicial behaviour. Early civil society co-option into 
the NARC had also hindered structural reform.261 Thus, by the time of the 2007 General Elections, 
Kenya’s political institutions remained weak, marred by corruption and impunity, ensuring 
continued ethnic, gender262 and regional inequalities and marginalisation as well as continued 
political mobilisation of the same:263 ‘ethnic and regional inequalities infiltrated not only Kenyan 
politics but also the society more broadly.’264 
Thus, while the violence that ensued from the electoral conflict was initially directed at the 
ruling political party, expressing dissatisfaction with the electoral process,265 it drew on and was 
fanned by historical economic and political grievances. These included prejudice and stereotyping 
on ethnic grounds and the political exclusion of the Luo and other ethnicities in favour of the 
Gikuyu. These also included persistent ‘indigenous’ land claims dating back to the colonial seizure 
of land in Central and Rift Valley provinces, the displacement of those from Central to the Rift 
Valley and the postcolonial seizure of land in the Rift Valley for distribution to the Gikuyu for 
political patronage purposes at the expense of Kalenjin and Masaai land claims.266 
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The state’s monopoly on violence was already tenuous267 given impunity for previous 
violence associated with electoral conflict in both 1992 and 1997.268 The instigators of past 
violence associated with electoral conflict were still active politically, and armed groups and 
militia remained at their disposal.269 Thus the violence associated with the electoral conflict of 
2007-8 easily and quickly transformed from spontaneous to organised violence, with the use of 
armed groups and militia by both parties as well as politically partisan violence by the security 
services, with GBSV cutting across all three.270 
Ultimately, while the process and supposed outcomes of the presidential election in 
particular were a trigger for the patterns of violence that ensued, it was clear that the process and 
outcomes were so important because of historical and long-standing grievances, including 
systemic discrimination on ethnic grounds:  
We are ethnically polarised with deep-seated animosities and historical grievances 
that could boil over into genocidal conflagration.271  
 
Systemic discrimination on ethnic grounds was understood as intersecting with that based on 
gender: 
We were cognisant this wasn’t something that had happened overnight, there were 
long-standing grievances. We weren’t going to have a conversation that pretended 
that discrimination, the instrumentalisation of ethnicity, didn’t exist. It was the only 
time the women’s movement in this country has acknowledged the intersectionality 
of different forms of discrimination. Normally we talk about gender-based 
discrimination as if it just happens alone.272 
 
 Systemic discrimination on ethnic grounds played out in terms of political representation 
and thus one grievance had to do with political exclusion, especially of leading Luo politicians:  
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The sense that systems and structures were not inclusive, certain groups would 
never ascend to leadership, not everyone can participate in deciding destiny of the 
country, an exclusive club. Our government, our economics, our political 
structures. Where people feel excluded, where people feel as citizens can never 
contribute.273 
 
This grievance can be traced back not only to the failed political transition of 2002 and the 
disregard of the MoU between Kibaki and Raila under the NARC but also even further to the 
immediate post-independence period: 
Had great hopes for the country. But we started mucking about with it, 
systematically, starting with the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), not 
honouring it. We started messing around post-2002, in another coalition where 
Raila came in. We had the opportunity to make him Vice-President. If they‘d done 
that, we could’ve avoided 2007. We would’ve had smoother elections, maybe 
could’ve postponed it to 2013.274 
 
The feeling among the Luo of being marginalised. Not just Raila, he symbolised 
this marginalisation. Goes back to 1966, when the father was ousted from his 
position as Vice-President of the party and diluted [the then ruling political party 
KANU cleverly. How they weakened him and then he left. When he left, 
unfortunately, we entered into tribal politics. [The then President] Kenyatta ailing, 
aggravated by the assassination of [another leading Luo politician, Tom] Mboya. I 
don’t know who advised the President to start oathing the Kikuyus. That was a 
disaster, isolated the Kikuyus. They couldn’t trust the Luos. Luos marginalised. 
[President] Moi took over that problem, never resolved. Then the coup, whether 
Raila involved or not. That atmosphere, that’s never resolved, is affecting the 
functioning of this nation.275 
 
 Systemic discrimination on ethnic grounds also played out in terms of access to and control 
over resources, particularly land. In addition, therefore, was grievance relating to equally historical 
and long-standing dispossession of land, this time dating back to the colonial period and: 
‘Bitterness within the Kalenjin on issues of land.’276 
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Finally explaining the violence and how it spread so fast was the question of institutional 
failure. The ECK had failed; ODM refused to use the electoral-dispute mechanism of the Judiciary 
to address that failure as the judiciary too was deemed politically partisan, as were the security 
services and the civil service: 
Therein lies the multiple crises the country had to deal with. Peeled away veneer of 
stability and no institutions left. Couldn’t trust the ECK, the security services, the 
civil service was partisan. Just hope that the military hadn’t walked into argument. 
But no pro-people institution standing.277 
 
Continued control of the provincial administration by the Executive further to the political 
transition of 2002 was also deemed responsible: 
In 2005, during the [constitutional] referendum, was in Eldoret. People came to me 
to say Chiefs are pushing us to vote no. Gikuyus who wanted to vote yes. Called 
Mirugi [Kariuki], said: ‘you guys are crazy’. These chiefs, three years after Moi 
had left, hadn’t been replaced. Maintained same structures that had organised 
violence.278 
 
 
4.4 Intervention through mediation in Kenya’s 2007-8 electoral conflict 
The AU’s response to both the elections and the unfolding post-election violence was 
uncharacteristic in both its speed and its circumvention of the design of its peace and security 
architecture under which intervention would normally be through the relevant REC (the EAC) or 
IGAD. 
The explanations for this swift and direct intervention—against the preferences of its 
principal, the PNU which had assumed the presidency—are many. First is the question of the 
normative allowances of the Constitutive Act of the AU, which was explicitly intended to move 
from ‘non-interference’ to ‘non-indifference’, and allow for ‘African solutions for African 
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problems’. Kenya provided an: ‘Opportunity for the AU to resolve an African problem through an 
African-driven process’,279 particularly in this:  
Era of transitional justice, coming in and salvaging places with a formula. The AU 
also having ‘African solutions for African problems’ rhetoric.280 
 
Under the OAU, we had this old doctrine of non-interference in the internal affairs 
of member states. It was a terrible doctrine, which reinforced a narrow doctrine of 
sovereignty which shielded abuses. The new doctrine when the OAU transformed 
to the AU, the Constitutive Act replaced the OAU Charter, was non-indifference to 
human rights abuses. Quite a radical change, a sea change. That sea change explains 
a whole lot of things, the AU becoming more assertive in the face of sovereignty.281 
 
 Those normative allowances were themselves rooted in experience of the potentially 
extreme consequences of non-interference. The post-election violence: ‘Looked like the 
beginnings of a genocide’282 and: 
They’d also had experience of the past and knew what’d happened in Rwanda. No 
surprise, people had Rwanda and Burundi on their minds and wanted to do 
everything they could. Four former Heads of State came in[to Kenya] before [South 
African Archbishop Desmond] Tutu and came in as real concern.283 
 
 The second reason for the rapid AU intervention was because Kenya had just undergone 
the AU’s governance ‘audit’, the APRM. The final APRM report, discussed at the level of heads 
of state and government, warned of the fragility caused by what, in the end, triggered and underlay 
the post-elections violence. In that sense, Kenya was already on the AU’s radar:  
The APRM had happened the year before, led by Graca [Machel]. 2007 comes a 
year after Kenya had undertaken the APRM, it was a pioneer APRM country. The 
APRM report had already highlighted the issue of ethnic tension in Kenya that 
becomes more explosive around elections.284 
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 Third was the question of leadership—in terms of both being concerned about upholding 
the normative commitments of the Constitutive Act of the AU and having the confidence of both 
political parties to the electoral dispute. The latter explains why the AU rather than the EAC took 
the lead in the intervention. There were:  
… sub-regional dynamics. For example, [Yoweri] Museveni shows not everybody 
on board with same approach. Didn’t bring in sub-regional leaders, sense of 
partisanship.285 
 
The attempt by Museveni to slyly attempt to mediate in the name of the EAC was 
rejected, immediately. Not seen to be an independent arbiter. His relationships with 
different actors, serious indictment of his credibility. The AU came in as had that 
distance. It could get traction.286 
 
As for the former: 
Leadership is crucial. The leadership in charge then, an assertive leadership. 
[Ghanaian President John] Kufour [then AU Chair] wanted to make sure the AU 
acts proactively, because Ghana’s also a model for democracy on our continent.287 
 
President Kufour put his strength and credibility… having come from a country 
which had those difficulties, overrode those problems and became a democracy, his 
person contributed significantly.288 
 
Give credit for moving quickly. Remember when Kufour came in, was not even 
sure that Kibaki would receive him. [PNU’s Minister for Foreign Affairs Moses] 
Wetangula was asked why Kufour was there and his answer was I don’t know, 
maybe he’s coming to have tea with the President.289 
 
Kufour came in quickly and elicited attention internally.290 
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Fourth, however, were the more strategic considerations at play when the AU is weighing 
up intervention, namely the strategic importance of a country and the implications of its 
deterioration into conflict not just internally but for the region:291  
The AU likes these islands of stability. Many factors appeal about Kenya, things 
function. So when things went wild, [it] took the right step.292  
 
Kenya is a very important state for Africa and the AU. Everybody anxious to ensure 
Kenya didn’t deteriorate further.293 
 
The particular country and its role in the region are also crucial. The regional 
position of Kenya should not be taken for granted, it’s a hub of this region. The 
perspective, correctly, was that if we let Kenya burn, literally, the entire region may 
burn.294 
 
Kenya regarded as a key pillar in terms of geopolitics and therefore watching 
situation collapse would have been unpalatable next to Somali and Sudan. Would 
have been a challenge for the rest of the region and the international community.295 
 
If collapses, East Africa collapses. Kenya’s regional position. It’s cliché when 
people keep saying Kenya is not Zimbabwe. But that did play out a bit.296 
 
That Zimbabwe was on the AU’s plate at the same time, although being addressed through 
the REC of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), provided an additional 
imperative for the AU’s intervention to work in Kenya given: 
The criticism of the institution being a toothless bulldog, a club of Heads of State 
that support each other, especially as that was the same time Zimbabwe was on the 
table and there was already a barrage of criticism [about] the AU. So wanted to 
send a strong message.297 
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 Other strategic considerations had to do with the internal dynamics of the situation, namely 
that the incumbent PNU’s position was evidently tenuous given the manner in which Kibaki had 
re-claimed the presidency despite ODM commanding a parliamentary majority. In this sense, the: 
Reasons for interventions by region and the rest of international community to be 
found within Kenya itself. Kenya divided, right in the middle, meant that a 
willingness to invite and entertain that kind of intervention. If, for example, had a 
situation that yes, a dispute, but no internal pressure for resolution and one party 
asymmetrically stronger than the other, the AU would’ve hesitated to be involved 
as would have been listening to the government. But stalemate and power tending 
towards the opposition created opportunity for the AU and international community 
to play a role. This wouldn’t have happened if PNU in a stronger position, would’ve 
resisted more powerfully international intervention.298 
 
 An additional strategic consideration was that there were appeals for regional and 
international intervention not just from the political opposition, but also from Kenyan civil society 
and the Kenyan private sector. In short, it was clear there were significant domestic constituencies 
in support of regional and international intervention: 
Civil society invited international involvement and ODM also amenable to 
international mediation. One thing always on table was international mediation, 
which spoke to the fact that there was institutional failure. So the conversation at 
the AU became the level of involvement. Had civil society, the opposition, saying 
want a lot of involvement and those with state power saying wanted as little as 
possible. The violence weakened those who had state power, didn’t have control 
over the country so had to accept engagement.299 
 
 The final strategic consideration was the sense that an intervention both needed to and 
would work, given Kenya’s recent political past. There are: 
 
Many regional and international bodies in Kenya. Sense that Kenya on the move. 
Internal and external created momentum for democratisation. Had been possible to 
make positive changes and have an outcome. Not a Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC), Somalia, Liberia.300 
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 Fifth, the AU itself was aware that if it didn’t provide an ‘African solution’ to the particular 
problem of Kenya, the rest of the international community would: 
The AU was also under pressure. The Americans had said it won’t let Kenya go the 
Rwanda way. Also the EU.301 
 
In this telling of the story, either the ‘African solution’ was an international solution in an African 
guise or there was a convergence of regional and international interests in resolving Kenya: 
Look behind the AU, at who was speaking. You’ll see it was a leadership that would 
listen to Western voices and Western voices clear what going on untenable. Don’t 
think the AU did this as concerned Africans. The AU coming in was a convenient 
accident. In most other contexts, the AU supports the status quo. 
 
Think the AU was a convenient proxy. The AU could play ball where your big 
superpowers, where your big bilaterals in Kenya, didn’t want to be seen supporting 
either side. Realised early that coming out in support of Kibaki would backfire on 
them and, in that sense, immobilised.302 
 
 
4.4.1 Achieving agreement to the mediation of Kenya’s 2007-8 electoral conflict 
The first question concerned whether there would be an intervention in the form of mediation at 
all. The ODM did not accept the announcement of the supposed presidential results and Kibaki’s 
swearing-in. It raised the discrepancies between polling-station, constituency and national-level 
tallying figures to demonstrate an alleged addition of up to 300,000 votes to the PNU tally. 
Claiming rigging,303 it demanded a re-count. It refused to consider arbitration under the Judiciary, 
which it considered as being under PNU control, and called instead for protests.304 It also refused 
to consider negotiation with the PNU unless Kibaki resigned.305 Finally, the ODM condemned the 
violence being committed by the security services in their bid to contain protests in ODM 
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strongholds.306 As arbitration and negotiation were thus ruled out, mediation remained the only 
option. The ODM’s pre-condition for mediation was Kibaki’s resignation and its initial preferences 
were for either a re-run of the presidential elections or the formation of a joint transitional 
government with a reform agenda, including on land.307 
The PNU did not dispute the tallying discrepancies but claimed they worked in Odinga’s 
favour. It demanded that the ODM submit to arbitration through the Judiciary to settle its electoral 
concerns and accused the ODM of instigating ‘ethnic cleansing’ through its calls to protests.308 It 
posited that it would agree to mediation only if the ODM accepted the supposed legitimacy of 
Kibaki’s presidency and if the ODM entered into mediation with no pre-conditions.309 Meanwhile, 
however, it proceeded to create a government of national unity with the third presidential candidate 
in the race and began arrangements to host the Summit of Heads of State and Government of the 
IGAD.310 
To the region and the rest of the international community, there was no question that the 
supposed presidential results were questionable. The EAC’s East African Legislative Assembly 
(EALA), which had observed the elections, did not endorse the electoral process or supposed 
presidential result. The American and EU Ambassadors had requested that the ECK hold off the 
announcement of the supposed presidential results, pending verification. The ECK had agreed as 
long as both the ODM and the PNU agreed to the same but the PNU had refused.311 Thus, the 
Election Observation Missions (EOMs) of the Commonwealth and the EU did not endorse the 
electoral process or the supposed presidential results, on the grounds that the counting and tallying 
                                                          
306 Kanyinga (2013), pp 97-8; Lindenmayer and Kaye (2009), p 11. 
307 Lindenmayer and Kaye (2009), p 8. 
308 Aman (undated), p 7; Lindenmayer and Kaye (2009), p 5 and 11. 
309 Lindenmayer and Kaye (2009), p 8. 
310 Lindenmayer and Kaye (2009), p 6 and 12. 
311 Brown, Stephen (2009) ‘Donor Responses to the 2008 Kenyan Crisis: finally getting it right?’ Journal of 
Contemporary African Studies 27:3, p 392. 
79 
 
process was not credible.312 Meanwhile, a confidential memorandum from the World Bank’s 
Country Director claiming that the UN had endorsed the electoral process and supposed outcome 
was leaked, to denials by the UN.313 
 Following the announcement of the supposed presidential results and the swearing-in, 
however, the US initially prevaricated. Amid allegations that it had suppressed an exit poll 
commissioned by the International Republican Institute (IRI) that gave Odinga an eight per cent 
lead, it furthered congratulations to Kibaki and called on the ODM to respect the supposed 
outcome. However, it eventually aligned itself with the region and the rest of the international 
community which refused to support the status quo by either endorsing the electoral process or 
calling for the ODM to seek remedies through adjudication by the Judiciary.314 
 To the region and the rest of the international community, there was no question either that 
the violence ensuing from the electoral conflict was untenable. Kenya has always played the role 
of regional ‘hegemon’, being relatively unaffected by Cold War conflicts and thus able to provide 
leadership for the resolution of the same in east Africa, the Horn and the Great Lakes.315 In 
addition, the economic consequences of the disruption of infrastructure and trade links caused by 
the violence resulting from the electoral conflict were experienced almost immediately by Kenya’s 
neighbours, reliant on its port,316 in terms of shortages of fuel and other imports.317 Regional 
leaders spoke out immediately, attributing the violence to Kenya’s electoral system and political 
polarisation along ethnic lines and going so far as to call for military deployment or intervention 
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if necessary.318 It has been argued, therefore, that ‘Kenya in 2007-2008 illustrates the logic of 
R2P’s “proximate prevention”. It was less compelling in terms of death levels and forced 
displacement but compelling enough by conjuring up fear of another Rwanda while early 
international action still appealed feasible.’319 
A steady stream of senior Africans thus made its way to Nairobi, urging the PNU to agree 
to negotiation if not mediation with the ODM. These included Archbishop and Nobel Laureate 
Desmond Tutu, a delegation from the Forum of Retired African Presidents (the former Presidents 
of Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia were on this delegation), the AU’s Peace and 
Security Commissioner together with the Ghanaian Ambassador to the AU and, finally, John 
Kufour, Ghanaian President and then AU Chair.320 
Meanwhile, as the mediation effort initially backed by the rest of the international 
community through the World Bank failed, given the leaking of its Country Director’s 
memorandum, the rest of the international community aligned behind support for African 
intervention in the form of mediation, publicly demonstrated through public statements and private 
pressure, particularly on the PNU.321 The United Kingdom (UK) was the first to call publicly for 
a political settlement in the form of power-sharing.322 That call was followed by a joint statement 
by the UK Foreign Secretary and US Secretary of State, a visit by the US Assistant Secretary of 
State for Africa and visits by the EU Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid.323 
Thus, although domestic actors were unable to broker the mediation themselves, being 
viewed as politically partisan, the failed domestic mediation efforts opened the door for regional 
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and international intervention by way of mediation.324 The PNU in particular was unwilling to 
accept mediation by regional and international actors,325 given its assumed incumbency and 
Kenya’s pride in its regional ‘exceptionalism’326 but ‘coerced consent eventually worked’.327 
During his visit, Kufour got both the PNU and the ODM to agree328 to accept intervention in the 
form of an AU-mandated Panel of Eminent African Personalities. The Panel was to be led by Kofi 
Annan, former UN Secretary-General and to include Benjamin Mkapa, former Tanzanian 
President and Graca Machel, former Mozambican and South African first lady,329 who had also 
led the APRM process in Kenya.330 The ODM and the PNU were each to delegate four negotiators, 
one of whom was to be a woman, together with an adviser to the mediation.331 Initial disagreement 
over the name of the process—with the ODM referring to it as an ‘international mediation effort’ 
and the PNU as a ‘national dialogue’—was dispensed with as Annan ruled for it to be named the 
Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR).332 
The ODM was initially resistant to the mediation, its position being that it had rightfully 
won the elections: 
It was not easy to access the ODM people. The most stubborn person was Martin 
Shikuku who said: ‘how do you go and negotiate with a thief, someone you’ve seen 
with a cow passing your gate and you go and negotiate?’ But Raila and [Musalia] 
Mudavadi saw sense and said if a joint meeting was convened, they would go. 
Suggested the same to [the then Attorney-General] Wako, that Raila was willing 
for negotiations… Immediately Kibaki’s team contacted Kufour. Raila said as long 
as [the mediator’s] not from Kenya. Raila was willing, knew these talks might bring 
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sanity for government, thinking of a government of national unity. Had had the 
coalition [under NARC].333 
 
In addition, as PNU had assumed the reins of the state, ODM felt that mediation was the best way 
to have some of its claims recognised:  
One strategy is to make a bigger issue, to internationalise and, when 
internationalise, more likely to gain more of what want.334 
 
Once ODM had agreed in principle to mediation, the question became what would make 
PNU capitulate to it. In the end, many reasons informed its decision. The first appears to have to 
with agency—Kibaki’s personal decision for reasons of both legacy and his own standing in the 
region as well as internationally:  
Don’t know why the PNU capitulated after being so recalcitrant. Maybe Kibaki 
himself relented, which is story that [the lead mediator] Annan tells. Or Kibaki 
made a leadership decision.335 
 
Kibaki wasn’t taking phone calls, the pressure was bearing on him that he’d go 
down badly in history and he didn’t want to be remembered like Moi.336 
 
The Kibaki regime, unlike the Uhuru regime, cared about its image outside. He was 
concerned about his own image.337 
 
Kibaki did not want to be the bad guy of the block. Kibaki acting a statesperson. 
When look at the character of some individuals, a way in which Kibaki did not want 
to be portrayed as someone who was a hardliner, a radical. That’s not his nature, 
he’s more aloof, more laissez-faire, he wanted to portray himself as a 
statesperson.338 
 
 The advice to him of the then head of the civil service, Ambassador Francis Muthaura, may 
have played a role in Kibaki’s ultimate decision, particularly when, like Raila, he was not opposed 
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to the person suggested as lead mediator: ‘Muthaura played a key role because he was a diplomat 
before’.339 
As long as the person being suggested was someone he did not feel had leanings 
towards ODM, remember they’d rejected Cyril Ramaphosa of South Africa on that 
basis.340 
 
Even the South Africans [tried] to bring in [Archbishop] Desmond Tutu, 
Ramaphosa. The South African government had a do-good posture. It was rejected 
outright.341 
 
 Beyond the concern for Kibaki’s personal standing in the region and internationally was 
concern also for Kenya’s standing in the region, especially given its historical leadership in 
mediations in other situations: 
If the AU’s sending a team, and we’re in the AU, have taken leadership in the IGAD 
processes in Sudan, Somalia, we could not afford ourselves to not go the way of 
mediation. Kenya has been key in terms of peacekeeping missions, in Sierra Leone, 
Angola. Kenya’s been key across the continent. On basis of that record, no option 
but to accept a mediation process by the AU… Because that’s what’s in the 
Constitutive Act, the APRM, the UN. We’ve signed up to, whenever there’s a crisis, 
mediation as the route to solve the crisis. That came into play, having signed up to 
these statutes and our record. Our standing within the continent required us to heed 
the voices calling for mediation.342 
 
If we had the AU around us, it might try before we call for the international 
community. Have worked with the AU, seen it tying to intervene in West Africa, 
before we start crying for the others.343 
 
The PNU also felt the pressure domestically on political grounds. The speed and spread of 
the post-elections violence had taken it by surprise. It was also affecting a key PNU political 
constituency, primarily the Gikuyu in the Rift Valley province, as the number of those internally 
displaced kept rising and there was fear of a mutation from political to class discontent. It was 
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evident that the security services, despite being heavy-handed, could not contain the discontent. In 
effect, while the PNU had assumed the presidency for itself, it had lost control of the country: 
It wasn’t AU, it was Kenyans that came together and saved Kenya because we were 
sliding into a war of have and have-nots, not a war of politics anymore. That had 
been recognised early. All of us agreed the [Gikuyu militia allied to the PNU,] 
Mungiki was going to be unleashed and wouldn’t be under anybody’s control. Other 
communities would release their own gangs. It was a dangerous thing.344 
 
Agreed to share power as, in own discussions with the President and Raila, said 
over a thousand have died, how many do you want to see killed? That was weighing 
on the President. When as situation reaches the thousand mark, that’s really 
tragic.345 
 
The violence in the Rift Valley. A core constituency for the Kikuyu elite, 
politically. The general sentiment was that Kenya was sinking into an abyss. I don’t 
think they had ever contemplated that.346 
 
The killings. The turning point for Mwai Kibaki was when he went to Eldoret and 
people took off from him. Many people had been killed, his own Gikuyus shouted 
him down and, as he watched, one more hut got choma-ed [burnt] in the distance, 
with all the jeshis [militia] he had arranged. It was a personal decision. Because the 
people around him, they are die-hards, they aren’t people to negotiate. Kibaki had 
to deliver a deal as his people were digging in.347 
 
There was violence around the country and they’d lost the power to put an end to 
that violence. They’d lost control of the country.348 
 
Kibaki was also under pressure. Calls were coming in from the Rift Valley, people 
crying. This is what made Uhuru Kenyatta come in. Couldn’t pass via Kikuyu, 
Limuru, to go to western Kenya. The problem in the Rift Valley, the police 
overwhelmed, that’s what made Kibaki concede.349 
 
And Kofi Annan went to see the President. The language he spoke: ‘Mr President, 
which country are you ruling? There is no Kenya, it’s all burnt down.’ He didn’t 
know that places were burning. Was being told that, in three days, this thing would 
be over. Which wasn’t true.350 
                                                          
344 Interview with General Lazaro Sumbeiywo, member of CCP, Nairobi, January 16, 2015. 
345 Interview with Dr Kofi Annan, lead mediator, Panel of Eminent African Personalities, KNDR, by telephone, May 
6, 2016. 
346 Interview with Dr David Ndii, economist and member of KPTJ, Nairobi, November 17, 2015. 
347 Interview with Linus Gitari, former Group Managing Editor, the NMG, Nairobi, February 16, 2015. 
348 Interview with George Kegoro, former Executive Director, the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ)-Kenya, 
Executive Secretary of the CIPEV under the Grand Coalition Government, Nairobi, January 15, 2016. 
349 Interview with Francis Atwoli, Secretary-General, COTU, Nairobi, January 12, 2016. 
350 Interview with General Lazaro Sumbeiywo, member of CCP, Nairobi, January 16, 2015. 
85 
 
 
 In addition, PNU felt the pressure domestically on economic grounds. Protests in ODM-
controlled areas had also taken the form of economic sabotage, including blockage of the highway 
through the Rift Valley and uprooting of the railway, both interrupting transit trade. A key PNU 
economic constituency, the private sector, was being negatively affected. The PNU had prided 
itself on the economic recovery made under NARC following the political transition of 2002 and 
the private sector had access to the PNU and the presidency to express its concerns: 
Our leaders are personal and personalised and take decisions based on the same. 
They couldn’t transact business; that pressure may have been brought to bear. One 
of the dynamics of Kenya that’s different, the middle class is bigger. Domestic 
pressure in terms of their own interests counts. Didn’t calculate on the basis of the 
poor, they think the poor can be contained and managed. Found they weren’t 
managing and the violence wasn’t ending. Was going to hurt them. They hadn’t 
planned economically for the crisis. Thought the worst that would happen would 
be that Luos would stand up in Kisumu and some towns. That’s why the Gikuyu 
response was hastily put together.351 
 
Much as some of the Kibaki elite wanted to go on with the war, hurting their 
business interests, reporting KES2 billion [losses] a day. Much as posturing [that 
was] under control, things out of control and they knew it. Within the security elite, 
a feeling of: ‘oh goodness’. They weren’t able to shut it down. Saw that without 
accepting something mediated, they would’ve been overhauled by Raila.352  
 
Brought home to this political elite the fragility of the country. All their wealth is 
here. Hadn’t known they were sitting on a tinderbox. Joe Wanjohi [a Gikuyu 
businessman close to Kibaki] got intelligence that the next phase [was] to burn their 
buildings. The Kikuyu business elite initiated the parallel mediation under Colin 
Bruce [then head of the World Bank in Kenya] as they realised the threat to their 
economic interests. Not how you want to get people to the table, to surround their 
properties with jerry cans, but comes to that if they don’t hear any other language. 
 
They had no idea that stealing an election would have economic consequences. 
They were war-mongering and then they get surprised. Economic shock, pure self-
interest. Business went to see Kibaki and put pressure on him to compromise.353 
 
The Kibaki regime was surrounded by people who’d invested in this country, the 
Kibaki elite, the owners of capital. Chris Kirubi [another Gikuyu businessman], Joe 
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Wanjohi, himself, unlike the Moi regime where capital was outside. The interests 
of capital swayed him to talk.354 
 
I don’t think they would’ve survived for more than three months with a blockade 
on Kenya. None of us would. I always wondered what would’ve happened if we’d 
continued. What was fascinating was the shilling didn’t depreciate, people taking 
out money, in dollars, but money coming in from Diaspora intense as well, so 
evened out.355 
 
As the PNU’s post-elections scenario planning, such as it was, fell apart, no alternative 
plan emerged:  
Had done activities at community, national level, having candidates sign up to 
forms saying would accept outcomes. So that turned violent a surprise to us, hadn’t 
put anything in place to steer process in event of violence.356  
 
The lack of leadership on this front, together with both the incapacity of and mounting tensions 
within the PNU and between the security services meant that mediation came to be seen as the 
lesser evil in terms of a way out. Karua, who’d been sworn in as PNU’s Minister for Justice argues 
that: 
Can’t say that PNU didn’t want talks. Remember that at KICC [the national tallying 
centre, the Kenyatta International Conference Centre] what refused was discussing 
outcome before declaration of results. Results never negotiated. If disputed, can 
take to court or talk. That was my view, not a government position. Once talks 
agreed upon, the resistance was not about talks.357 
 
But, she admits:  
We were supposed to be in charge. We seemed to be in a paralysis. At wits end. 
Everybody was feeling helpless amongst us as Ministers, Kibaki not leading, felt 
we were being negligent about people’s lives by not being decisive.358 
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On [January 1, 2008], a few of us had gone to see President to support him in what 
needed to be done as needed a response that wouldn’t add to the violence. I wanted 
the President to appear on national television asking people to be calm, ordering 
security agencies to do their duties as already reports being idle while on duty. 
Should have cautioned all security personnel would be personally liable from 
anything in their areas. Remember telling them we can be accused of criminal 
negligence but couldn’t command security forces. Didn’t know the Minister of 
Internal Security and the Police Commissioner were not on talking terms. 
Information coming to the Minister might not reach the Commissioner and vice 
versa. They fell out. That explains the lack of response. 
To the public, there was total absence of government in the middle of all 
this chaos and the situation only began to stabilise when talks commenced and the 
opposition at the encouragement of Kofi Annan had gone to their areas to cool the 
situation. That suggestion of talks did save the country because the situation was 
degenerating by the minute. Remember one horror being shown on television in 
Naivasha, houses being burnt, arrows, police not arresting, something from hell.359 
 
The PNU thus capitulated because it had no plan B of its own. And, once it had agreed to 
mediation, the mediation developed its own dynamic and logic: 
A mediation process was going to uphold ODM which PNU hated but, on other 
hand, would uphold PNU as would give them a semblance of control over the 
country. They’d run out of ideas about how to manage the country going forward. 
One hope was that, out of mediation, would come ideas on continuing in power and 
buying time. Agreeing to mediation threatens you but less bad than violence 
including on a support-base that is the object of the violence. Buying time in hope 
that, if agreed to mediation, things would clarify with them still in power.360 
 
The odds were stacked against them. Their claim to have won the election was 
tenuous. Once process started, had own dynamic, once a foot in the door, difficult 
to resist. Not sure PNU had much choice except to accept reality.361 
 
 Part of accepting reality had to do with the PNU placing its own interests on the table, 
given that ODM was engaging with the AU and also seeing the AU’s intervention as preferable to 
intervention by anybody else: 
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The AU had been rejected by Kibaki’s people for a while but the message got 
through that wouldn’t get recognised. Then Raila is seen to be talking to some of 
these people. A moment they’d have been loath to allow to happen. Imagine if front 
page was Raila meeting with all these international names? A complication.362 
 
Kufour saw President and suggested that can’t let the country go down, we need to 
talk to the other side. Although the President declared winner, the other side held 
half the country. In that situation, where the [opposition] had a slight majority in 
parliament, nothing will ever go on here. We need to talk. Kibaki convinced. 
Kufour said important to agree who’ll facilitate, suggested his countryman, [former 
Tanzanian President] Mkapa, Graca [Machel] and said would check with the other 
side. No formal AU resolution but Chair. As respectable head of AU, we accepted 
it and the opposition also accepted it.363  
 
Kibaki happier with an African process than a non-African process. Because there 
was a rumour, which had some legitimacy, that the West was with the opposition. 
The opposition and civil society were seen as amenable to the West. So that 
intervention came from the AU was critical in the sense that Kibaki would find it 
easier to talk to his colleagues, President Kufour and ultimately [Tanzanian 
President Jakaya] Kikwete.364 
 
You’ve got to choose. Intervention by the AU or by the EU and [the] US. Seemed 
more benign to deal with the AU. [Given] the flip-flopping of the US, the US had 
lost the moral high ground so couldn’t be the face of that mediation. The EU had 
been accused by Kibaki of favouring Raila. The AU all too aware of their 
governance flaws, would be more tolerant of deficiencies. Also a misreading by 
PNU and those in power of the shape that mediation would take.365 
 
 That said, once the mediation had begun, the PNU recovered enough to pursue its 
interests—and the retention of power—vigorously, including through assuming some financial 
responsibility for the mediation: 
We were worried the situation would be internationalised in the sense that they 
literally take over, almost become part of you and lead everything. I was advised 
by a senior UN official here, a lady, whatever happened, the negotiations must 
remain a GoK process, must take ownership. 
When Kibaki appointed me negotiator, the first thing I did was say we have 
to acknowledge there’s a government, even if disputed and that the talks are a 
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government thing and it’s the government that will implement and that government 
takes financial responsibility. Anybody wishing to support brings to basket under 
the UNDP [UN Development Programme] with no strings attached. Therefore, 
although much money paid by friends into the basket, we paid for Serena [Hotel, 
where the bulk of the negotiations took place] and we took responsibility.366 
 
The PNU’s pursuit of these interests and the retention of power also played out in contests 
over language, the nature of the political settlement and, once the political settlement was reached, 
the division of ministerial portfolios between ODM and PNU: 
One of the stand-offs a simple matter of terminology. ODM talking about mediation 
and PNU would say no, these people coming for a cup of tea and then moved on to 
dialogue. When you say mediation, a particular approach with a particular structure 
whereas dialogue can be free-flowing engagement without particular agenda. So 
the minute ODM talking about mediation, PNU resisted as had implications: that 
had to recognise a problem; that problem needed a solution; that solution involved 
mediation. Then, who are the mediators, then a simple step to say can’t have anyone 
in Kenya as an acceptable mediators, have to think about others. What looked like 
simple matters of wording reason […] the process called the Kenya National 
Dialogue and Reconciliation because word mediation remained largely 
unacceptable to PNU even though eventually accepted process itself.367 
 
We [PNU] wanted Kibaki to have total control. Wanted to accommodate them 
[ODM] but on our terms. They wanted to be in government as a right. They won 
the day. But want best for your side, to cede as little ground as possible. If we’d 
had our way, they’d have come in as Ministers under Kibaki and Kibaki would 
decide. The outcome was a coalition government not a government of national 
unity. And ours went further as entrenched in the Constitution. We also didn’t want 
to entrench it in the Constitution.368 
 
The government realised that this is between self-preservation of the political elite 
and preservation of the nation. It had those two choices. If I go for self-preservation 
of the elite, then I may not achieve preservation of the nation. They were aware that 
that would also have serious ramifications for the region. The thing that softened 
them was the carrot of the government of national unity. They recognised that they 
could try to have their cake and eat it at the same time. Let’s aim for partial self-
preservation while at same time we preserve unity of the country.369 
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There wasn’t any other option. If the situation had deteriorated further, would’ve 
been on their watch, they would’ve been responsible. They were in charge of 
security and protection and probably felt that, even with power-sharing, given 
powers of incumbency, could still have influence and power and survive. If didn’t 
share power, how would they have defended themselves or what would they have 
had in terms of political influence?370 
 
What incentive was there for PNU? Even as agreed to mediate, [PNU] took all key 
ministries.371 
 
Ultimately, the political settlement was both face- and image-saving because PNU got enough out 
of it: 
Kibaki not forced to climb down. A sweetener there, we will survive this. Lost 
some, but not the big prize, which we were fighting for. And much as pissed them 
off, when push came to shove, will still run government.372 
 
 Domestic calculations and pressure aside, the region also exerted pressure. Neighbouring 
countries experienced immediate effects on their economies with transit trade from the Kenyan 
port to Uganda and Rwanda effectively stopped: 
The implications of our crisis on the region [meant] the leaders in the region had a 
major interest in Kenya being stable in terms of their economies. These actors had 
a stake in peace in Kenya.373 
  
Given the ‘Sabre-rattling from Museveni and [Rwandan President Paul] Kagame because 
of the blockage’,374 Rwanda and maybe Uganda played a role in pushing the AU to resolve this 
given the movement of their goods;375 ‘Don’t forget that Museveni had been here, Kagame was 
talking to him, so there was pressure to talk.’376 
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The region as a whole also exerted pressure, including at the highest possible level through 
a delegation from the Forum of Retired African Presidents: 
There was [former Zambian President Kenneth] Kaunda, Graca, [former 
Mozambican President Joachim] Chissano, [former Botswanan President Festus] 
Mogaye, Mkapa. These African Presidents who’d left power and were walking 
freely, Kaunda telling stories about life after power, waking up and finding no 
drivers and no chaperones. That did begin to change the siege mentality. Presidents 
do leave power.377 
 
There were former heads of state in town, some had difficulty getting appointments 
with Kibaki but in end felt couldn’t be resisting or appear to be refusing to talk as 
situation getting out of hand. By the time Kufour came in, had decided would try 
mediation. But [was] not sure would lead anywhere.378 
 
The region stayed engaged through the mediation, including at the very last stage, when agreement 
had to be reached on the political settlement: ‘Heads were knocked together, was it Kikwete with 
Kibaki?’379 
Kofi Annan was compelled to call [then Tanzanian President] Kikwete on how the 
Office of Prime Minister works. Kikwete said: ‘I also have a Prime Minister and 
do you hear him?’ [Thus there was] domestic pressure from the owners of capital 
and external pressure from the region and the international community.380 
 
The rest of the international community also maintained high-level engagement—
including threats of financing cuts and targeted sanctions—to ensure the mediation happened and, 
following, throughout the mediation: ‘International pressure sufficiently mounting’.381 This too 
explains the consent of the PNU to the mediation and, ultimately, to the political settlement: 
They keep shouting about [only receiving] two per cent [of the budget from] aid, 
but get recurrent and development expenditure and a big issue.382 
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The international community was catching up with them as individuals. The need 
for pressure individually. The Americans published names of people they wouldn’t 
give visas to, a big story, that donors would use that as a carrot or a stick.383 
  
The personal sanctions made a difference, the threat they’d go for families as well 
as all of them had children in the West, money. A big incentive.384 
 
Pressure from the international community and threats, they were throwing 
tantrums. Remember some announcing would deny visas to perceived hardliners of 
the Kibaki side. Whenever there’s a hard stand, they never blame the principal, but 
the agents. We [PNU] were being blamed, threatened with denial of visas which 
thought silly as not everybody dying to go out there. Asked whether the position of 
heaven had changed.385 
 
The international community, led by America through the Ambassador, also were 
calling. Kibaki received calls from Washington.386 
 
There was the [former US President George] Bush trip, [US Secretary of State] 
Condi Rice flew in. The last bit of pressure that was decisive had to do with the 
visit by Condi Rice.387 
 
It is the Americans who made Kibaki talk. Not the AU. It’s Condoleeza Rice.388 
 
Can’t just ignore superpowers. The [US] Secretary of State, when she came and 
said you either find an option or dot, dot, dot. This guy in Kenya Airways, part of 
Kibaki elite, [was] pissed off: how can a small girl come and talk to them like 
that?389 
 
The international community was strong when had Condoleeza Rice come in. Both 
carrots and sticks used to help two sides come to an agreement. Not just about PNU 
and ODM, greater than one side wants power. We’ve got the UN here, international 
agencies, those things came to bear in terms of softening both sides.390 
 
Overall, domestic, regional and international pressure all leveraged each other: 
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There was a domestic voice proposing things, it wasn’t an alien thing imposed on 
people, it was a situation where Kenyans were saying what should happen. The EU 
were a bit slow, were afraid of being viewed as people intervening but were able to 
point to domestic pressure. Above all, it was Kofi Annan, with his prestige. Was 
here for the AU. It was an African solution. Westerners could back it up without 
fear of being seeing as interventionist, imperialist.391 
 
The choice of the mediator helped to harness the three different sources of pressure by 
insisting on a single mediation and by calling for pressure to be brought to bear when necessary. 
The high standing of Kofi Annan ensured this. Negotiators from both sides also credited the lead 
mediator which his strategic guidance of the negotiations, including through pre-emptive 
announcements of his vision for the political settlement, moving all negotiators to a secret location 
to break an initial deadlock on the nature of the political settlement and, finally, resorting to 
negotiations between the two Principals only, locking the two negotiating teams out and bringing 
Kikwete in, as both then Chair of the AU and a peer with a similar constitutional arrangement: 
Anan announced would be a grand coalition government. Our side [PNU] upset, I 
made statement he’s pre-empting as haven’t negotiated. That nearly broke the talks 
when Annan decided to sit with Raila and Kibaki without any of us.392 
 
Just Raila and Kibaki in the room with Kofi, Mkapa and Kikwete, President 
Kikwete chairing as Chair of the AU. The discussion was do we constitutionalise 
the Accord. Kibaki felt no need to constitutionalise. Attorney-General [Wako] 
called to give advice. Raila said the Attorney-General serves the government of the 
day and he needs his own lawyers. That’s why I [James Orengo, ODM negotiator] 
was called in. An argument between me and Wako on constitutionalising the 
Accord. Agreement that provisions had to be constitutionalised. Sent out with 
Wako to do final draft using Kofi’s Secretariat. Did final draft and went back. Even 
after had read final document, Kibaki refused to have any discussion with his team 
and said everybody should go downstairs and prepare seats and table for signing 
ceremony. What Muthaura did was prepare seats. Without that, wasn’t going to be 
an Accord. Said should sign every page, which they did. Signed the agreement and 
a celebration. The Accord signed and follow-up was how this unity could be shown, 
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the two of them should go out to the country particularly to the Rift Valley to cool 
tempers down.393 
 
 
4.4.2 The content of the mediation of Kenya’s 2007-8 electoral conflict 
The KNDR began on January 22, 2008, three weeks into the violence occasioned by the electoral 
conflict,394 in the awareness that its failure could precipitate descent into civil war and its success 
the opportunity for structural reform demanded by domestic actors for two decades.395 It had two 
objectives: achieving a political settlement to end the violence; and catalysing structural reform.396 
These objectives were to be reached through negotiations on a Road Map with four agenda items: 
ending the violence and restoring human rights (proximate causes); addressing the humanitarian 
crisis; addressing the electoral conflict (the trigger); and addressing the long-term problems 
(structural causes).397 The first two agenda items implicitly reflected R2P.398 
By February 1, 2008, the KNDR had concluded agenda item one, agreeing to the 
demobilisation and disarmament of all armed groups and militia and investigations into the 
violence through a Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Elections Violence (CIPEV).399 By 
February 4, 2008, the KNDR had also concluded agenda item two, agreeing to the restoration of 
suspended human rights and humanitarian assistance, including the re-settlement of all internally 
displaced persons (IDPs).400 
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Agenda item three had two components: addressing the past (the 2007 General Elections); 
and addressing the present and future (the political settlement in the form of power-sharing).401 On 
the first component, it was eventually agreed that neither a re-count nor a re-tally of the supposed 
presidential results was possible given the compromise and destruction of some electoral records. 
Neither was it possible to hold a new presidential poll, given the disrepute of the ECK and the 
displacement that had occurred as a result of the violence.402 Therefore, by February 11, 2008, the 
KNDR had agreed on investigations into the elections through an Independent Review 
Commission (IREC) with a mandate to recommend electoral reforms.403 Although an IREC 
member has since claimed that it was clear that the IREC’s task was not to determine who won, 
the wording of the agreement belies that clarity.404 Regardless, the issue of who had won the 
presidential election was effectively parked. The KNDR thus deferred accusations and blame about 
both the elections and the violence to two Commissions of Inquiry, to be composed of both 
domestic and regional/international members to ensure independence and public confidence, with 
short timelines for completing their mandates and quick public reporting for transparency.405 
As to the second component, negotiations on a political settlement involving power-sharing 
proved far more difficult and lengthy, taking about three-and-a-half weeks to conclude. The PNU 
was particularly (if unsurprisingly) intransigent on this component, claiming variously that power-
sharing would end Kenya’s multipartyism and political pluralism as it would decimate the political 
opposition, that it was unconstitutional and amounted to a ‘civilian coup’ and that it would 
fragment Executive power.406 The ODM insisted, based on its previous experience with the failed 
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MoU within the NARC post-2002, that any power-sharing would have to be entrenched within the 
Constitution.407 The three-and-a-half weeks therefore saw much backtracking, brinkmanship, 
delaying tactics and prevarication, particularly from the PNU’s negotiating team, dealt with by the 
Panel by announcing agreement on power-sharing during a parliamentary ‘kamukunji’ [meeting], 
organising a retreat for the negotiating teams and, finally, suspending the negotiations for direct 
recourse to the Principals.408 In a closed-door meeting with the two Principals, Annan and Mkapa, 
supported by Kikwete, Tanzanian President and new AU Chair, finally reached a political 
settlement in the form of a power-sharing agreement that established the position of Prime Minister 
for Odinga and a coalition government of the ODM and the PNU.409 On February 28, 2008, the 
Agreement on Principles of Partnership of the Coalition Government was concluded,410 together 
with the National Accord and Reconciliation Bill, 2008.411 The political settlement was a 
compromise, in which neither the ODM nor the PNU got what they had originally wanted.412 
By March 4, 2008, agenda item four had also been concluded, including agreements on 
establishing a Committee of Experts (CoE) to conclude the constitutional reform process and a 
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) to address the sources of economic and 
political grievance as well as on the members of the CIPEV and the IREC. On May 23, 2008, 
agreement was reached on principles to guide implementation of the KNDR agreement and, 
finally, on July 30, 2008, an implementation matrix was concluded.413 
As to why the mediation agenda included four key items:  
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What we wanted, based on our experience in mediations we’ve done in various 
places, was first, stop the mayhem. Get people to share power because that was the 
immediate reason why we had the crisis. Then look at the root causes, that every 
time we have elections in this country we fight. Ours had a basis, a contested 
election.414 
 
The most contentious item on the mediation agenda—and the most difficult to negotiate 
during the mediation itself—had to do with what had triggered the post-elections violence. The 
process and supposed outcome of the presidential elections was eventually addressed through an 
agreement to establish the IREC into the 2008 General Elections and, of course, the power-sharing 
agreement. 
Prior to the arrival of the mediation team, however, Kenyan academic and civil society 
constituencies had already determined that, of all possible options to address the process and 
supposed outcome of the presidential elections, some sort of accommodation between PNU and 
ODM was likely to be necessary. A re-run was impossible given both the blow to public confidence 
in the ECK and the on-going violence around the country. A re-count was out given the apparent 
inability of the ECK to secure the ballot boxes and a fire where they had been stored. A re-tally 
was difficult given the number of altered or missing tallies from all polling stations and all 
constituency tallying centres. Kenyan academics began talk of a coalition government fairly early 
and the peace and security sector of civil society, including Kenyan mediators who’d been engaged 
elsewhere in the continent, was used to proffering power-sharing as an answer to political stand-
offs of this nature. What was needed was to: 
Establish what’d happened with the elections. Then, because incidents around the 
elections, tampering with ballot boxes, the warehouse where materials stored was 
torched, that option off the table. Could’ve done a re-count as problems were with 
counting and tallying. But that option interfered with. Because many people 
perceived the security services as partisan, couldn’t even say secure the elections 
materials because who’d secure them?415  
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Violence started spreading fast—the pattern common every time there were 
elections. The only thing that came to my mind was coalition governments in the 
context of disputed elections for purposes of preparing a constitutional framework. 
Called [political scientist] Michael Chege and asked him what usually happens and 
he said: ‘yes, this is recipe for a coalition government and there’s no way PNU can 
govern under any circumstances’. But it was a stolen election and he said there’s 
no way PNU would agree. 
The crisis presented opportunity to have a shared government that could 
deliver. A shared government with limited mandate. Messed-up election, can’t do 
re-count, can’t go back to the polls, so take the pain, have an illegitimate, shared 
government for two years, transitional government, to institute legitimate 
leadership.416 
 
We are about 50/50 [between ODM and PNU], close to half of the votes. Wanted 
something credible that will mean the anomaly has been addressed. Hence the 
‘mkate nusu’ [half-loaf] slogan.417 
 
The Kenya Scenarios Project [of the Society for International Development, SID] 
came over to CCP [Concerned Citizens for Peace], issued a Citizens Agenda for 
Peace. Ideas emerged as to way forward. Cannot re-count the ballot, cannot re-tally. 
And if were to re-run, would need a preparatory period, not possible, couldn’t call 
elections within next three months. Even if re-counted and decided ECK 
mispronounced, wasn’t going to be as easy as saying here’s the correct winner. So 
the suggestion was that needed a government of national unity. Didn’t call it a 
Grand Coalition Government. But said would be an interim government for two, 
three years that’d reform institutions. The surprise was when agreement signed and 
parties willing to go full five years.418 
 
Made a memorandum on what workers wanted. Continued to appeal to leaders to 
strike a compromise. We were asking for a government of national unity. We didn’t 
have a coalition government in mind. Achieved it. Told Kibaki. He said not with 
[William] Ruto [a member of the ODM leadership]. Said bring all into government, 
you’re an elder. Raila said, when Prime Minister, it’s you who gave me this job.419 
 
Remember [Anglican Archbishop Eliud] Wabukala bringing up Prime Minister.420 
 
The current Bishop of the Anglican Church of Kenya said he called Kofi Annan 
and suggested [a] coalition government. There were many people talking to both 
sides, it was from individuals the shift began to happen.421 
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 While addressing the process and supposed outcomes of the presidential election was 
recognised as necessary, the priority agenda items were: one, ending the violence and disarming 
armed groups; and two, addressing the humanitarian crisis and restoring fundamental freedoms. 
This was recognised by negotiators from both ODM and PNU:  
For us [ODM] what most important was political crisis and who goes to State 
House. Yet not most important in circumstances. Got reports from security 
agencies, the Red Cross, daily briefings from Kofi’s own Secretariat about how 
many people had died, how many in hospital, what kind of wounds suffering, either 
shot or crude weapons, knifed, speared. Had a chilling effect on negotiators. All 
agreed had to stop the violence. 
How to stop the violence and restore respect for fundamental rights and 
freedoms. That was immediate. Then how to deal with humanitarian crisis, the 
deaths, the displaced persons. Thirdly, how to deal with political crisis and long-
term issues.422 
 
 The sequencing of the agenda items was deliberate on the part of the lead mediator as well 
as the urgent manner in which he approached agenda item one. The primary agreement arising 
here had to do with the establishment of the CIPEV and, later, the TJRC, recommendations about 
which had been pending since just after the political transition of 2002: 
Created the CIPEV [which when constituted became known as the Waki 
Commission after the Judge, Philip Waki, who chaired it], in our parlance, the small 
TJRC, to deal with immediate problems and TJRC will deal with long term.423  
 
Those agenda items concluded, the more difficult agenda item was on addressing the 
election. The lead mediator, having benefited from views of Kenyan academics and civil society 
prior to his arrival was also clear that some kind of accommodation needed to be found. The 
positions of the two negotiating teams were, however, initially intransigent: 
What caused problems was dealing with the political crisis. The PNU delegation 
said ODM could should accept the role of being a loyal opposition. But preliminary 
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reports from the electoral commission were that couldn’t determine a winner and 
our [ODM’s] view was that won the elections, Raila should become President and 
ODM should form government. These contending positions difficult to deal with. 
Other side said [we were] responsible for the violence because didn’t accept the 
elections.424 
 
Again, the manner in which the lead mediator handled the intransigence was deliberate, 
including taking the negotiating teams through each option proposed, bringing in comparative 
examples, trying to turn the political impasse into a legal problem capable of resolution and, when 
all else failed, reversion directly to the Principals. 
Kofi’s idea was to bring people to us [both negotiating teams] to have conversations 
on how problems like this could be resolved. Brought up sharing power. He came 
out strongly imploring us to be honest [about] whether Kenya could have a repeat 
election with violence that had taken place, integrity of electoral commission in 
question and incumbent in power that wouldn’t like other result. So brought people 
who had ideas about sharing of power. Said even in more mature democracies, 
where elections results not conclusive and formation of government becomes 
difficult, coalitions are formed. PNU obviously adverse to discussions on that.425 
 
 Once the idea of a political settlement involving power-sharing was accepted in principle, 
the issue became the devil in the detail: 
Then engaged in formation of government, portfolio balance. Against 
parliamentary strength, ODM had more members but agreed on 50/50. Kofi had 
told us if you have this kind of coalition where almost equal in numbers, important 
to look at key ministries outside the presidency, the deputy, Treasury, Internal 
Affairs, Foreign Affairs. Anybody who controlled those ministries would carry 
government. Raila had idea [of] a Permanent Secretary from ODM, Minister from 
PNU. But said important to take ministry in entirety so work can be done. 
Arrangement accepted was to mix and match every ministry. 
He said: ‘Can’t the lawyers come up with solutions?’ I was the only lawyer 
on the ODM side. On the other side, three lawyers, Martha, Wetangula, [Kilonzo] 
Mutula. Said let’s have a chat about constitutional, legal questions that would arise 
having a Prime Minister. PNU didn’t want two centres of power. [Said] if you have 
that arrangement, should be clear that Prime Minister responsible directly and 
accountable to the President and appointed and dismissed. Our position was that 
should have executive Prime Minister and Ministers from our end would be 
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appointed by the Prime Minister. Total disagreement, a bitter exchange of words 
and Kofi was incensed with Martha. Called off meeting and said going to talk to 
Principals. Said talks should continue, leave power-sharing, start dealing with long-
term issues, constitutional reforms, land, legal and institutional reforms. Had a 
document, what became the Accord, but everything contested and in brackets. Kofi 
not making progress. So went back to Raila and Kibaki.426 
 
 Ultimately, the primary agreements under agenda item three on addressing the elections 
had to do with establishing the IREC to examine all failures of the 2008 General Elections and the 
power-sharing agreement establishing what became known as the Grand Coalition Government: 
‘The elections, if we went on finding fault, wouldn’t find answers so another Commission.’427 
 The trigger for the post-elections violence thus addressed, the mediation then moved on to 
the long-term and structural issues deemed to constitute the proximate and structural causes of the 
post-elections violence. For Kenyan academics and civil society, agenda item four on the long-
term issues was the most critical and the impact of their engagement was evident:  
The Accord gave an opening to allow more than political actors to be involved in 
the reform process, taken advantage of to the fullest, a second chance for Kenya 
which most countries never get.428 
 
Political scientists think[ing] about using moment to do institution-building as 
social renewal. Unfinished business from failed constitutional review of 2005. 
What informed the content of the national accord? The dialogue team and people 
around the dialogue team on both sides. But in terms of agenda four, [constitutional 
lawyer] Wachira [Maina], [economist Dr] David [Ndii] and [political scientist 
Professor Karuti Kanyinga] were contracted to give meat to agenda four.429 
 
 The women’s movement also saw it as a chance to make progress on addressing the gender-
specific impacts of the post-elections violence and advance women’s political representation in all 
the mechanisms arising from the Accord: 
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Key issues women wanted to bring out: how the conflict affected women, how 
sexual violence to be dealt with, services for women. Reinforcing regional and 
international commitments to women’s rights. Also representation of women in the 
negotiations, calling for the two parties to have women in the negotiation teams, 
mediation team to have services of a gender expert, so that all gender issues 
addressed. 
The contributions from women’s groups impacted on final outcome of the 
mediation. Indicators, the Commissions, the representation of women 
mainstreamed in all that. Provisions for women to be appointed. All proposals on 
addressing root causes were there. The setting up of the CIPEV and how it invested 
in [addressing] sexual violence. So women’s participation had an impact, all the 
way to the Constitution.430 
 
Negative and positive peace were pursued at the same time. Negative was to 
negotiate immediately an end to violence. But not just signing of the peace 
agreement. Attempt to ask question why, what led to this? Civil society saying 
bound to happen, the land issue, social injustice issues, have caught up with us and 
need to return to them. Can’t talk about ‘Africanness’ without emphasising that 
difference relative to other cases.431 
 
First was to stop the killings, stop the violence, protect the people and find a way 
of ending the conflict and bringing tensions down. That was the rationale behind 
the effort to get the two leaders to come out and shake hands and send the message 
that they were ready to talk. Gave time to move on to humanitarian assistance to 
those in desperate need. Then focused on the political settlement and long-term 
issues. A four-phased approach. From the beginning, all determined not only to 
stop violence but to ensure that Kenya, so important to the region of Africa, dealt 
with root causes and ensure that not repeated at the next elections.432 
 
4.5 The roles played by domestic, regional and international actors in the mediation of Kenya’s 
2007-8 electoral conflict 
If PNU was initially shocked by the public response to the swearing-in of Kibaki and the unfolding 
violence, ODM was also shocked but also thinking of how to internationalise and publicise 
protests: 
I was part of a group called the ODM intellectuals who were coming up with policy 
and looking at how, if ODM won, ODM would deliver on its promises. The group 
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was not re-convened post the elections but I had access to the Pentagon and would 
go in and out of [ODM’s headquarters at] Orange House. So we were coalescing 
but not as an organised group.  
We were trying to make sense of it. We responded by the first meetings with 
the party leadership when it became clear violence had broken out and the elections 
had been stolen. There were meetings at Orange House at senior level, Raila, the 
Pentagon, people running on party tickets who’d been elected. Discussions were 
mooted on conversations with international leadership and trying to get an 
intervention. At the same time, there were discussions about going to the streets 
and demonstrating. There was a group within ODM that wanted to install Raila at 
Uhuru Park. The other side got wind of that and cordoned off the park. We started 
the demonstrations moving from Orange House trying to get to Uhuru Park but had 
the special GSU [General Service Unit] or AP unit, the teenage mutant ninjas, 
stopping us. Raila never came and don’t know if he intended to. That’s when we 
found out Ruto was a coward, the old activist types like Anyang [Nyong’o] walked, 
but Ruto turned tail early. 
As rank and file, I was not privy to those discussions [on when to talk to 
PNU]. Those discussions were in the inner circle.433 
 
4.5.1 Domestic civil society, including the women’s movement and the private sector 
Civil society’s role in democratisation was evident during Kenya’s 2007-8 electoral conflict, 
despite the differences in understanding of the conflict and the approaches adopted by the two 
main civil society groupings that emerged at the time. These groupings have been defined as 
including, on the one hand, conservatives and moderates and, on the other hand, progressives and 
radicals.434 
The conservatives and moderates saw peace as both a means and an end and thus 
effectively supported the status quo with respect to the elections, consonant with the PNU’s 
position. The progressives and radicals saw truth and justice about both the elections and the 
violence as means to the end of peace and demanded accountability for the same, consonant with 
the ODM’s position. The conservatives and moderates, including Christian organisations 
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uncomfortable with the ODM’s campaign promises to Muslim organisations and on devolution, 
as well as ‘conflict entrepreneurs’ (senior diplomats and military officials involved in peace 
processes outside Kenya), grouped together under CCP.435 Their engagement was through public 
prayers as well as lobbying the media around peace promotion and, more importantly, parties to 
the electoral conflict on mediation if not negotiation. 
The progressives and radicals, including academics as well as governance, human rights 
and legal organisations, grouped together under Kenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice 
(KPTJ).436 Their engagement was through elections- and then violence-monitoring to generate 
data and analysis on both the elections and the violence. For example, KPTJ audited the 
presidential results, revealing significant differences between tallies at the presidential as 
compared to parliamentary and local levels, and advocated for mediation.437 The Women’s 
Consultative Group’s Women’s Memorandum was ultimately in line with KPTJ’s position,438 as 
was the position of the Kenya Association of Manufacturers (KAM), Kenya’s largest private-
sector umbrella organisation.439 
Civil society contributed to resolving Kenya’s 2007-8 electoral conflict: ’CSOs [Civil 
society organisations] in Kenya have played what appear to be non-traditional and non-
conventional roles’.440 Civil society obviously assisted with the humanitarian response to the 
violence that ensued from the electoral conflict, liaising with humanitarian organisations and 
providing services to survivors and victims441 as well as protection to elections and violence 
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monitors.442 It also, particularly through the women’s movement, initiated local-level 
reconciliation.443 
But civil society was also the first to identify the patterns of violence: spontaneous violence 
in protest in ODM strongholds; ODM-organised violence in the Rift Valley aimed at perceived 
PNU supporters; counter-attacks by PNU in the South Rift Valley and Nairobi; and excessive use 
of force by the security services in ODM strongholds, all including GBSV.444 It also identified the 
causes of the violence, with the announcement of the supposed presidential results and swearing-
in providing the trigger.445 Civil society challenged claims of the PNU and international media 
that the violence was atavistic and primordial: ‘the violence [was] neither genocide nor ethnic 
cleansing’, given that the state had not collapsed but was conducting selective and uneven policing 
aimed at preventing protest and not providing protection.446 It identified possible solutions to the 
electoral conflict, discounting arbitration through the Judiciary given the new judicial 
appointments made unilaterally by Kibaki (three in the very week of the 2007 General Elections) 
and the lack of judicial independence. It moved soon from an initial call for a re-count or re-tally 
to one for a political settlement447 through mediation.448 
Civil society then brought pressure to bear on the two parties to agree to the mediation,449 
including through regional and international advocacy to highlight the electoral conflict and 
provide information on its causes450 in key capitals, including the seats of the AU, EU and UN.451 
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It called for consistent regional and international pressure to get the two parties to the negotiating 
table and keep them there, condemning actions that delayed or subverted the mediation, especially 
by the PNU’s hardliners.452 Given the initial US response, civil society paid particular attention to 
the US in capital, calling for its leadership at the UN Security Council on Kenya, the release of the 
IRI exit poll, suspension of military assistance, re-channelling of development assistance through 
civil society, travel bans and asset freezing of hardliners on both sides as well as those implicated 
in violence through both armed groups and militia and the security services.453 Finally, during the 
mediation, it called for truth and justice and for no impunity for either the elections or the violence 
through investigations into both, a political settlement through power-sharing in the form of a 
transitional government of both PNU and ODM for a short period to oversee constitutional, 
electoral, security service and judicial reform, prepare for devolution, establish a TRJC and 
conduct new elections.454 
Civil society’s impact was clear. The PNU’s initial position was weakened and few states 
recognised Kibaki’s presidency. KPTJ’s demand for truth and justice about both the elections and 
the violence as a means to peace was reflected in US Congress and Senate resolutions pertinent to 
the Kenyan 2007-8 electoral conflict.455 The data and analysis handed over to the Panel was used 
to leverage, when necessary, the positions of the PNU and ODM negotiating teams.456 And civil 
society demands were reflected in both the Road Map and agenda items for the KNDR as well as 
in its final agreements,457 including on the gendered impact of the violence that ensued from the 
electoral conflict and the long-term issues and solutions.458 
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 In short, with the PNU initially bunkered down and ODM trying unsuccessfully to hold its 
public protests, leadership ended up being initially provided by Kenyan academics and civil 
society, as well as, later, the private sector, who provided data and analysis on what had happened 
and potential solutions to both Kenyan and external publics:  
This was the alternative leadership, not something many people prepared for. 
Picking up that responsibility, as alternative leadership, what do you want to do? 
Articulate the crisis and begin to frame options out of it.459 
 
Gatherings began immediately as everybody was: 
 
Struggling like everybody else to understand what just [had] happened, from 
understanding [of] what’d happened, to seeing what was happening, the wanton 
destruction, the killings, the destruction of property.460 
 
Kenyan academics soon merged with the governance, human rights and legal organisations 
to form what became known as KPTJ, whose distinguishing features were two-fold. First, 
‘breaking ranks’ with its members’ assumed political positions based solely on their ethnicity: 
We talked about ‘breaking ranks’. Said let’s get a group of ‘Mount Kenya’ 
professionals [Mount Kenya being the PNU stronghold], go public about the 
government stealing the election, plunging the country into chaos. Said ‘breaking 
ranks’ to say we want justice for these elections. Was a popular idea, needed about 
50 of us to say we’ve broken ranks.461 
 
People in that room were the new Kenyan ethnic, the cross-ethnic. Because 
everybody had sunk into this identity crisis. But people who’d consistently viewed 
Kenya as a viable entity gathered in that room, began asking what to do. Skilful at 
avoiding perception that were one ethnic group because politics had been 
ethnicised. Ethnicity the cover but ideological and policy questions underlying 
that.462 
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Second, the provision of data and analysis on the elections and the patterns of the post-
election violence, together with demands for truth and justice and engagement with the region and 
the rest of the international community: 
Became a question of how soon does Kenya collapse. A core part of civil society 
wouldn’t take Kenya caving in while sitting there. First question was electoral 
violence. As became clear police carrying out shenanigans, ethnic violence in the 
Rift, question of peace and accountability became part of it. Within 48 hours, a 
huge group, about 40/50, press conferences, reaching out to the international 
community.463 
 
This group had been forming, what ended up becoming KPTJ, meeting at the Kenya 
National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR), talking about how to 
respond.464 
 
Don’t remember what made us go to the National Commission but we started 
gathering and working.465 
 
Maina [Kiai] convened us at KNCHR.466 
 
Continued to meet [as academics], another group meeting [at the] KNCHR, at some 
point, those groups merged and originated what is now KPTJ. That went on, got off 
to various initiatives, got structured.467 
 
Formed our own group, KPTJ. Clear, informed and informative, institutions talking 
together, as opposed to the Serena [Hotel] group [of writers and peace and security 
organisations] which was individuals trying to have the status quo, the peace, calm 
agenda. Side-lined it.468 
 
We were trying to put together the story of what’d happened with the elections with 
the help of Koki Muli [then Executive Director of the Centre for Governance and 
Democracy, CGD, which had been key to the domestic elections observation 
umbrella]. We released a statement, collated what we were hearing, no peace 
without truth and justice. Took Koki’s statement, she took us through what’d 
happened, began to inform what we were saying, were putting together the 
pieces.469 
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The one thing everybody agreed about, including PNU sympathisers, was that 
needed to establish what’d happened with the elections. 
That people had been killed began to settle [in] when [the Independent 
Medical-Legal Unit] (IMLU) began to document how many people had been killed 
and how had they been killed. Other people in the room were doing survival 
support. There were three competing narratives of victimhood. Narrative about 
displacement, being sent off from one’s land and losing property. Also the story of 
injury. The invisible story was the story of the deaths.470 
 
Writers and Kenyan mediators who worked with peace and security organisations were, in 
parallel, forming what became known as CCP whose distinguishing feature was seeking to end the 
violence by encouraging dialogue between ODM and PNU, well in advance of the AU 
intervention: 
[Writer] Binyavanga [Wainaina] and I had been working on Kwani 5, [a] creative 
take on the elections. Building up by talking to people, commissioning work, 
workshops, people going into the field. People calling, saying can’t stay on in the 
field, heard there were going to be problems.  
Apart from these calls, other conversations with writers, creatives, other 
friends, using all contacts to find out what was going on. Remember stopping being 
an editor, stopping being a writer [and] starting being a citizen. People who 
straddled civil society and writing were going [to the Serena Hotel]. The Serena 
meetings concentrated on two areas. Everybody would give a small testimony, what 
they knew, what they’d heard, what other people were doing. Then what do we do. 
Nucleus of idea for [Concerned Kenyan Writers] (CKW). How to get beyond time, 
space-specific Serena meetings. Writers’ group so people could share all these 
things. 
Binyavanga, Ory [Okolloh, Ushaidi founder], myself, [journalist] Parselelo 
[Kantai]. Daudi Were [IT specialist] as group was going to be online but also had 
an activist background.471 
 
Started calling. [Ambassador] Bethuel [Kiplagat, mediator for the Somali peace 
talks], Florence [Mpaayei, Executive Director of Nairobi Peace Initiative, NPI]. 
This didn’t look good, situation falling apart.472 
 
Kiplagat calls me [General Lazaro Sumbeiywo, mediator for the South Sudan peace 
talks], I call [General] Daniel Opande, he’s got IDPs on his farm, Kiplagat calls 
George [Wachira of NPI. Dekha [Ibrahim] came in, she was the most useful person 
on our team. She was Muslim and she was a woman so we made her our Convenor. 
Gave us the leeway not to be seen. Our people put tags on us, I was being rung by 
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people from my community saying: ‘Get out of that place or we’ll burn your place’. 
I said: ‘Why don’t you burn it, why are you informing me?’ Became acceptable, 
Daniel a Luo, myself a Kalenjin, just a group of Kenyans and the flavour of Dekha, 
from North-Eastern province, married at the coast.473 
 
Grew group tending towards a movement, CCP. Quickly forming, being surprised 
how many people available to lend themselves to idea that needed to secure the 
peace for things to happen.474 
 
Discussed solution, came to conclusion only way forward was a government of 
national unity.475  
 
 While there were women in leadership in both KPTJ and CCP, what became known as the 
Women’s Consortium came together later than the rest of civil society and at the initiation of 
Machel, a member of the Panel. Relative to the rest of civil society, it also spent more time 
members were affiliated to political parties. A benefit of this, however, was that the Consortium 
could reach out to both sides. But because of when it came together it responded more to the 
mediation agenda already on the table: 
The response was based on a request from Graca Machel to convene women so that 
they speak with one voice. The challenge was women were polarised by tribe and 
political party. Having been here before for the APRM, she’d noticed that. Graca 
didn’t want to receive different petitions from women’s groups, she wanted one 
voice.476 
 
This had come out of Graca saying to [Mary] Wandia she wanted to know what 
women were thinking. When Graca came, Wandia reached out to us across party 
and professional lines. Asked to come as women from the women’s movement but 
also ODM, as feminists able to influence ODM. We were given space to present 
views just as women.477 
 
                                                          
473 Interview with General Lazaro Sumbeiywo, member of CCP, Nairobi, January 16, 2015. 
474 Interview with Florence Mpaayei, former Executive Director, NPI and member of CCP and the Women’s 
Consortium, Nairobi, February 26, 2015. 
475 Interview with Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat, member of CCP, Chair of the TJRC under the Grand Coalition 
Government, Nairobi, week of April 27, 2015. 
476 Interview with Mary Wandia, member of the Women’s Consortium, Nairobi, February 27, 2015. 
477 Interview with Atsango Chesoni, lawyer and member of the Women’s Consortium, member of the CoE under the 
Grand Coalition Government, Nairobi, February 20, 2015. 
111 
 
Call[ed] women together to reflect on crisis and contributions to a solution. Asked 
if I could convene women’s meetings to understand what was going on and add a 
voice. Convene[d] women’s forum and my role was to facilitate.478 
 
Had to ensure had women from key ethnic groups, political parties and sectors. 
Especially women from key political parties, ODM and PNU. The Urgent Action 
Fund (UAF) was already supporting the response to violence against women, 
women working on reconciliation. Also reached out to the UN Development Fund 
for Women (UNIFEM).479 
 
We need[ed] to ‘spit’ to take advantage of the space Graca had opened up. We 
talked about that legacy of exclusion within the women’s movement.480 
 
Provided space for women to acknowledge that, prior to the elections, they weren’t 
united, that was why it was difficult to provide joint response. Requested space for 
candid conversation on what kept them divided to overcome that and work together. 
We later came to call [that meeting] a ‘spitting’ session.  
 
Because people had different feelings and explanations on what was wrong, what 
was happening and how it’d impacted on them. Women from North-Eastern, saying 
not part of the problem. Women from Nyanza were bitter as felt their people had 
been targeted and didn’t feel people speaking out and supporting them. Women 
from Kisii feeling had never had any issue with any ethnic group but, neighbouring 
the Luo, had also suffered. Acknowledged had been polarised by tribe and political 
party which had made it impossible for them to offer alternative voice prior to the 
elections. A challenge to be overcome. A space to come together as women of 
Kenya.481 
 
Not just wearing identity as women, wearing many identities, ethnic groups, 
professions, political affiliations, religious identities. Needed to vent as difficult to 
shape memorandum without individuals looking at it from their political affiliation 
lens or an ethnic lens.482 
 
An agreement we’d nominate 11 women who’d collect and put forward women’s 
concerns to the Eminent Persons.483 
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 The private sector too took longer than civil society to forge a response, partly because a 
generational tension within it had to be overcome. The older generation had benefited more from 
state patronage and was more ready to accept PNU’s incumbency as long as the violence ceased. 
The younger generation, not being as reliant on the state, felt freer to push a policy-oriented 
response: 
Was in Nairobi when results were coming in. Raila leading. Landed in Mombasa, 
drove to Watamu, something had changed. Don’t remember if it was [the burning 
of] Kiambaa church [in the Rift Valley], began hearing incidents at the Coast, 
Gikuyus in Diani starting to get into trouble. Called Patrick Obath, Chair, 
[Federation of Kenya Employers, FKE]. I was Vice-Chair and discussion was that 
business community needed to make statement. Steve Smith [Chief Executive 
Officer], Eveready, Chair of KEPSA [Kenya Private Sector Alliance]. Vimal 
[Shah], Chair of KAM. Things getting worse, kept hearing about areas where 
people turning on Gikuyus. Organised a meeting at Holiday Inn, called friends from 
different communities, had a joke: ‘Are you about killing me now?’ KEPSA, KAM, 
decided to have one meeting. Before rivalry. In face of this crisis, business 
community came together and agreed on KEPSA as voice, channelled everything 
through them.484 
 
 The first priority was getting data, analysis and proposed solutions out to domestic and 
other publics. The media, well aware from the start of the deteriorating situation, made decisions 
to both open up to alternative leadership and also help convene the same: 
You call your journalist, he tells you he’s on top of a building and people are 
coming for him, so send a helicopter. From page one to last page, nothing other 
than bloodshed. Do we continue reporting bloodshed or do something else? 
Let’s engage. Alternative news. The editorial: ‘Save our Country’ was 
driven by the Editors. Although the Media Owners Association (MOA) discussed 
it, was thought out and executed by the Editors. We had a common headline [across 
all media outlets].485 
 
The data and analysis concerned, first, the process and supposed outcome of the 
presidential election. KPTJ staged a protest to file a complaint at the Kilimani police station, held 
press conferences to release public statements and deployed its members to various talk shows on 
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Kenyan and other television stations to ensure Kenyan and other publics could begin to understand 
what had happened and possible solutions:  
Through public statements, buying space in the papers. We were also writing, op-
ed pieces, and buying space’.486 
 
I forgot our first demonstration when walked from the [Kenya National Human 
Rights] Commission to the [Kilimani] police station. A little thing but had impact. 
Forgetting meetings where people stood up, one by one, Shailja [Patel, poet] asked 
everybody to stand up and say why they were there.487 
 
Decided needed to do some media interventions. Called Julie Gichuru [a television 
talk show host with the Nation Media Group, NMG], she agreed, went on and did 
say persuaded the election had been stolen and that that was a recipe for chaos. As 
soon as I left, got calls by people who weren’t amused.488 
 
Was one of the talking heads on [television].489 
 
A journalist called, asked whether I had an idea of what could be done. I said a 
coalition government. I went to Citizen or KTN [Kenya Television Network] and 
was calling it power-sharing. Said the purpose is to have a framework in which a 
new election can be held. This was the most difficult part: passing the message on 
the election through the media. The media became the most important disseminator 
of the message.490 
 
 CCP was also deploying its members to various television talk shows to urge a cessation 
of violence and dialogue between ODM and PNU, while KPTJ shared data and analysis of the 
specific patterns of violence: 
Agreed important to go to the media, in particular TV and radio stations. People’s 
reactions to TV powerful, needed to use to call for peace, say not to kill one another 
and destroy property, allow for dialogue and maintain calm.491 
 
First move was to talk to Kenyans through the media, to say if we allow the country 
to disintegrate, there’ll be consequences. Need to hold politicians accountable, but 
not be willing to die for them.492 
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Publicising the idea of liv[ing] together in peace. Making statements in the media. 
Sumbeiywo and myself [Kiplagat] went to Kass FM to speak in Kalenjin: when 
you shed blood, the land is contaminated, when you kill, you’re also affected. 
Prayed, spoke, had a night vigil.493 
 
Then Kofi Annan came and we’d released a full-page statement in the dailies. No 
interest in becoming a pariah state. Analysis of the violence. Negotiations not for 
political parties alone, shouldn’t be reduced to share the cake.494 
 
 At the same time, writers affiliated with CKW, itself affiliated with CCP, began to target 
the international media, incensed with the simplistic understanding of the post-elections violence 
that they had adopted (reducing the same to supposedly historical ‘tribal’ conflict): 
At some point, the Western correspondents’ narrative started. One word being 
bandied about was genocide. Immediately, this Kwani crowd, ‘How to write about 
Africa’, [crowd, reacted with] alarm. That’s when CKW seemed to get purpose. 
Everybody encouraged to write what they knew, thought, what other people were 
doing and send this material to counter the meta-narrative about this crisis. 
Everybody [was] asked to give contacts and resources, to send material to the West, 
so could get out there.495 
 
A writer formed a committee [that] wrote articles about the situation in Kenya, got 
about 45 articles published internationally.496 
 
Despite the differences in focus of the two main civil society umbrellas that emerged, KPTJ 
and CCP, there was quite a lot of cross-over. Both had contacts across the different umbrellas, 
utilised to come to a common understanding of what needed to happen well before the AU 
intervention, namely some form of accommodation. 
Critical constituencies were engaged, including faith-based organisations (FBOs) and the 
private sector: 
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Also convened within the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), a meeting of 
members to think through as legal problem. Prepared document giving options for 
resolving Kenya’s problems. A caretaker government with participation of both 
PNU and ODM. A caretaker government without either to organise elections. 
Power-sharing, first time mouthed or articulated. Looked outlandish at the time. 
But one of the possible solutions.497  
 
People started reaching out to other groups, including religious groups. Nobody had 
good ways to pass the message to PNU. Also difficult to pass the message to the 
private sector as all it was [initially] interested in was stopping the violence. It was 
not concerned about justice for the elections. The coalition government idea found 
traction as easier than justice for the elections.498 
 
Meetings with various constituencies, talking to business, talking to the religious 
people.499 
 
Started doing outreach. Did speak to business. The one that left biggest impression 
was [with] the [Anglican] Bishops. The room was full of these Bishops in all their 
regalia and long hats. Became clear they were ethnically polarised. [But] 
Remember Wabukala talking about compromise and bringing Raila in as Prime 
Minister.500 
 
 At the same time, critical constituencies on the ground, particularly in areas affected by the 
post-election violence, were also engaged, including with providing practical (financial) support 
to enable organising and community-level responses and facilitating community-level advocacy: 
With regard to places where already people were being killed, displaced, like in the 
north Rift, had a network that cut across the country, in Eldoret, in Mombasa, began 
to reach out to them. In Eldoret, reached out, started to help mobilise networks of 
peace, asked what needed, even airtime. How to conduct burials, how to reach 
people in the camps, get medical help for women, sanitary pads, food, so that stay 
in camp would be dignified. 
In Kibera, had worked with youth so began to also mobilise them through 
Peacenet, [the] Peace and Development Network. They had monitors on the ground 
and were able to see how violence affecting people. And the religious leaders, 
Christian and Muslim, from networks we’d begun working with from 2001 to 
address conflict evolving at grassroots level. That was the first reaction, who was 
our network, how could they respond and call for calm as volatile and people 
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divided along ethnic lines. If people not happy with elections, how to address that 
credibly.501 
 
Met Bishop [Jackson] Kosgei, leader in Rift Valley. Told him he had responsibility 
as a clergyman, as a Christian leader, to deal with what’s happened. Blood has been 
shed, the land is contaminated. He listened, two days later, called a meeting of 
Kalenjin leaders. He asked me to address them, to tell them what I’d told him. 
Spoke frankly, asked me a few questions. After some days, he called me and gave 
me a statement that that group had done, stealing votes not right, killing is not right, 
agreed to establish a committee to deal with peace and reconciliation. Challenged 
him again, said would like him to get hold of pastors from Kalenjin to take initiative 
to meet with pastors from Gikuyuland. He took the idea and organised a delegation 
of pastors, seven or eight, from Kalenjin and approached Kikuyu pastors, they met. 
What he told me is that the pastors, after praying, the Kalenjin apologised, said 
sorry for what’d happened, that broke the ice, with time they mellowed and began 
talking. Said continue and get the message down in Rift Valley, they took it up with 
people like [Major-General John] Seii, Chair of the Elders. This went on for more 
than a year. Culminated in a joint committee of Kikuyu and Kalenjin in Eldoret. 
Had a request of pastors from Kalenjin who wanted to meet with the 
American Ambassador. Called him, he agreed, arranged a room, left. They had a 
two-, three-hour meeting, mine was to facilitate.502 
 
Once all the civil society umbrellas were on board, they tried to engage both ODM and 
PNU. Given its data and analysis of the elections, KPTJ found it easy to reach ODM. However, 
they weren’t on the same page as concerned the violence. And even CCP had difficulty reaching 
PNU although the Central Organisation of Trade Unions (COTU) obtained an audience with the 
person in the presidency. Members of the Women’s Consortium, however, being more political- 
party-affiliated, had access to both, although not all were transparent about how they utilised this 
access: 
Met the Pentagon, Ruto was there, Charity [Ngilu] in her sneakers coming from 
some march, Raila falling asleep, Anyang [Nyong’o]. Orengo. They were wanting 
to form [a] Movement for the Restoration of Democracy. We laid forth our analysis, 
the pattern of the violence, said they’d have to stop the violence in the Rift [Valley] 
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and Ruto was scary. His eyes just flashed. Inconclusive. We weren’t going to work 
with them as long as engaging in violence but kept the door open.503 
 
People were reaching out to people at different times. Got upset with [ODM] re: 
their lack of energy, focus, strategy. Some of us were interested in doing it on our 
own, an independent approach.504  
 
Never made direct contact with party that had claimed to win the election, the 
President. Made direct contact with the ODM, including meeting with Raila Odinga 
and his lieutenants. ODM dismissive, didn’t think right to sit down and talk and 
understandable in terms of strategy. With regards to the PNU, we were talking to 
people other than the Principal himself. Carrying messaging across two sides, tried 
to reach out to Principals.505 
 
The only person from the PNU who talked to us was [PNU’s Minister of Finance 
Amos] Kimunya. The rest kept themselves off.506 
 
We played a pivotal role. It is us that made them tone down the arguments, the 
fight, the confrontation, between Kibaki’s team and Raila’s team. On 18th January, 
we had the first meeting with the President and Raila. The President was hostile. 
He didn’t want to hear about [ODM], particularly Ruto. We had to appeal to him 
that Kenya’s bigger [than them], our children and grandchildren must live here, he 
must accept dialogue. Impressed upon him to be in touch with the AU. It was us 
who proposed Kufour. Muthaura supported us.507 
 
Directly in touch with our party leadership. Also had meetings as women affiliated 
with ODM. The PNU women were not as honest about their party affiliations. 
Nobody declared.508 
 
Still having back channels, especially to political parties. Information going back 
to political parties. Goes to show how the women’s movement held hostage by 
ethnic and political interests.509 
 
 The private sector also had easier access to PNU, after an initial shock at the manner in 
which it was handling the fall-out from Kibaki’s swearing-in: 
[Minister for Roads and Public Works, John] Michuki banned live feeds, 
transmissions. I was livid, thought it the wrong decision. Called [his son,] Fred 
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Michuki, then my banker, asked: ‘What are we doing, are we in a state of national 
emergency if you’re interfering with press freedom?’ He went off on me: ‘You guys 
not with the programme, we’re going to crush these guys.’ Realised oops, things 
more serious than I thought. Called my friends, my peers and asked if you’re talking 
to these wazees [old men], they’re crazy, they’re no longer rational. 
Tried to get meeting with Kibaki. Tried to get meeting with Raila, Raila’s 
view was that KEPSA just Kikuyu, Indian. Then invited by Muthaura, trying to 
organise business community to go see Kibaki, but [with] [established Gikuyu 
businessmen], mostly Kibaki friends, none a member of KEPSA, wealthy, have 
disdain for organised lobbying. Mistake they made was going under guise of 
KEPSA. Wrote to State House Controller, with list of names of Board members of 
KEPSA. On morning, they were at State House, we jumped ahead of them. Which 
was good. Two slipped in so Kibaki saw faces he knew.510 
 
 Given all the above, both civil society and the private sector laid the ground for the eventual 
AU intervention and the mediation process. The media had the idea from the start that mediation 
was necessary and proactively supported the convening of Kenyan mediators that eventually grew 
to become the CCP. The Kenyan mediators, while consciously constituting CCP so as to reflect a 
multi-ethnic umbrella quickly saw the need to go outside Kenya and reached out to their contacts 
across Africa: 
Why not get Kenya, a provider of people to reconcile others, [in] Somalia, Kiplagat, 
[in the] Sudan, Sumbeiywo, [in] Mozambique, Opande. Why don’t we gather them? 
Put them in Serena [Hotel] where they went on to convert themselves to Concerned 
Citizens for Peace. The advantage was that we had alternative voices, they were an 
also an oasis of hope. They tried to bring in [Archbishop] Tutu.511 
 
Contacted Bethuel Kiplagat, General Opande, Dekha Ibrahim, important to have a 
Kenyan face, important to have a face from North Eastern and a woman. Had 
General Lazaro Sumbeiywo, his experience with mediation processes in the Sudan. 
Would bring in soberness. Also Kalenjin and would help balance who was sending 
out peace message. These individuals appropriate to appeal to the high level, able 
to reach out to Kibaki, Raila, the five in the ODM, were credible, were people 
who’d brought honour to the country. 
Launched the day after the eruption of the violence, speedy, started 
contacting people, made call to South Africa looking for Archbishop Tutu. Models 
seen in other places, how to get people out of dangerous moments, create possibility 
for alternatives. 
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See who we can reach out to, even outside Kenya, engaged with General 
Opande and Bethuel Kiplagat, talked to the All Africa Conference of Churches 
(AACC) to talk to Desmond Tutu to see if could come and talk to Kibaki and Raila. 
Increasingly, began to see need for analysis of what was going on and need for 
options.512 
 
[I, Ambassador Kiplagat] Was working with the APRM, an Eminent Person. Went 
to Nigeria, had a breakfast appointment with [former Nigerian President Olusegun] 
Obasanjo, said what’s happening in Kenya not good. Said he’s been trying to call 
Raila. Called Nairobi and instructed somebody to contact Raila and tell him that 
Obasanjo has to speak to him today. An hour or so later, message came back 
confirming he would. The next day, he came running, so happy, said Raila’s coming 
tomorrow. Briefed him, said: ‘Sir, don’t allow Raila to go back the same day, he 
needs to rest, he’s under tremendous pressure, show him your chickens, let him 
walk on the farm, let him sleep.’ 
Then the idea came up for the AU to send Kufour to intervene. Wasn’t sure 
Kufour the right person. A President, wouldn’t have time. When choice made for 
Kofi Annan, endorsed it. Former Heads of State came. Kofi, the four ex-Heads of 
State.513 
 
 The reaching out across the continent by CCP was supplemented by regional advocacy by 
KPTJ. KPTJ sent a delegation to the January AU Summit of African Heads of States: 
The AU was involved from the beginning. Kibaki knew an important site and 
invested in projecting an image of calm: ‘This is a small tiff.’ Civil society began 
to say this is also an important site to engage. Had a mediation crisis, because didn’t 
have anybody who could talk to both sides. Had PNU and ODM talking at each 
other and nobody of sufficient stature to sit them down. Kenyan crisis occurred 
within five years of APRM taking off. Kenya had just completed this process in 
2005. Civil society had taken part and created linkages with influential voices 
within that process, gave them an entry point.514 
 
The internationalisation, the international advocacy. We went to Addis [Ababa]. 
The AU. The ODM delegation [was there] but they were out of their depth, 
traumatised and emotive. We ended up making their case. We did effective 
advocacy in Addis [Ababa] and that changed things. We came in, they [the PNU] 
were there, they saw us and did a double-take. We were the last people they wanted 
there. 
Those advocacy forays had impact, being there, solidarity with African civil 
society, those things were beginning to push PNU to the status of a pariah regime 
                                                          
512 Interview with Florence Mpaayei, former Executive Director, NPI and member of CCP and the Women’s 
Consortium, Nairobi, February 26, 2015. 
513 Interview with Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat, member of CCP, Chair of the TJRC under the Grand Coalition 
Government, Nairobi, week of April 27, 2015. 
514 Interview with Kwamchetsi Makokha, journalist and member of KPTJ, Nairobi, April 23, 2015. 
120 
 
and [for] these people who were more of a business elite, those were fairly costly 
things, both for prestige and their pockets. For [the AU], to meet ordinary citizens 
who could articulate issues, that strengthened them as otherwise would’ve just been 
listening to the two sides. Given the bad blood and [that] my friends in ODM were 
incoherent, some cool heads around helped.515 
 
We also went to the AU [Summit]. We went to the AU again in February. Since 
not allowed into the Summit, went around talking to various delegations. Some 
were like: ‘This is just your usual disputed elections.’ Others, like Senegal, [were] 
supportive. Managed to put the KPTJ analysis on the agenda. That persuaded 
people and began to draft a statement for the PSC. Described what had happened, 
said it was a civilian coup, described the violence, how the GSU had moved in, how 
Kibaki sworn-in surreptitiously or hastily. By the time Kibaki came to the AU, he 
found a not very friendly reception. They went as far as they could in terms of 
indicating to him he had to go back and sort out his problems.516 
 
 KPTJ also carried out international advocacy, through the Western diplomatic community 
in Nairobi, in key Western capitals, in Brussels with the EU and in New York with the UN: 
Meetings with international partners. Then we started reaching out internationally. 
I was invited to London by the all-Africa parliamentary group and the Royal 
African Society and used that to convey our message. Started developing a written 
position. I went to London, Brussels, met people at the EU, international NGOs 
[non-governmental organisations] in Brussels, various delegations of the EU. Then 
I went to Oxford. An MP [member of parliament] spoke on the floor of parliament 
and mentioned me and the KPTJ proposal. Talked to the media, went to the BBC 
[British Broadcasting Corporation], talked to the Guardian, went to the FCO 
[Foreign and Commonwealth Office], those cold fish. Then you and Maina went 
off [to Washington DC and New York], wrote your [New York Times] op-ed.517 
 
 Once the idea of an AU intervention had gained traction, in the form of a mediation 
between ODM and PNU, civil society also engaged the Forum of Retired African Heads of State 
and the AU Panel of Eminent African Personalities. The aim was to ensure that the mediation 
process would result in truth about and justice in respect of both the elections and the violence. 
And to continue to provide domestic backing to the idea of a political settlement: 
As part of KPTJ, went to see the Elders, Maina [Kiai]. Making suggestions. 
Remember meetings we’d have, the fact that scared, that harm just around the 
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corner. All the ups and downs and the pre-mediation discussions in various places. 
Then the mediation itself.518 
 
The significant event was the first meeting with the mediators. There was Kaunda, 
Graca, Chissano, Mogaye, Mkapa.519 
 
Met with Kofi Annan’s mission, met with the retired Presidents, Mkapa, Kaunda, 
Festus Mogaye. Kaunda mentioned that [KPTJ’s was the] first gender-balanced 
delegation he’d met.520 
 
When Kofi arrived, met with him. Decided to let Dekha be the face, a lady, the 
youngest amongst us, the Kikuyu/Kalenjin factor. Met with Kofi a number of times, 
gave them the brief a number of times, made suggestions, had lunch with Mkapa 
[and the former Heads of State].521 
 
CCP had five individuals in the forefront and male-dominated, not hearing 
women’s voices. Yes, had women in negotiating team and Graca in the mediation 
but didn’t feel had Kenyan women contributing.522 
 
Despite the fact that women were at the negotiating table, we were concerned 
women’s concerns wouldn’t come through. We wanted a peaceful resolution to the 
violence, to be sure that whatever came out of the negotiations would ensure that 
women’s rights would be respected. We did insist that whenever the Eminent 
Persons went around the country, they should hear the voices of women, not just 
the privileged male elite. We were able to say that all those instruments in the 
National Accord needed to include women.523 
 
Focus on how to engage with the mediation team. Appointed a working group to 
consult with the wider group and come up with a statement to be presented to the 
mediation team. Ten or 12 people. Cautious to ensure women affiliated to ODM 
were represented, PNU, other groups based on their professional contributions. The 
team started working on the statement and then decided to organise a meeting where 
they invited women from Rwanda to share experiences on conflict, post-conflict. 
The women managed to hear from women from other post-conflict settings on best 
way to engage.524 
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Once the mediation agreements were concluded, both CCP and KPTJ continued with more 
long-term initiatives. KPTJ focused more on monitoring implementation of the mediation 
agreements, particularly those intended to obtain truth about and justice for both the elections and 
the violence. CCP focused more on continued peace and reconciliation at the community level in 
areas affected by the post-elections violence: 
 
2013, a meeting in Naivasha. Initiated by the pastors. About 80 people, Kalenjin, 
Kikuyu leaders, businesspeople, politicians, discussing peace, that must live 
together. That Gikuyus there belong to Rift Valley, jokingly accusing them, had 
reached position where could speak. Invited Ruto who came and addressed the 
meeting, said must live together. Uhuru came, spoke in the same vein, that need to 
work together, live together. Before the elections.  
Then the elections in March [2013]. The AACC, the Secretary-General, told 
me they have a request from Rift Valley through the National Council of Churches 
of Kenya (NCCK), that the group working for peace and reconciliation would like 
to send a delegation to Rwanda.525 
 
4.5.2 The AU’s RECs under its peace and security architecture 
Under the AU’s peace and security architecture, the relevant RECs are intended to be the first port 
of call and the first responder in situations of conflict, including electoral conflict. This was not, 
however, the case in Kenya’s 2007-8 electoral conflict, in which the AU intervened directly 
through mediation by the Panel. Were the EAC and IGAD ‘marginalised’ by the AU despite the 
division of labour and subsidiarity that pertains between the AU and the RECs on conflict-
resolution?526 Or were the RECs just ‘tested’ and found wanting?527 
Although the EAC’s EALA’s EOM did not endorse Kenya’s 2007 General Elections, no 
use was made of IGAD’s early warning system528 and statements of concern by the two RECs’ 
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most senior political leaderships did not translate into either of the RECs taking charge of the 
intervention through mediation. The question is ‘Why?’ It has been posited that cultural and 
historical differences among the EAC and IGAD member states persist, with all also being 
illustrative of low levels of democratisation given the continuities from the pre-multiparty into the 
political pluralist era. In addition, the EAC and the IGAD are both weak institutionally, the former 
particularly as concerns peace and security, and thus have yet to demonstrate similar levels of 
influence as their southern and western counterparts with respect to conflict resolution. This lack 
of capacity and influence was evident in Kenya’s electoral conflicts of 1992 and 1997—and 
became starkly so in 2008.529 
In addition, Uganda’s President Museveni was one of only four African Heads of State and 
Government who initially endorsed Kibaki’s supposed electoral victory. This undermined his 
attempts, in his capacity as then EAC Chair, to intervene through mediation—particularly as he 
then deployed the Ugandan military near Kenya’s western border.530 His attempt at a parallel 
intervention through mediation ended with his presence at the launch of the KNDR, effectively 
ceding ground to the AU.531 That said, it was Tanzanian President Kikwete, who had just 
succeeded Kufour as AU Chair, whom the Panel invited into the final negotiations directly between 
the two Principals—in his capacity as both AU Chair and a peer with an executive in which power 
was shared between the President and the Prime Minister.532 
Thus, although the AU can rightfully take credit for the intervention through mediation in 
Kenya’s 2007-8 electoral conflict, it has to be noted that that intervention through mediation was 
not, strictly speaking, according to the design of the AU’s peace and security architecture and the 
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intended division of labour between the AU and the RECs. Whether there has been policy learning 
since by the EAC and IGAD is questionable. ‘For the most part, East Africa treats the Kenyan 
events as if they never happened’.533 
 
4.5.3 The rest of the international community 
The rest of the international community—defence, development and diplomatic—has been blamed 
for failing to recognise and respond to what became the trigger for Kenya’s electoral conflict as 
well as its proximate and structural causes. Not only did it tend to focus only on the lead-up to 
General Elections in Kenya, but it failed to proactively address the violence that preceded and 
accompanied the General Elections of both 1992 and 1997. Due to competing foreign policy aims, 
it opted instead for ‘quiet diplomacy’, while channelling humanitarian assistance through the very 
state that had sponsored that violence, thus contributing to the lengthy and ultimately failed 
political transition of 2002 and undermining democratic consolidation.534 
Continued economic and military assistance from the UK and US in particular stands 
accused of enabling the stalling of political transition and democratic consolidation—culminating 
in Kenya’s electoral conflict of 2007-8.535 ‘Decades of turning a blind eye to corruption, impunity 
and mismanagement by Kenya’s governments has contributed to this crisis’.536 
Prior to the violence that ensued from electoral conflict, the international community 
lacked a ‘thick’ understanding of Kenya’s political context537—in part due to the regular rotation 
of defence, diplomatic and development staff and the resulting lack of memory about 1992 and 
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1997.538 It thus misread the absence of violence during the General Elections of 2002 and the 
constitutional referendum of 2005, ignored warning signs and failed to proactively prevent 
violence from ensuing from the 2007-8 electoral conflict.539 
The data and analysis that would enable a ‘thick’ understanding of Kenya’s political 
context were available. Conflict and governance and conflict analyses had been commissioned and 
were available, including those in the APRM’s 2006 report and the Kenya Joint Assistance 
Strategy (KJAS). The APRM’s 2006 report had cautioned as to the levels of political polarisation 
along ethnic lines while the KJAS had included a low case scenario in which the international 
community would not conduct business as usual. However the KJAS’s low case scenario had been 
downplayed to ensure GoK agreement and none of these analyses were systematically shared and 
used in actual programming.540 
Other warning signs included the unilateral presidential appointments to the ECK just prior 
to the 2007 General Elections, on-going extrajudicial executions (EJEs) by the security services in 
their operations against armed groups and militia and the hate speech along ethnic and gender lines 
during the political campaigns. Structurally, continued neo-patrimonialism (including corruption 
and impunity) in the context of the stalled constitutional reform process and levels of inequality 
on ethnic, gender and regional grounds were further warning signs.541 
Yet the international community proceeded to finance a joint election support programme 
to the tune of USD12 million.542 That said, its response to the violence that ensued from the 2007-
8 electoral conflict was an improvement on the past. It pressured the PNU to acknowledge the 
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contested presidential results and submit to mediation, it acknowledged the need for the mediation 
to be African-led and coordinated well to assist the mediation, in tandem with the low case scenario 
foreseen by the KJAS.543 
The normal divide between the development and diplomatic fronts was overcome through 
the Like-Minded Partners Political Group (Limid-P), usually including political counsellors but, 
in the lead-up to and during the KNDR, meeting at the level of Ambassadors and High 
Commissioners to formally collaborate and ensure an appropriate division of labour. Coordination 
of decisions on development assistance occurred through the Donor Coordination Group (DCG) 
behind the KJAS and its Democratic Governance Donor Group (DGDG). In the lead-up to and 
during the KNDR, it met weekly to exchange information and also regularly met with the Panel 
and domestic stakeholders. A multi-donor trust fund was established to support the KNDR through 
the UN Development Programme (UNDP), enabling quick disbursements for the KNDR’s 
financial and human resource needs.544 Both the Limid-P and the DCG’s DGDG consulted 
regularly with Kenyan civil society, particularly KPTJ, and the private sector. ‘The international 
community was very supportive of the strong, outspoken and respected Kenyan activists who also 
carried considerable public support’.545 
To get the ODM and the PNU to agree to a political settlement through power-sharing, the 
international community utilised, in consultation with the Panel and domestic stakeholders, a 
combination of ‘carrots and sticks’ which included public statements, visits and targeted sanctions. 
As the KNDR proceeded, Kenya was visited by the US Secretary of State and the UN Secretary-
General.546 Some bilaterals suspended on-going development assistance, replacing it with 
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humanitarian assistance and financing for the KNDR. While the amounts suspended were not that 
significant, the suspension was a significant signal.547 The UK was the first to threaten cuts in 
development assistance, stop some payments and thus affect Kenya’s credit rating.548 The US was 
the first to threaten use of targeted sanctions for those either implicated in the violence that ensued 
from the electoral conflict or those impeding progress within the KNDR and proceeded to 
announce some travel/visa bans and asset freezes.549 Accordingly, ‘the international development 
and diplomatic communities collectively commanded substantive influence of the nature and 
trajectory of Kenya’s evolving political settlement’.550 
After the KNDR, the DCG’s DGDG created new sub-groups to follow implementation of 
the mediation agreements, including one on elections to support the IREC, one on conflict to liaise 
with the CIPEV and one on civil society to continue to liaise with and support civil society.551 It 
also provided financing for implementation of the mediation agreements. The US, for example, 
offered KES1.75 billion for reconstruction and KES2 billion for implementation. However, as the 
urgency of electoral conflict resolution faded away and the scale of commitments made under the 
KNDR became clear, the DCG’s DGDG reached a decision to prioritise implementation with 
respect to critical reforms. By 2010, the year in which the new Constitution of 2010 was finally 
passed through referendum, the international community had reduced the political pressure it had 
brought to bear on the PNU and the ODM, now in the Grand Coalition Government together.552 
The international community’s unity of purpose, coordination within itself and cooperation 
with the Panel and domestic stakeholders has been assessed as being a good example of mediation 
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for electoral conflict resolution.553 That said, in the more medium- to long-term, it arguably again 
began to prioritise peace over justice, with negative impacts on democratic consolidation.554 With 
respect to the trigger, it focused on the technical (symptoms) rather than political (causes) of the 
IREC’s reform recommendations. This is also the case with the proximate causes in respect of the 
CIPEV’s recommendations for the demobilisation and disarmament of armed groups and militia, 
security sector reform and accountability. As for the structural causes, although the Constitution 
of Kenya, 2010 is now in place, land reform is not the focus of attention that it should be.555 The 
final assessment is that, with some in the international community remaining or reverting to being 
risk-averse,556 the international community focused on state-building for two years following the 
KNDR but then shifted from the political to the technical.557 It has justified this shift from political 
to economic, security and foreign policy imperatives given what it terms its decreased leverage, 
the limitations of political conditionalities and the fact that they have only indirect or symbolic 
impacts.558 
Philanthropies active in Kenya on human rights and justice issues responded to the 
unfolding situation immediately. The Open Society Initiative for East Africa (OSIEA), as part of 
the broader Open Society Foundation (OSF) network, made an early decision to support KPTJ 
with additional funding to enable its response as well as by using its African and global advocacy 
teams to facilitate high-level access for KPTJ within the region and elsewhere: 
This group morphed into KPTJ. Unparalleled, unprecedented, daily report backs to 
OSF’s New York office to let them know where stood. Emergency situation, 
needed facility this civil society group could use to respond to situation. A grant 
given through [the African Centre for Open Governance] (AfriCOG), an OSIEA 
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grantee, to make sure energy around electoral justice, truth, accountability for 
crimes against humanity, where we located our programmatic and ideological 
sympathies. First attempt to inform negotiated intervention was when heard Kofi 
Annan would lead it. Sent as much information as possible to prepare him. Effort 
to prepare Graca too, Mkapa not so much. Not sure we had trust in [Annan’s] ability 
to wade into Kenya and not get pushed and bullied up and down. So informally 
talking to Annan’s team, which morphed into grant to South Consulting to do its 
assessments about how well or how badly implementation was going. 
A step ahead of most donors. Because have been in civil society. Bilaterals 
looking at bilateral aspects and letting diplomats, political officers speak, rather 
than thinking about Kenya for Kenyans.559 
 
 With the exception, initially, of the US, the Western diplomatic community also responded 
decisively to both the elections and the violence. This followed heavy investments after the 2002 
political transition, ultimately with disappointing results: 
By the time we were going for the elections, [NARC’s former ethics advisor, John] 
Githongo had written his letter [about grand corruption in the NARC government], 
the raid on the Standard newspapers by the men in black [Armenian mercenaries 
believed to be acting on behalf of NARC]… the Brits, the Canadians [had] pulled 
out of GJLOS [Governance, Justice, Law and Order Sector the sector-wide reform 
programme], left SIDA [the Swedish International Development Agency] there, not 
the place to be for reforms. We had a donor community that was divided.560 
 
In that sense, the elections were the straw that broke the camel’s back. And, of course, the 
violence created as much concern in the Western diplomatic community as it had in the African 
diplomatic community and the AU, for the same reasons: 
The EU [election observation] monitors said: ‘Hey, there’s a problem’. Clear no credibility. 
No way could come up with a souped-up report. Then the violence. Wasn’t just that Nairobi 
shut down. They’d been watching Raila strongholds, not enough intelligence on Ruto 
strongholds and what Rift Valley means to Kenya, food security, the highway.561 
 
A lot of straws were broken, this was the last straw. The fact that at KICC [the 
national tallying centre], there was a clear stalemate, the way the announcement 
was made, the blackout of the media, the police going in, the way Kibaki was 
sworn-in. A deluge that knocks down the door. Our own people telling them there’s 
a big problem, the situation wouldn’t lend itself to acceptance of Kibaki. Became 
what to do, how to engage and not be accused not just of bias but of imperialism. 
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These were not governments Kenya happy to listen to. The spin around regime 
change would come into play. So when the AU option on the table, the best 
option.562 
 
  ‘The Americans were not on board initially.’563 But the initial pro-Kibaki bias of the US 
Ambassador and the Assistant Secretary of State for Africa slowly changed, in part due to the 
international advocacy conducted by KPTJ and fairly strong positions/resolutions taken by both 
Congress and Senate which reflected KPTJ positions, in part due to skilful diplomacy by the lead 
mediator and in part due to analysis from the American Africanist policy community, which had 
links to Kenyan academics:  
Former Secretary of State, Rice, the American academics who study Kenya, the 
Stanford ones, she had an open channel to them. A number did urge her to be more 
nuanced. That might have played a role. She did reach out to people she could trust 
who also knew Kenya, people like [Professor Joel] Barkan.564 
 
 The UN had had forewarnings from the Department of Political Affairs (DPA): ‘DPA had 
written three memos saying there’d be violence’. But within Kenya, the UNDP, which, like SIDA, 
had yet to disengage from its support to NARC and, like the US, believed a Kibaki win was better 
for Kenya, despite housing the basket for electoral support, initially also didn’t respond: 
UNDP played a nasty role. In Kenya and elsewhere. In most countries, takes the 
lead, but can’t seem to be bigger than the government, cannot extricate itself from 
linkages to government, just not useful. One institution that needs transformation. 
Will lead to more crises.565 
 
In the end, however:  
The international community stood as a major ally. Initially thought they were 
conservative but many were buying in. Think they thought ODM represented 
reform wing of society and PNU conservative element of society.566 
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What the international community was able to offer were ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’ in support 
of the mediation process to ensure, first, that PNU came to the table and, second, that PNU 
capitulated to power-sharing. It also provided financial and technical support (mediation expertise 
and comparative experiences) to the Secretariat of the AU Panel of Eminent African personalities 
when required: 
These players came in from AU and UN, coming with experience in this field 
because they wanted us to make progress and any progress was better than no 
progress. A guided-missile kind of negotiation, discussing openly how to achieve 
objectives of the mediation. 
Other international players, the UN, countries like the US, the UK, Germany 
and, to a lesser extent, France. Sending representatives at the highest level was 
good. In sense that could talk to one another in presence of people not intimidated 
by authority of the state. When had meeting with Condoleeza Rice, clear that what 
telling us was telling other side, using direct not diplomatic language. Had sessions 
with UN Secretary-General. Talking to us as two sides whose stature wasn’t 
different, looking at us equally.567 
 
This was primarily due to the confidence of the Western diplomatic community in the lead 
mediator and his handling or management of their urge to assist. 
 
4.6 The outcomes and impact of the mediation of Kenya’s 2007-8 electoral conflict 
4.6.1 What outcomes, what impact? 
Although there is no counterfactual, the AU-mandated, domestically demanded and internationally 
backed intervention, in reaching a political settlement, arguably prevented further escalation of the 
violence that had ensued from the electoral conflict and worse impacts.568 The most critical of the 
KNDR agreements were implemented over time, addressing to varying degrees the trigger as well 
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as the proximate and structural causes of the violence that arose from the electoral conflict. 
However, implementation was both insufficient and slow.569 
As concerns the trigger, despite entry into the Grand Coalition Government, the ODM and 
the PNU continued to contest the details and meaning of the political settlement. Despite the 
existence of the position of Prime Minister, the presidency remained centralised and the state 
continued to be in control of the PNU.570 In September 2008, the IREC’s report was released, 
finding the 2007 General Elections had been too flawed to determine who had won but 
recommending reform of the EMB.571 New electoral legislation was passed, including on the 
registration of national (rather than ethnic or regional) political parties, and the ECK was disbanded 
and ultimately replaced, following interim arrangements, with the Interim Independent Electoral 
Commission (IIEC). Critically, however, constitutional negotiations failed to result in the 
transformation of Kenya’s majoritarian electoral system into a mixed member proportional 
representation (MMPR) electoral system. It has been argued, therefore, that mediation, 
commissions of inquiry and enhanced regulation of political parties are insufficient to address the 
political mobilisation of ethnicity.572 
As concerns the proximate causes, in October 2009, the CIPEV’s report was released, 
finding the causes of the violence that followed the electoral conflict included the concentration of 
powers in the presidency (and thus that presidential contests remain high-stakes) and grievances 
over land.573 Contrary to the IREC, it engaged the questions of the political mobilisation of 
ethnicity and accountability by recommending the establishment of a Special Tribunal to try those 
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it had implicated in the violence that ensued from the electoral conflict, failing which the ICC 
should assume responsibility for criminal proceedings against the same.574 
Finally, as concerns the structural causes, agreements under agenda item four had covered 
structural reform and statebuilding.575 The Constitution of Kenya Amendment and Review Act, 
2008576 was passed, ultimately ushering in the new Constitution of Kenya, 2010.577 The 
Constitution of Kenya, 2010 reduced the powers of the presidency, restored separation of powers 
and checks and balances and also provided for devolution. Other means of addressing economic 
and political grievance were to be handled by the institution of the TJRC, together with the Ethnic 
and Race Relations Act and Commission.578 The TJRC was, however, dogged by controversy from 
its inception—due to the appointment to its Chair of a senior diplomat implicated in previous 
public reports as being present at a massacre in the north of the country and being a beneficiary of 
previous illegal and irregular allocations of public land. It only released its report in 2013 amidst 
further controversy as to apparently Executive-ordered changes to its final report—having to do 
with the current President’s family benefiting from previous illegal and irregular allocations of 
land. 
Thus the short-term outcomes of the KNDR agreements are mixed and their medium- to 
long-term impact is unclear.579 Further to the 2013 General Elections—the first under the new 
Constitution of Kenya, 2010 and devolution—it is true that violence did not follow the electoral 
conflict that occurred, again having to do with voter registration, counting and tallying as well as 
the supposed presidential results. Electoral reforms proved insufficient, as did judicial reforms—
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the ODM, alongside civil society, placed the 2013 electoral conflict before Kenya’s new Supreme 
Court to an unsatisfactory response. The lack of violence has been attributed to the peace education 
now incorporated into the educational curricula580 and an early warning and response system, the 
‘Uwiano Platform’. But, it is more likely that violence was checked by the engagement of the ICC, 
restrictions on freedom of assembly and expression as well as media self-censorship, the 
deployment of the security services across the country and voluntary internal displacement in 
advance of the poll.581 
The violence that ensued from Kenya’s 2007-8 electoral conflict was at the cost of the myth 
of Kenyan exceptionalism—its supposed stability given its middle class, civil society and media—
and undermined its role as a regional broker with respect to peace and security, most notably in 
Somalia and South Sudan.582 But the lack of violence from Kenya’s 2013 electoral conflict also 
came at a cost, to Kenya’s prospects of democratic consolidation. There has been no accountability 
and policy learning, with focus in the main shifting back to stability rather than democracy and 
justice in the interests of long-term peace.583 
What Kenyan civil society and the Kenyan private sector provided was alternative 
leadership and voices and, in advance of the AU intervention, information—data, analysis and 
ways out—helping to shape public opinion domestically and internationally in favour of the 
mediation process and a political settlement: 
What I did was to give a sense of what’s going on. People were starved of 
information, except in own neighbourhoods. As comprehensive a picture as 
possible of what going on across the country. An unfolding humanitarian problem 
that needed to be responded to. [An] appeal for calm, peace, however aggrieved 
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people are, no reason to kill anybody else. [That the] elections results not 
accountable and hope a process to address problem developed. 
Impact was to create a picture of the condition of the country, needed for a 
response based on correct information. Appeal for calm and for people not to take 
the law into own hands. Appeal for justice for people violated but also that people 
feel aggrieved about the elections get grievances addressed.584 
 
Because of contacts, content started appearing. [An] op-ed in The New York Times, 
‘An Obituary for Kenya’. A couple of New York Times pieces, stuff in the Guardian 
and also connected with Embassies, who were also asking for material. Apart from 
sending out to Western media, local media. 
People were publishing, a lot in The [Daily] Nation, the mainstream media. 
[Before], disregard for local media. Then, [in 2007/8], saw as very important.585  
 
 Civil society and the private sector, in this way, began to create a narrative about both the 
elections and the violence that transcended political party divisions (and the ethnic divisions 
assumed to underlie them). The result: ‘Was to begin collating a national narrative that was not 
ethnic’.586 
Came up with citizens’ agenda for peace, beginning to look at repeat of elections, 
shared government. The bone of contention was the fact the presidential elections 
were disputed. Given that, what alternatives could we offer to both sides? Trying 
to explore solutions.587 
 
Civil society’s major strength was coherence and consistency in messaging. It kept 
the country focused on truth and justice. This is not to deny that the ‘flower girls’ 
[CCP] were not also consistent in their messaging. They weren’t contradictory, 
reinforcing each other. Evidence-led advocacy. That must have swayed everybody, 
no matter whom you were, as didn’t make an argument without evidence. Never 
visited any Embassy without a message to give that was well-researched. Any 
government, the same. The private sector was swayed by analysis KPTJ was doing, 
including evidence on the costs of the violence. The media focused on civil society. 
I have never seen such collaboration between media and civil society. We had 
access to the KTN [Kenya Television Network], [The Daily] Nation. A partnership 
between civil society and the media. Even though we talk about civil society being 
fragmented, that fragmentation did not show itself during the period. The people 
who’d taken sides were not as vocal as the people who hadn’t.588 
                                                          
584 Interview with George Kegoro, former Executive Director, the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ)-Kenya, 
Executive Secretary of the CIPEV under the Grand Coalition Government, Nairobi, January 15, 2016. 
585 Interview with Billy Kahora, Editor, Kwani and member of CKW, Nairobi, February 12, 2015. 
586 Interview with Kwamchetsi Makokha, journalist and member of KPTJ, Nairobi, April 23, 2015. 
587 Interview with Florence Mpaayei, former Executive Director, NPI and member of CCP and the Women’s 
Consortium, Nairobi, February 26, 2015. 
588 Interview with Professor Karuti Kanyinga, political scientist and member of KPTJ, Nairobi, February 20, 2015. 
136 
 
 
Frankly, up to the point that Kufour came and decided that the former UN 
Secretary-General was going to mediate, those were the voices people were looking 
at, civil society. About peace and bringing back sanity. We [the Nation Media 
Group] spent money, we paid for everything, but didn’t want anybody to know that 
we were paying. We gathered them together, with no discrimination. They held the 
fort, they managed to meet ODM, emissaries from the PNU side. After that, Annan 
took over. By then, the country was beginning to have semblance of normality. We 
never publicised it. 
What we did more than anything else was support them. We opened our 
platforms to them. Annan did many opinion pieces as we were supporting the peace 
process deliberately. Kenyans have forgotten that, Annan is now persona non grata 
in Kenya. But we were proud of it. Beyond what we showed on television, we gave 
them materials, they were able to review, buy what they wanted.589 
 
I read a blog by a woman who chronicled the events. She says when she saw us on 
TV, she felt there were voices of reason and some sober people left… [Dr David] 
Ndii, [Professor] Karuti [Kanyinga, both in KPTJ], Julie [Gichuru, of the Nation 
Media Group]. [She] felt that things would be OK. If that was a widespread enough 
sentiment, citizens likely to identify with us, could’ve had an effect.590 
 
For civil society, it gave us a realisation that we, citizens, have a reserve of power 
that probably didn’t know we had. We were able to have voice and influence over 
what happened to the country, because our ideas affirmed by the mediation. It 
affirmed the voice of citizens. Its very creation is an affirmation that citizens had 
an extraordinary voice at the time.591 
 
 The result was a historical record of the period: 
CKW ended up having the most alternative, creative and unrecorded conversations 
of that time. Biggest records of what alternative media and creatives thought about 
what was going on. Kwani 5 got a lot of international academic interest, [who] 
wrongly thought [it was the] only font of creative memory as structured as a 
book.592  
 
Another result was providing a domestic anchor and domestic legitimacy for the mediation, 
the region and the rest of the world: 
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KPTJ among the first to call for international engagement as scale of what was 
happening looked like the beginnings of a genocide.593 
 
Giving the mediators, the process, a sense [that] a participatory national process, 
giving legitimacy and moral force. Whether contributed to cessation of violence, 
don’t know. But, intellectual contribution. The public was so polarised, people 
weren’t listening to anybody not on their own side.594 
 
By ‘speaking truth to power’, civil society and the private sector also helped soften the 
hardliners in both ODM and PNU, moving them away from their initial positions and, during the 
mediation, enabling the mediation’s success: 
Brought two opposing camps together in a violent environment and able to talk. 
Changed nature of politics and this was reflected in 2013. People disappointed but 
resorting to violence out. The ICC also helped [with deterrence in 2013].595 
 
Must not send wrong message to President [during the private sector’s first meeting 
with him]: ‘Your Excellency, we recognise you’re the duly sworn in President. 
However, 50 per cent of the country considers your election as illegitimate.’ Wrote 
it down or nobody would have the guts. Felt his Ministers cheating and lying to 
him. Was livid with [them], they’d made comments that all that is going on has no 
impact on the growth of the economy: ‘When 1,000 people already killed, no 
tourism, no agriculture. Even if you and Raila came together today, no way this 
economy is going to do more than two or three per cent this year and each day you 
waste is going into negative territory.’ 
Everyone candid, told him he needed to be Commander-in-Chief, secure the 
country, make sure people not being killed. A political problem and have to meet 
with Raila. Gave him the legacy thing, said [he’s the] third President of Kenya, this 
never happened under the other two Presidents’ watch. For one hour, never said 
anything. When he opened up, he was furious: ‘That fellow, they’re killing people, 
they’re murderers, you’re telling me to talk to murderers.’ But after he’d vented, 
said he appreciated us coming. Told us he’d made efforts to see this guy [Odinga], 
had invited him to State House, religious leaders had mediated. Told Muthaura to 
get mediators to go to the other side. Said: ‘Go and tell him I’m willing to meet 
with him outside State House.’ 
Spent about three hours with Kibaki: ‘People sitting around this table 
represent the entire economy, forget the middle man (Finance Minister).’ Kibaki 
got message. All thought that [the Ministers were] the hardliners. Walked out and 
said: ‘We’ve just met the hardliner himself, there is no other hardliner.’ 
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When Raila heard we’d had this meeting, wanted to meet us. Met with 
Raila, the Pentagon, [he] kept talking about the business community as Kibaki 
supporters. Both of them had ridiculous demands, pre-requisites to meeting each 
other. Raila also opened up furiously: ‘That man you’re referring to as the President 
is nothing but a common thief. In 1992, in 1997, the IPPG, at least Moi honoured 
the IPPG, this guy just came and threw out IPPG.’ Had a few valid points. But, we 
had to fetter ourselves to reality. Asked him if willing to split the baby into two to 
get own way. Raila said no.596 
 
Finally, the data and evidence-based analysis provided by civil society and the private 
sector helped first frame and then fill out the content of the mediation agreement, ensuring it went 
beyond responding solely to the trigger of the post-elections violence and sought to address the 
proximate and structural causes of the same. That it did so was deliberate on the part of the lead 
mediator and the rest of the AU Panel of Eminent African Personalities: 
We defined success in several ways. First, ensuring that the killings and 
displacement of people stopped. Working with the Red Cross and international 
actors able to get help to the needy and the internally displaced. Then, when we got 
to agree to a political settlement in the form of power-sharing, that was another 
benchmark. Then a focus on long-term goals, with the Kenyan people pushing for 
the new Constitution, which was adopted. The real test for us was to wait for the 
next election and when that went the way it did, we felt we had made a difference.597 
 
 In that sense, the mediation agreements had a life-span that lasted well beyond the political 
settlement and the Grand Coalition Government that they brought into being: 
People do think about the peace accord. When refer to the Constitution, know came 
from the peace accord. And devolved government. It was a blueprint or a beginning. 
A reference point. We understand why have a National Cohesion and Integration 
Commission (NCIC). A Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) 
that’s stalled but people are always asking, ‘Where’s the TJRC report?’ 
Organisations working on reparations, make their reference the TRJC report and 
ultimately the national accord.598 
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The first important impact of the mediation agreements was stopping the post-elections 
violence and beginning to address the needs of those that its different forms had displaced:599 ‘We 
got back calm. Afraid to use the term peace. We got a ceasefire.’600 ‘We succeeded in stopping the 
violence. We partly succeeded in tackling the humanitarian crisis.’601 
In addition, the agreement to establish the CIPEV reflected the desire to end impunity for 
politically instigated violence and the excesses of the security services:  
[The CIPEV or] Waki [Commission] made an effort to address accountability. Even 
the TJRC before it was scuttled and its report doctored by State House.602 
 
The mediation averted civil war. Without the mediation, accountability for the 
violence wouldn’t have occurred. Attempts at accountability put in place and that 
search for accountability for the violence has been a reference point for demands 
for justice enabled as a result of the mediation. Also articulated an agenda for the 
long-term causes of violence: why were people so easily recruited for violence?603 
 
The second important impact of the mediation agreements was acknowledgement that the 
presidential electoral process and supposed outcome was wrong: ‘[The] success of the mediation 
was an acknowledgement that the election was troubled’.604 
KPTJ was injecting analysis and facts into the debate. Nobody else was doing that. 
That’s what made an impact.605  
 
Event we did, at which presented the data analysis, which then took on a life of its 
own. It was that event that culminated in the list of Kikuyu traitors.606 
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 In addition, the agreement establishing the IREC set the stage for the accountability and 
disbandment of the ECK, an investigation into what had gone wrong and legal, policy and 
institutional reform of the electoral process: 
A lot of people upset with Raila going into power-sharing but anger palliated by 
acknowledgement that elections hadn’t gone as meant to and that needed a process 
of renewal, reform. Subsequently, the disbandment of the ECK, the legal 
awkwardness of it notwithstanding, did not take the expected partisan positions, 
both PNU and ODM had a general sigh of relief about shutting it down and 
beginning anew. Used as basis to create a new electoral framework.607 
 
 Reform of the electoral process, including the new complaints procedure about contested 
presidential results through the Supreme Court, arguably helped to ensure that an equally contested 
process and supposed outcome in 2013 did not serve as a trigger for post-elections violence: 
We had the same thing in 2013. We had a repeat, right. [But] we waited for the 
court. I don’t know whether we’ll wait again. But at least tided us over that 
particular event. We are more ethnically polarised after 2013 than after 2007.608 
 
 A third important impact of the mediation agreements was the political settlement in the 
form of power-sharing that led to the establishment of the Grand Coalition Government: 
‘Everybody got a share of the pie.’609 
The Citizens’ Pathway Group (CPG) [of the private sector umbrella] got over 
shock, began doing research, had a session on narratives that communities have of 
each other and the country, that we have about government, said if we took PNU 
and ODM, how to get talking? Had a mock negotiation, came up with pie chart and 
became clear there must be power-sharing. Clear productive sector ministries must 
go to ODM as grievance is being left out of economy. Gikuyus insecure [so] 
security ministries to Kibaki. Called [political cartoonist at the Nation Media 
Group] Gado, he did a cartoon.610 
 
The business community and NGOs, you came to camp at Serena [Hotel] as though 
telling us [PNU] was not enough. Pressuring, wanting normalcy restored. That 
pressure did work. The business community and NGOs did well. Had local 
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ownership. Although we did feel as government that you treated us as criminals. 
Nobody wanted to see our point of view or believed we could have won the 
elections. Civil society, the business community, a majority of you were supporting 
the opposition, you’d taken sides, that’s what we felt. Any calls for inclusion, for 
accommodation, in our ears sounded like support for the opposition. But now, with 
insight, know that helped to see if don’t agree to a solution that restores normalcy, 
would’ve lost what support was there.  
Through the chief negotiator, the Eminent Persons, the views from civil 
society, from Kenyans, informed us, our think-tank without knowing it. One way 
persuaded about coalition was that had hung parliament [so took] opportunity to 
finalise the Constitution, institute legal and institutional reforms, youth.611  
 
Kofi Annan came. Called for meeting with KEPSA. Said I’ll lead, said fax/email 
those documents to Serena [Hotel]. Our job was to help Kofi. Took the pie chart 
and its rationale, the narratives. Had a whole business agenda, how business, the 
economy affected. Will never forget Graca asking me if Kibaki and Raila know all 
this stuff. I told her: ‘Madame, what I’ve read to you is out of research, these people 
have lived this, they know it better than me, don’t make mistake and think fools or 
naïve.’ [Annan] said one thing: ‘power-sharing’. Kofi told us we need to go out 
there and talk about power-sharing, I can’t say that, must be clear that’s what 
Kenyans want. Called a press conference, said KEPSA’s view is that there needs to 
be power-sharing. When we said that, people who used to think KEPSA good, hated 
it and vice versa. Ruto called and said: ‘I can’t believe you said what you said, are 
you for real?’ Said: ‘Not about you, about Kenya.’ 
Co-opted COTU [the Central Organisation of Trade Unions]. Sponsored 
two ads [as] my view was power-sharing has got to be the theme of the ad in the 
dailies. Second, a photo of Raila and Kibaki and Kenyans saying: ‘Not about you, 
about Kenyans.’ My proposal to have a big cross in red on Kibaki was vetoed. 
Kofi Annan took over, met KEPSA, Kiplagat’s group [CCP], you guys 
[KPTJ] skilfully drove us towards a settlement.612 
 
 A related but perhaps unintended impact of the mediation agreements was the lessening of 
‘grand corruption’ during the tenure of the Grand Coalition government: 
I can’t recall during the Coalition Government a scandal of the scale of Anglo-
Leasing [the major ‘grand corruption’ scandal of the NARC]. Because everyone 
watching each other, you do something, I scream. Not as common as today or 
during Kibaki 1. God saved us as one wing unable to steal as they would do in other 
circumstances.613 
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Another related impact of the mediation agreements was assured or guaranteed political 
representation of women in all the institutions and mechanisms arising:  
How to address women’s participation in politics and decision-making moving 
forward, in whatever structures would come out. Recommendations about that.614 
 
Because we had been involved as women speaking on behalf of the party, in the 
post-accord processes, we had opportunities women who hadn’t done that did. For 
instance, I was asked to serve on the [South African Justice Johann] Kriegler 
Commission [the IREC]. I turned it down because I’m not interested in electoral 
law. I said interested in the Constitution. Gave me insight into our political culture. 
Why as women we get left out of opportunities. Because not political in that sense, 
an old boys’ way of doing things, people take a position not because concerned 
about the issue but opportunity for patronage, influence, not necessarily influence 
in the public interest.615 
 
Of the long-term issues, the most important impact of the mediation agreements was 
conclusion of the almost two-decades-long struggle for constitutional reform to restore separation 
of powers as well as checks and balances:616 ‘Kenya made progress because of the violence. Would 
never have concluded the Constitution.’617 ‘It couldn’t have been obtained if either was President 
[alone], nobody wanted to be contentious:’618 
Ask if there would’ve been commitment to new Constitution? Was now a goalpost 
written in the law because the agreement became an act of parliament which was 
constitutionalised. These goalposts were important. To avoid them was difficult 
without a political cost. When something not there in the law or as recognised 
goalpost, people tend to view not an obligation but guideline that don’t need to 
follow. If left to usual and normal politics, the Constitution would’ve been more 
difficult. Would never have been without the Accord.619 
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We got a progressive new Constitution. We were able to preserve the majority of 
what was positive in the earlier drafts. Separation of powers. The Bill of Rights 
except on abortion, same-sex marriage.620 
 
Gave Kenya a chance to revive constitutional process, which had come to a 
standstill, address long-term injustice and create opportunity. Constitution of high 
quality that has assured checks and balances. The Constitution made fundamental 
structural changes, holds out hope.621 
 
The long-standing demand for the introduction of proportionality into the electoral system 
to lessen the intensity of electoral competition for the presidency didn’t, ultimately, make it 
through parliamentary negotiations on the draft Constitution. This meant that while the quota to 
guarantee women’s political representation remained, the means to reach that quota was 
unresolved: ‘There are areas that we need to think through more, like women’s representation.’622 
But the new Constitution did, critically, devolve powers to the regions, helping lessen the intensity 
of electoral competition for the presidency: 
We got a new Constitution, all these new mechanisms to check and balance 
Executive power. We got devolution, the Bill of Rights. We got these independent 
Commissions. A place where you’re not just drunk, you’re high: my goodness, 
we’ve hit the jackpot.623 
 
Devolution has mitigated the potential political price. Distribution of power. 
Imagine this government was plundering as it’s doing without anything going to 
the counties? The distribution of grievances so people don’t feel as vulnerable to 
the national government, the state.624 
 
Devolution is a major step forward. State House weakened. No longer sufficient to 
take State House. A whole lot of hotels and houses, like Monopoly. Devolved 
system is [a] check on central government. Weak, nascent, subject to same 
corruption networks and dirty politics. But, if strengthened, a push factor against 
centralised Executive power complete with impunity and abuses. Mediation is to 
thank for that.625 
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 Even more fundamentally, the structural reform brought in by the new Constitution has 
also altered the manner of political contestation: 
You can put a lot of things under the rubric of the Constitution. We have as 
retrogressive a government as Moi[’s]. The same people. We’re surviving them. 
They’re messing up the economy, squandering money, but you can see institutions 
working. Before [the] Constitution, most conflicts about individuals, now between 
Uhuru and Raila. But other contestations [are] about institutions fighting for power. 
Between judiciary and parliament. Parliament and the Senate. All against the 
Executive. I consider that progress. Wars on institutions are better than wars on 
tribes.626 
 
 Apart from concluding the Constitution, long-term issues were addressed by the mediation 
agreements, ensuring they had far more potential to address the proximate and structural causes of 
the post-elections violence than would otherwise have been the case. The mediation agreements 
had: 
More focus on structural causes than many other mediation processes, especially 
processes intended to resolve electoral disputes. In Kenya, attempt to go beyond 
resolving electoral dispute and recognise other issues that needed to be resolved.627 
 
They did not just address the immediate concern and took a historical perspective, 
into root causes. Because the conflict a symptom of deeper issues over the years.628 
 
 Agenda item four, covering long-term issues, thus addressed historical grievances about 
historical dispossession from land, past gross and systemic human rights violations, systemic 
discrimination on the basis of ethnicity in particular and national cohesion and integration:  
The land question. Marginalisation. Mechanisms like the TJRC, mechanisms to 
address the violence.629  
 
The mediation agreements were: 
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More comprehensive than anybody would’ve imagined. Power-sharing everybody 
expected. But sought to address the long-term and stipulated constitutional reform, 
Agenda Four.630 
 
 In short, the mediation agreements: ‘Provided an agenda for reform’.631  
We did more reforms within a short period of time than we’ve ever done in 
postcolonial Kenya to address structural causes.632 
 
Constitution review became possible and key legislation. National cohesion. TJRC. 
Everything passed except the [bill establishing a] local [special] tribunal [to try 
those suspected of criminal culpability for the post-elections violence, as 
recommended by the CIPEV] which was disrupted by self-interests on both sides, 
not one side.633 
 
Exclusion, inequality, that’s also an agenda that the mediation put on the table.634 
 
Look at cabinet formed: based on an understanding of the need for ethnic equality. 
A Ministry of northern Kenya and other arid areas. The need to address 
marginalised areas. That consciousness emerged. We started talking about ethnicity 
in public. It used to be a silent discussion, in private. All of us started looking at it 
with our eyes open.635 
 
An acknowledgement that needed to de-politicise the civil service. General 
appreciation power-sharing was going to neutralise the partisan poison in the public 
service.636 
 
Different commitments and mechanisms arising, however, had different results. While:  
Everybody knuckled down to take advantage, different efforts had different 
impacts. Hybrids. Local, international and of varying quality. But an amazing 
amount of work undertaken.637 
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Other issues that came up [weren’t] allowed to fester. Not implying they were 
resolved but they came to the fore and we had discussions on them and even that 
was healthy.638 
 
 
4.6.2 What enabled those outcomes, that impact? 
Legitimacy for the intervention in Kenya’s 2007-8 electoral conflict came from the fact that it was 
AU-mandated—to that extent, it constituted ‘an African solution to an African problem’.639 
However, it was also demand-driven640—and by domestic actors beyond the ODM itself, including 
CCP641 and KPTJ.642 The opening for the KNDR was provided by domestic actors, who exerted 
domestic pressure, applied pressure on and influenced regional and international actors and whose 
engagement with the KNDR also influenced and shaped its Road Map, agenda and agreements. 
Civil society in particular provided the lead through evidence-based analysis, messaging and 
advocacy.643 Ultimately: 
external interests converged with civil society interests. International actors and 
civil society created and sustained a huge demand for peace and thereby compelled 
the two parties into mediation.644 
 
The fact that there was a single mediation was important.645 The Panel included 
knowledgeable and skilled mediators,646 who committed to being present for the time it would 
take.647 The Panel also commanded credibility, independence, stature and trust, 648 enabling it to 
exercise control over the structure, agenda and sequencing of the KNDR, including its division 
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into short- and long-term issues649 as well as its procedures and problem-solving measures.650 
These problem-solving measures included its use of international ‘carrots and sticks’ for 
leverage,651 its use of experts on the humanitarian situation, options for addressing the supposed 
electoral results, coalition governments and the legal basis for the same to ensure pragmatism over 
politics,652 and direct recourse to the two Principals when the ODM and PNU negotiating teams 
were stuck.653 
The Panel also leveraged the legitimacy afforded by its AU mandate and domestic demand. 
It cultivated ownership of the KNDR with the parties to the electoral conflict by engaging them in 
reality-testing, for example, on options to addressing the supposed electoral results.654 It cultivated 
ownership of the KNDR beyond the parties to the electoral conflict through consultation with civil 
society and the private sector,655 insisting that one each of the ODM’s and PNU’s four negotiators 
be a woman and proactively catalysing the formation of the Women’s Consultative Group to 
ensure inputs with a gender and women’s rights perspective.656 Finally, it cultivated public 
ownership of the KNDR, while managing public perception, through addresses to and 
consultations with the media, including through the Kenya Editors Guild.657 Beyond ownership, 
this all also ensured that the KNDR maintained access to ideas and resources from domestic actors 
and the public.658 
                                                          
649 Kanyinga and Walker (2013), p 11; Lindenmayer and Kaye (2009), p 1. 
650 Aman (undated), p 9. 
651 Lindenmayer and Kaye (2009), p 6; Weiss (2010), p 21. 
652 Kanyinga and Walker (2013), p 11; Lindenmayer and Kaye (2009), pp 1, 11, 13, 15 and 18; Weiss (2010), p 23. 
653 Brown (2009), p 397; Khadiagala (2009), p 440. 
654 Aman (undated), p 10; Lindenmayer and Kaye (2009), p 13. 
655 Khadiagala (2009), p 440; Lindenmayer and Kaye (2009), p 7; McGhie and Wamai (2011), p 15; Weiss (2010), p 
22. 
656 McGhie and Wamai (2011), p 18 and 19. 
657 Aman (undated), p 9; Khadiagala (2009), p 440; Lindenmayer and Kaye (2009), p 1 and 7; Weiss (2010), p 22. 
658 Aman (undated), p 9. 
148 
 
The regional-international collaboration was also important.659 ‘The AU was well-placed 
to act quickly and with the implicit support of the UN Charter.’660 Explicit support was provided 
by the deployment of UN staff and experts to the KNDR. In summary, ‘it was the [AU] led by 
Kofi Annan that was at the forefront of the mediation effort, but the UN was present earlier on and 
actively working behind the scenes. The UN quickly deployed... the main support staff for the 
mediator... Few would contest that the prompt international mediation in Kenya helped prevent an 
even larger catastrophe.’661 
That the impacts listed above were achieved was not guaranteed. That they were achieved 
was due to mutually reinforcing factors. The first of these factors was the involvement of the AU:  
[The] involvement of the AU was critical in sense that, if internally initiated 
process, would have been too many roadblocks.662 
 
The second factor was the AU’s choice of lead mediator: his perceived independence but also his 
stature and ability to leverage all internal and external stakeholders:  
The mediator was an independent person who was not interested in who the victor 
was but a process to bring the country back to sanity. The level and authority of the 
intervention was important. Kofi had just been Secretary-General of the UN, was 
highly regarded and the AU had chosen somebody with those kind of credentials.663 
 
 The third factor was the mediation strategy adopted by the lead mediator and the Panel as 
a whole. Key elements of the strategy were: ensuring there was one mediation process; ensuring 
the participation of civil society and the private sector, even though they were not at the negotiating 
table; providing technical inputs to the negotiating teams to help de-politicise points of contention; 
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and agreeing to stay for the duration and monitoring implementation of the full set of mediation 
agreements for five years. 
They [the Panel] spoke to people beyond the key Principals, gave space to youth 
groups, women’s groups, religious leaders, private sector, listened to other 
opinions. That was important. They did help ensure women had space in the 
dialogue process and post-conflict arrangements.664 
 
Kofi Annan has remarked on depth of civil society. We [KPTJ] engaged him many 
times and subsequently did some work around Agenda Four items, wrote some 
papers, intellectual work.665 
 
When people managing by crisis, your ability to think is hampered. It came in 
handy the way Kofi Annan treated those suggestions. He would formulate them and 
propose to us [the ODM and PNU negotiating teams]. That’s how the Agenda Four 
was suggested and we adopted.666 
 
The first week, talking about how to stop the violence. Engaging the state to tell us 
why people are dying. Called the Police Commissioner. The head of internal 
security. The Red Cross was coming to us every morning, the strategy was to show 
the government this was something to resolve. Then the humanitarian crisis. Again, 
government agencies would be called.667 
 
I [Annan] thought I would stay ten days and stayed for six weeks straight. My staff 
started calling me a prisoner of peace as the people were not capable of making a 
deal and I couldn’t go. So stayed so could get to the logical conclusion and stayed 
engaged for five years. It was necessary.668 
 
Fourth was domestic data, analysis and pressure before, during and following the mediation 
process into implementation of the mediation agreements: ‘My view is that it wasn’t AU, it was 
Kenyans.’669 
Was coming a week or two earlier, but fell sick on my [Annan’s] way to the airport, 
had to go to hospital and the doctors wanted to keep me there for two weeks. [While 
in hospital,] I was on the phone, speaking to everybody and reading to keep 
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informed. That was my time to prepare, consult and reach out to other players, not 
only in Kenya but also in the international community. Some [information] came 
from the AU but not much. The UN had some, not much. Quite a lot, I had to gather 
with experts who’d worked on Kenya. And then, in Kenya, had wide outreach and 
was talking to lots of people, including yourself and others. The historical context 
was there but what was relevant was key elements needed to get a complete picture 
of what was needed. Of course, both sides put forward information to put them in 
a good light but needed to go behind that. 
[Civil society and the private sector] made substantive contributions, you 
guys [KPTJ] came with written submissions and we factored them into our work. I 
remember the business community telling me they were glad we were making the 
effort because all of us have plan Bs and those plan Bs are not good for Kenya: to 
close down, cut back or relocate. Told me they represented 85 per cent of [gross 
domestic product] (GDP). I told them: ‘That’s power, that’s influence, did you talk 
to government?’ 
Speed was of the essence and if had broadened table and brought all in [to 
the negotiations], it would’ve taken longer. But civil society and the business 
community had a right to be part of the process. I was not going to make deals 
behind their backs. It was their society and their agreement and they’d have to press 
for implementation. Which couldn’t have been left to politicians alone. 
Participation added pressure on the politicians.670 
 
Without the interventions from non-political actors within and without the country, 
getting on the table [for ODM] would’ve been extremely difficult. Before started 
formal meetings, separately being met by civil society and all manner of groups. 
Giving ideas. Having heard from civil society and internal groupings, once the 
negotiations started, difficult to open up. During those negotiations, there was little 
formal engagement with other actors. Final document was result of period prior to 
mediation, partly the mediation and partly when the Principals agreed.671 
 
Where work that civil society did came in was after signing of the Accord. Not just 
implementation but various questions that were raised, constitutional, legal and 
institutional reforms. You all did a good job during the crisis. I [Annan] am very 
proud of the Kenyan people.672 
 
4.7 A cautionary note 
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The KNDR lasted for 41 days, taking just under six weeks to de-escalate the electoral conflict and 
end the consequent violence, which is unusually fast.673 The KNDR has therefore been celebrated 
for being ‘an African solution to an African problem’.674 It is unique in that it was the AU’s first 
direct and swift intervention in an electoral conflict that sought a political settlement intended to 
address both immediate and longer-term aspects of that electoral conflict. But it became a single 
and successful intervention due to both domestic and international support. It was inclusive of and 
transparent with domestic actors and it commanded, unusually, undivided support from the rest of 
the international community.675 It does provide, thus, a positive example of UN and AU 
cooperation under Chapter VIII on regional arrangements—legitimate and timely response by the 
AU with political support and capacity from the UN.676 
While it has also been posited that this UN and AU cooperation was, in effect, a positive 
example of R2P,677 questions have been asked as to whether R2P explicitly motivated the AU 
response and explained the alignment of domestic, regional and international interests and whether 
the KNDR is therefore a unique or replicable example.678 As a related question, was the KNDR 
the success of the AU or the Panel? More specifically, would the rest of the international 
community have been so supportive of the KNDR had it not been led by Annan? If not, is the 
KNDR replicable?679 
In addition, the question has also been asked as to whether a political settlement in the form 
of power-sharing is an appropriate solution for electoral conflicts.680 Not only was the political 
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settlement in the form of power-sharing derailed by ‘spoilers and in-house detractors’ throughout 
the course of the Grand Coalition Government,681 it also diminished the political opposition 
(although the ODM often played that role from within the Executive and parliament).682 More 
fundamentally, however, the trade-off of ‘negotiated democracy’ is that of peace over democracy 
and justice, which, in Kenya, compromised reform and continues to pose risks for the future.683 
The lack of accountability and continued impunity for both the elections and the violence of 2007-
8 undermined rule of law and provided no disincentives for electoral manipulation or the use of 
violence as an electoral and political tool.684 
In addition, while the Road Map, agenda and agreements were intend to address not just 
the trigger, but also the proximate and structural causes of the electoral conflict and the violence 
that ensued, over time it was felt that the implementation matrix was too ambitious and that 
prioritisation was needed. This is particularly so given the low buy-in from both sides of the Grand 
Coalition Government with respect to structural reform that would address ethnic, gender and 
regional inequalities, and the coalition’s equally poor appetite for accountability and an end to 
impunity.685 The diminishing of regional and international interest over time contributed to this 
low buy-in and appetite.686 
The agenda was good, the negotiated settlement was one of the best things to 
happen to this country and, for a moment, had great hopes for the country. But we 
started mucking about with it, systematically.687 
 
 What turned out to be a problem with the mediation agenda and agreements was, ironically, 
ultimately the flipside of what was vaunted as their success. A political settlement arrived at 
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through negotiations between contesting political parties meant that all agreements and legislation, 
policies and institutions or mechanisms arising were not necessarily what was best for the country 
but what those contesting political parties could agree upon. The mediation was: 
Reduced to a PNU/ODM issue whereas it was our elections that were stolen, 
reduced to a battle over spoils. We lost that battle early. Concerned about the 
approach to Commissions of Inquiries because of our experience with the same. 
Agenda four was broad enough. We would’ve had reservations about timelines, 
firmness, what was required of political parties.688 
 
A first problem was that the criteria for selection of the AU Panel of Eminent African 
Personalities were implicit, rather than explicit. In addition, the AU didn’t provide the mediation 
team with terms of reference (ToRs). While this provided the mediation team with flexibility, the 
ability to achieve what they did was not necessarily guaranteed: 
There were gaps. The mediation team members not knowing why appointed. Graca 
said assumed because here for the APRM and as a woman. The mediation team had 
no terms of reference (ToRs). But were able to develop own framework.689 
 
A second problem, albeit perhaps evident only with the benefit of experience and hindsight, 
was that civil society and the private sector had initially argued for a political settlement limited 
in terms of both mandate and time—as necessary only to implement the mediation agreements and 
move the country to new General Elections under a new constitutional order. In the end, however, 
the Grand Coalition Government remained in place for a full electoral cycle, not seeing its mandate 
as transitional. In addition, the mediation agreements were general and, in some areas, lacked the 
detail or specificity that could have forestalled the tug-of-war between ODM and PNU on the 
formation, size, cost and effectiveness of the Grand Coalition Government as well as obligations 
arising once it was in place. In effect, the agreements rewarded the incumbent in a manner 
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reminiscent of previous political settlements in Kenya, including the one that brought about the 
political ‘transition’ of 2002 under the NARC: 
Power-sharing took us back to the NARC MoU, which is what the fight was about. 
Demonstrated the futility of Kibaki and his people subverting the NARC MoU. 
Could’ve given Raila half a loaf before. This is political myopia, insight about our 
Kikuyu political jingoism of 2003.690 
 
It put a cap on things, [but] the abscess wasn’t drained and came back to haunt us. 
Everything reduced to politicians. The political settlement came too soon, reduced 
to the interests of the two competing parties and not everything in our politics that 
causes this violence.691 
 
The National Accord was conservative, not radical. Giving the incumbent and the 
opposition a lifeline, a soft landing. No reason to think about elections again. Even 
ODM didn’t accept the idea of going to elections after two years. The Coalition 
Government lived for itself. Nobody was pushing for a public agenda. Made it 
difficult to give public goods. Were all looking for opportunities for themselves and 
to reproduce themselves.692 
 
What was put in the political settlement was experimental, to ensure society didn’t 
sunder completely. ODM had symbolic power, with PNU retaining real power. 
Kibaki remained President even if pesky Prime Minister trying to make his life 
difficult. Was rewarded even though had dodgy electoral victory.693 
 
An agreement in itself is not enough, there’d be need, if had to do it again, to go 
the extra mile, to spell out what we meant by portfolio balance. Whereas Raila 
meant to have relevance in day-to-day running of government, critical ministries, 
didn’t get. Would talk to him out of courtesy but do what they wanted or what 
Kibaki wanted. Affected government operations. An agreement is not good enough. 
The harder part is executing the spirit of the same. A repeat of 2002 when Kibaki 
said no longer the Summit which brought together people from the LDP and [the] 
NAK.694 
 
Power-sharing meant right through the civil service. Kibaki was able to manipulate 
the civil service. [The Panel] thought Odinga had a strong enough personality to 
manoeuvre that. Forgot about people like Francis Muthaura. Once clear that 50/50 
not 50/50 but 70/30, implementation skewed in favour of people who wanted to 
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maintain a strong authoritarian presidency. Everything was a fight. Assumptions 
made in the agreement that could’ve been paid better attention to.695 
 
A marriage of convenience, forced, not something PNU wanted. Unclarity as to 
roles, tension between three, President, Vice-President and Prime Minister, affected 
functioning of state. Bloated administration. 42 ministers, expensive, unworkable. 
But a compromise. Only way to move forward.696 
 
Grand Coalition Government dysfunctional. President and Prime Minister fighting 
each other rather than digging country out of the pit. A consequence of mediated 
agreement with adversaries, rather than when have outright winner [who] can take 
country in particular direction.697 
 
We had this huge cabinet, had demonstrations about it, a full page thing in the paper 
saying your greed is obscene, shame on you. Kibaki had the upper hand. Reduced 
to a squabble between politicians and left out everybody else, left out the entire 
nation.698 
 
 Another unintended consequence of the political settlement was diminishing the opposition 
as well as the ability of civil society to leverage the same to achieve public policy objectives in 
line with the mediation agreements. In some ways, it was a reversion to the state of affairs under 
the KANU dictatorship: 
With hindsight, we started [down] the road to finishing the opposition. Because had 
a coalition, we had no opposition for five years. The government was not put on its 
toes. There was no vigilance. We started seeing weakening of civil society in 2003 
[when leading civil society personalities had gone into the NARC government] and, 
by 2007, religious organisations came out of the violence weaker than ever. Human 
rights organisations also came out weakened. Yes, had a platform within 
government, space was there. But didn’t operate the way they did before as no 
opposition to support them the way they did in the past.699 
 
Everybody into government and we became a one-party state.700 
 
We’ve retreated to the one-party state. The regime or its alternatives look the same. 
They both use democratic language but when look at practice, at intention, just to 
get power and make most of it. Kenya removed itself from place where could say 
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need to fix the system, no attempt to look hard at the question and see what real 
problem is. It elongated the life of this elite. We wanted that settlement, we gave 
[the elite] a new lease of life. They have re-settled. We’re less able to sustain a 
challenge to the illegitimacy of this political elite. Because they’ve given a new 
shine to it. Have a recycled elite that’s smarter. The operating system is KANU 
101: everything has to go through the Executive, to please the Executive.  
The thing about power is it can’t be reserved for you, has to be fought for, 
civil society didn’t gird its loins. When comes to getting into the mud of politics, 
there’s no appetite. Kenya can’t move forward in that democratic sense that’s so 
required.701 
 
What this led to was back-pedalling on the political commitment to constitution-making. 
On both, substance mattered more than form and the devil was in the detail. Important 
commitments to specifics in the constitutional review process as well as to accountability were 
sacrificed: 
The script was clear in terms of working on a new constitutional dispensation. But 
people already in office, going through process now not attractive and enthusiasm 
low. In cabinet became difficult. People would reach out to the President when the 
draft [Constitution] became a problem and the Church was intervening with Kibaki 
and PNU. When came to the constitutional review process, not committed to any 
ideals on either side, bigger and larger objective that’s not immediately translated 
into political capital. Constitutional debate was translated into a quest for power 
and what arrangements would suit each [part of the] political coalition.702 
 
 What got kicked to the wayside were many of the proposals intended to lessen the intensity 
of political contestation for the presidency such as shifting to a purely parliamentary system and 
introducing proportionality in the electoral system. Although devolution was finally agreed upon, 
it was not devolution as initially proposed: 
On the Executive, we wanted a parliamentary system as ODM. For inclusivity, we 
thought a parliamentary system would take care of all interests. But the other side 
wanted a presidential system. The President would be the ultimate authority. The 
idea of having coalitions in parliament which could fall at any time was not 
attractive to PNU.703 
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We need to re-think this presidential system. We knew it was the wrong thing but, 
because of path dependence, [we didn’t] consider going parliamentary. Wouldn’t 
have an executive presidency for tribes to fight for. Could change government 
without the nuclear option. Parliamentary systems more stable. The problem was, 
by time negotiating, ODM was pushing parliamentary and, whatever ODM 
pushing, PNU resisting, fighting for Kibaki. [The C]onstitution is an instrument to 
change society. With tribalism so entrenched, need to shock the system as just 
reproduces itself. It’s the thing which makes us fight. So why not get rid of it? This 
presidency we fight for, insult other people, use language we can’t believe, possible 
to have a ceremonial President who’s a referee between this slag-fest.704 
 
The Committee of Experts (CoE) decided the winner-take[s]-all is a bad system, 
given our divisions. We need coalitions depending on how many votes you win. 
That gives every ethnic community a stake and an obligation to check each other. 
Was more viable than one community being in charge. Devolution’s helped. But 
need the national level as well. People like Kenyatta and Ruto so ingrained in a 
centralised government, will do anything to bring it back.705 
 
My biggest regret is the electoral system. A MMPR system would’ve allowed us to 
introduce proportionality into the electoral system. That system [also] prevent[s] 
you from having bloating. [We were] very naïve, had a draft that left the size of 
parliament open-ended with an assumption that parliamentarians wouldn’t go 
beyond 210. Didn’t anticipate would do what they did with the size of the national 
assembly. They said was non-negotiable.706 
 
We [ODM] wanted less counties. Even the eight [provinces]. Except that the Rift 
Valley was too big. Our maximum was 14 with the Rift Valley having additional 
counties and Eastern as well. [PNU] would not hear of it. They wanted even more 
than the 47 and how to create the 47 was becoming difficult as would find 
minorities [all across the country]: the Kuria in Nyanza. Nakuru an issue between 
the Kalenjin and the Kikuyu. The Kalenjin wanted to control Nakuru but could only 
do it if counties larger. Said: ‘OK, if not workable, have eight regions and those 
regions would have counties, a three-tier system’.707 
 
System of government is where there was some loss, devolution also. Because we 
ended up with devolution units that have affirmed ethnic boundaries.708 
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 Once the new constitutional dispensation came into being and devolved governments were 
voted in through the 2013 General Elections, more challenges emerged, including that of 
essentially having devolved the notion that the state is the source of largesse down to the counties: 
We’ve entered into this era of devolution, there’s been such teething problems. See 
MCAs [Members of County Assemblies], Governors, Senators not agreeing, 
translating former style of politics to the county level, where the first thing I think 
about is how, as a Governor, my building should look posh, what kind of car I 
should get, how I should travel. No sense that a civil servant coming to serve the 
people. Corruption transferred into those counties, priorities at the county level not 
clear. In terms of ownership, people participating in the budget process, that’s 
lacking. [In] which county do you see a clear break, a demarcation between what 
was before and what’s now? What’s changed? Who’s in charge? Where are those 
voices of change within the counties?709 
 
 In summary, there were ultimately problems with both the specifics of the Constitution and 
implementation of its provisions in line with the reasons for which those provisions were brought 
into being: 
Need to contrast the Constitution and constitutionalism. You have the Constitution 
as a document but is it a way of life? Which is constitutionalism. We have a 
situation in Africa where we have constitutions without constitutionalism. Look at 
the way they’re being changed left and right across the continent. We have term 
limits but a number of countries blatantly violate the letter and spirit of the 
Constitution, electorally manipulate the processes simply to maintain power. This 
is against the spirit of the African Charter on Democracy.710 
 
 Similar losses were registered with institutional reforms intended to be brought into being 
by the findings of the IREC on the electoral system, the CIPEV on the security sector and the 
Constitution on equality and non-discrimination, human rights in general, transitional justice to 
address historical grievances and the justice sector: 
A measure of institutional reforms but corrupted to suit the two groups, not the 
country, with the next election in mind. Even the IEBC [Independent Electoral and 
Boundaries Commission]. That’s how we, the political class, undermined the 
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solution. That’s the crisis we’re fighting today. We keep infesting and re-infecting 
institutions. It’s more of a political problem than the Constitution.711 
 
Security sector deforms, not reforms. Non-professionalisation. What were 
supposed to be short-term gains—new Constitution, new policy and institutional 
arrangements—turned around to serve exactly same interests as before.712 
 
Looking at institutional reform, window-dressing around the police. Have an 
independent IG [Inspector-General] of police but security beyond his ken.713 
 
These guys were going to hold onto the police. At the CoE, one of the discussions 
was having one police service. We needed to do away with the administration 
police because of the role they’d played, clear in 2008 that we’d had some elite 
ethnic formation with the AP. 
Police reform could’ve been continued through constitutional reform. I 
pushed for us to set up an Equality Commission separate from the KNCHR. If I’d 
had the slightest idea that parliament would use that to weaken the KNCHR and 
create weak institutions, wouldn’t have. We did not anticipate how 
parliamentarians would manipulate the transition from the old to the new 
Constitution to weaken bodies they considered threatening. If we had preserved the 
provision on a body for historical injustices, might have had leeway to insist on a 
stronger TJRC. If I’d had a crystal ball, I wouldn’t have removed, naïve. 
Post the Constitution coming in, those against the Constitution precisely 
because could see its power, organised to undermine it. Have a Judiciary, for 
example, with a progressive CJ [Chief Justice] but the CJ never sits alone. The 
Supreme Court was stacked. By 2010, those against reform [were] not going to 
make mistake of allowing people not amenable to their interests be in these 
positions.714  
 
We agreed to reform the Judiciary, you can see how it’s going. We’ve also messed 
up judicial reforms. Comes into the selection panels. The result is that even the new 
people in the Judiciary corrupt. We, the political class, have ruined the atmosphere. 
Everything.715 
 
Have gone back through legislation, the Chief Justice, the President must decide. If 
appointed by President, if a man, you’ve lost your manhood. If a woman, your 
womanhood. Now at the mercy of Head of State. Can be bullied around. The 
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Constitution set up the Judiciary, the police, independent, without interference of 
the Executive. When the Executive starts interfering, using its majority in 
parliament, that’s the beginning of problems. All those independent bodies no 
longer independent.716 
 
Have Judiciary that’s mixed in terms of its judgements.717 
 
 The consequence is that, only one election cycle away from the institutional reforms 
ushered in by the mediation agreements, public confidence in critical public institutions is again 
low: 
Don’t think people believe in reforms any more. I’ve seen opinion polls in 2014 
and people’s confidence in institutions is low. The triggers of violence are with us. 
They were about lack of faith in institutions, lack of trust. In terms of institutional 
reforms, we’ve lost it. During the Coalition Government, we’d talk about the most 
reforming institution. These days, which institution would we talk about? That’s 
why corruption is taking place the way it is. Extortion rings in parliament are as big 
as ever, if not worse. Committees that used to be reformist aren’t. Even if led by 
CORD [the Coalition for the Restoration of Democracy]. The voices that demand 
accountability have either become fewer or have decentralised.718 
 
 There was also back-pedalling on the political commitment to accountability as a result of 
the political settlement. This includes accountability not just for ‘grand corruption’ but also for 
electoral malfeasance and, critically and ultimately, the post-elections violence: 
The fight against corruption and impunity was also an immediate and long-term 
solution. Both sides undermined that fight. We’re more corrupt than we’ve ever 
been. Today’s corruption makes Moi’s corruption look like child’s play. The 
corrupt of Moi’s era used to hide. Today, they beat their chests, come out with a 
hammer to see who interrupting their holy mission. The right to corruption. Both 
sides had vested interests in corruption.719 
 
The mediation process appeared to give solutions but those solutions were not 
durable, clawbacks, leads to questions about assumptions that went into settlement. 
Could something else have been done, shooting Kibaki for example, that gives us 
lessons that if you do this, the consequences are this? Nothing discouraged as a 
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result of the mediation. Saw in 2013, a repeat, because the mediation didn’t 
discourage the behaviour that led us to 2007. 
That the grievances have never been addressed is what gives us 2013 where 
Kenyatta a continuation of Kibaki, emboldened enough to say can steal the Kenyan 
state and there’ll be no consequences. The impotence of instruments available to 
ensure there are real consequences for people who steal political power. 
Emboldened the two suspects before the ICC when were two dark horses at that 
time. What will happen this time when more emboldened now? There’s nothing 
they can’t do now. So 2007 frames the enormity of the problem of 2017.720 
 
The government is not accountable to society. It is accountable to itself. The culture 
of impunity. That is entrenched at all levels. Whether on violence, on corruption, a 
war that’s been lost. Rule of law is also out the window. The moment [Kenyatta 
and Ruto, suspects before the ICC, were] allowed to run to office with the criminal 
cases before them, allowed everybody at every level to compete whether criminal 
or not.721 
 
 Arguably, the retreat on the commitment to accountability began not so much with the 
mediation agreements as with the decision by the IREC to opt for reform rather than accountability 
beyond the ECK for what had happened with the process and supposed outcome of the presidential 
election:  
We’ve had electoral reforms but remain unconsolidated. Because the integrity of 
the election result was neither here nor there.722 
 
[Chair of the IREC, South African Justice Johann] Kreigler wasn’t bad but could’ve 
been better, had he gone into [what happened at the national tallying centre, the] 
KICC which he refused to do.723 
 
We didn’t get truth and justice around the elections, that was dismissed as naïve. 
The Kriegler Commission, we began to look as though we were the only ones who 
had a problem. Remember how Kreigler took us [KPTJ] on and made us 
responsible for the violence, remember how Karuti [who gave KPTJ’s data and 
analysis of the elections] was handled?724 
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Kriegler sidestepped accountability for the elections and we see the short-
sightedness of that at the next elections. Kriegler least successful and led to a 
fraudulent election.725 
 
 Why the IREC took that turn is hard to explain. The desire not to upset the political 
settlement, with the Grand Coalition Government in place when IREC began, may have been part 
of it. But there was also the agency of its Chair: 
South Africans working elsewhere in Africa don’t have a good grasp of dynamics 
and tend to extrapolate own limited experience and impose it. South Africa’s 
solution was a conciliatory one without accountability and the model that Kriegler 
sought to impose. Sidestepped fundamental issue of electoral fraud.726 
 
Ended up with somebody leading the Commission who had his own notions about 
African people. Kreigler was a racist. Thinking about how he treated KPTJ. 
Remember the way Karuti’s evidence dismissed. 
The PNU lot also able to successfully manipulate that process. Some solid 
recommendations made [but] because those able to hang onto power not interested 
in reform, not implemented. When the IIEC [Interim Independent Electoral 
Commission, the immediate ECK successor] and the IEBC were set up, there was 
political interference as to who got appointed onto these bodies, we didn’t put onto 
these bodies people best placed to do this work. Just the way those bodies set up, 
how they were staffed, it was obvious what their political input was, even whatever 
came out of the Kriegler process was frustrated. If you look at the report, sound 
reasoning on our electoral system and those discussions not followed. Clear we 
should be thinking about getting out of first-past-the-post but the body responsible 
didn’t do that. Same thing with the IEBC, on boundaries, they were entrenched in 
the old system. All those political interests trounced the technical. Maybe they 
suffered from the fact that didn’t have any internationals on board. They needed 
somebody without direct interests. The only post-accord groups that didn’t.727 
 
Kriegler made good suggestions and proposals, half of which we’ve watered 
down.728 
 
An independent electoral commission but no independence. Institutional model OK 
but social context wrong. Took these nine commissioners through public 
interviewing and vetting. Less than 12 months later, getting stories of disquiet 
internally. Because of corruption, trying to find a balance between a politically 
representative Commission and a professional Commission. Looking for electoral 
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experts but those pushing them through, using the parliamentary approvals process, 
politicised the appointments process. Question about independence.729 
 
 The result was that there were the same problems with counting and tallying of the 
presidential vote in 2013 as there were in 2007: 
We were condemned to repeating the same problems. Repeated it in 2013 and will 
have gone back to square one in 2017.730 
 
We tried to plug the gaps in our electoral system and failed. Or plugged some holes 
and left others. In the 2013 elections, the problems with counting and tallying didn’t 
go away. Back to discredited manual system, despite black and white 
recommendations. We took longer, we took a week to complete counting and 
announce presidential results. Which is unbelievable for an exercise decentralised 
to 33,000 polling stations. We took six days to know what those numbers were. 
What we thought was a success needs to be re-visited.731 
 
 The only difference was that, relative to 2007-8, the aggrieved opposition was willing to 
take its grievance with the process and supposed outcome of the presidential poll to the new 
Supreme Court, itself birthed by the new Constitution, concluded as a result of the mediation 
agreements. That said, both civil society and the opposition were dissatisfied with the manner in 
which the Supreme Court addressed their separate bodies of evidence and its final judgment: 
We created a valve in terms of saying if you’ve a dispute with the elections, there’s 
a place you can take it. But questions about whether the Supreme Court played that 
role. Did it help people get to the truth about the 2013 elections? The answer is not 
in the affirmative. Listening to people on the two big sides, there’s still uncertainty 
about whether that election result the true verifiable result.732 
 
What matters is what gives you political advantage. Not unthinkable that Kenyatta 
and Ruto, on opposite sides in 2007, would be buddies in 2013. In Kenyan context, 
that’s what works. About numbers, what gets you to office. Have 50 per cent plus 
one rule, the polls say one thing, the outcome says something different. Looked like 
this going to go to a second round then, bam, there we are, we have 50 per cent plus 
one. We’d made ourselves believe we had different institutions, could take this to 
the courts. That court makes a ruling and, having submitted ourselves to it, what do 
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you do with verdict at that point? Do you accept? Or cast aspersions on what we’d 
accepted?733 
 
The Supreme Court didn’t allow the audit of the results. If that’d been allowed, we 
would be talking with confidence about the final outcome. 
The Constitution says you can’t deny justice on the basis of technicalities 
but denied CORD [the Coalition for the Restoration of Democracy] on the basis of 
technicalities, as submitted affidavit [on issues around the use of IT] late. 
In the civil society petition, the solid ground was the [voters’] registers. It 
was deliberate of the IEBC to use different registers. You use different registers to 
stand with the one that gives the opportunity to argue what you want to argue on 
50 per cent plus one. It was not an accident to have registers with different numbers 
of people and not know which one to call the final register. 
The Supreme Court ruling left a lot to be desired as it’s full of contradictions 
and those contradictions have continued to dog it as time goes on. Unfortunate how 
the Supreme Court ruled in that petition and how it made some of the decisions it 
made. What happened in that election? Two things. Jubilee did not have 50 per cent 
plus one. Would they have had it if we went to the second round? They might have, 
looking at opinion polls. But the Supreme Court didn’t want a second round. 
There’s no single petition that’s been filed thus far that they’ve allowed to go for a 
second round. No by-election. 
Why? Thinking not about democratic justice but that should give people 
peace rather than justice. The general feeling was that peace was more important 
than the outcome of the election. Wherever I went, was told didn’t give a damn 
about who won, only didn’t want to go back to 2007. The triumph of the peace 
discourse. People are no longer concerned about democratic issues if take the space 
for peace. A legacy we have to deal with.734 
 
[ICC] indictees came into office in questionable circumstances follow[ing] the 
Supreme Court judgment that raised questions about independence and left people 
fearful that gains could be swept away easily. Supreme Court ruling a 
disappointment. If had been a split judgement, would’ve indicated the way the 
country felt. The fact that 100 per cent unanimous gave the mistaken impression a 
100 per cent endorsement, an election landslide. Emboldened the incumbents. A 
cloak of silence fell over the nation. The media became acquiescent. Voicing public 
dissent more difficult.735 
 
 The implication is that the intent or purpose of the mediation agreements have failed to be 
sustained, with the result that elections remain a potential trigger for violence: 
The threats of violence in the run-up to the election in Naivasha, people transferring 
out of areas. Large swathes of Coast Province didn’t vote because of violence on 
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election day, attacks on polling stations, disenfranchising large sections of the 
population. Worse than in 2007 because people weren’t prevented from voting then. 
But in 2013, significant sections prevented from voting.736 
 
This is primarily due to the continued inability of the EMB to shield itself from political 
interference, particularly from the Executive and the absolute lack of consequences for such 
interference: 
In 2013, may have failed to ask questions as didn’t want to be seen as rocking the 
boat. My fear is that the opposite might happen the next elections, 2017. We remain 
an unstable country. Elections are going to remain our most vulnerable point. If we 
can sail through elections safely, might be able to teeter on until we find some 
balance somewhere. But where that balance is going to emerge, don’t know. Don’t 
think we’ve heard the last of accountability for 2007. These issues will come back 
again, either violently or through institutions. How to avoid this situation where 
every election is a nail-biting experience. Depends on commitment and discipline 
of our politicians.737 
 
The electoral system is owned by both sides. If look at Kreigler [IREC] report, 
you’ll see both sides manipulated the vote. Even in 2013, both sides committed 
irregularities. The IEBC failed in its duties [but] we’ll never have free and fair 
elections without dealing with the political issue. Being ready to respect rule of law, 
follow the rules. Otherwise, each side trying to out-deal each other and incumbent 
having all the machinery. The people’s will can only be actualised if an 
overwhelming majority on one side that can defeat corruption. Difficult for those 
at fault to reform themselves.738 
 
 The CIPEV’s report was more promising in terms of not only identifying patterns of the 
post-elections violence and suspected perpetrators, including a stinging indictment of the security 
services, but also recommending the establishment of a Special Tribunal to try suspected 
perpetrators. Failure to establish the Special Tribunal meant that criminal accountability would be 
taken up by the ICC: 
Unlike South Africa, we’ve never had a problem with truth-telling. Extensive 
documentation on who’s responsible, people have been named again and again. Not 
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like our killings happen in dark corners. Don’t lack truth-telling, lack 
accountability. After the mediation, substantial gains toward that.739 
 
Ultimately, however, legislation to establish the Special Tribunal failed to be passed by 
parliament no fewer than three times and, further to the release of names to be charged by the ICC, 
the Executive under both the Grand Coalition Government and then Kenyatta and Ruto was used 
to frustrate the ICC proceedings in every manner possible. The ICC itself made some errors in its 
approach to the Kenyan cases. The result was: ‘Accountability for the violence not achieved in 
any meaningful manner.’740 
The Waki Commission a success. The biggest failure was with Agenda one on 
disarming militias. The networks still exist in some form. Easy to resuscitate 
them.741 
 
Militias. No Kenyan pretends that Mungiki not alive and well. Or the Kalenjin 
warriors.742 
 
We had issues around the Special Tribunal. We didn’t start off focusing on the ICC, 
we were quite sceptical, all the concerns we had around the ICC in other situations, 
[then Prosecutor Luis] Moreno [Ocampo] himself and the controversy surrounding 
him. But because the only game in town, we began engaging and weren’t publicly 
critical although we were critical in meetings with them. We did keep harping on 
about accountability for all levels, low level, mid-level, high level. If could go back, 
would be more aggressive about that, pushing for alternative solutions. Dealing 
with armed groups, that was left to the ICC. No attempt to deal with that so later on 
morphed and became something else.743 
 
My biggest disappointment with the ICC was the police. That was the easiest case 
to prove and didn’t. That was the most important part for us in terms of 
accountability. Because if can transform state machinery, then can deal with militia. 
But not now. We’re still vulnerable. The police, the military can be used as militia. 
And know they can get away with it.744 
 
The ICC indictments were the first time people had seen such high-level people 
called to the dock to account for their actions. Saw the Kenyan delight in that 
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because everybody knew people in government responsible for things and long 
overdue. Success story at beginning. But not a matter of if, a matter of when, 
because Ocampo always makes mistakes. The ICC indictments went terribly 
wrong. Didn’t need to go that way if [the] Office [of the Prosecutor, OTP] had been 
less publicity-seeking. Could’ve sealed indictments until had completed 
investigations. But wanted the glory.745 
 
Lawyers, including some I respect, believe the ICC also made mistakes. You do 
not charge people with serious crimes and let them walk. In situations where 
interference was possible, or even where not, when charged with such serious 
crimes, you do not let them walk.746 
 
No time to waste, need to try the big fish for the justice of the many. In the process, 
lost concentration on that larger society. Nobody could deny justice was important 
and the ICC helped keep pressure on people who’d never have looked for justice 
for those affected. But that hybridity also allowed the global, the particular 
template, the particular form of seeking justice, to supersede and overwhelm local 
conversations. And introduced a politics of business as usual, politics into what 
could’ve been a different African agenda. And the rest is history.747 
 
 Apart from mis-steps made by the ICC, the problem was that with suspected perpetrators 
existing in both ODM and PNU, believed to be responsible for different patterns of the violence, 
there was no appetite within the Grand Coalition Government for accountability for the post-
elections violence. The exception was for suspected perpetrators from the other side or from the 
Executive in respect of the security services: 
National amnesia, forgetting uncomfortable truths. There was a political settlement, 
leave the violence alone. Questions of accountability are difficult. When people 
clamouring to get into government, accountability attractive as strengthens base. 
But when starts happening, people walk away from it. Realisation that both camps 
had been involved in crimes and desire to shield perpetrators. Everybody brought 
down, nobody had a higher moral ground. Created a complex context for 
accountability.748 
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Those involved able to continue to be part of political elite, manipulate the justice 
process and ensure no accountability. It was a mistake by the ICC to let them be 
here and not hold them.749 
 
Young people were arrested [in the Rift Valley], Raila raised in Cabinet. Then the 
ICC. Which was good in terms of dealing with impunity but in terms of dealing 
with political formations, it weakened [ODM], it hit us hard.750 
 
 As for PNU: 
Tried to intervene once or twice with Kibaki on the local tribunal, let’s go with the 
tribunal. Initially Kibaki persuaded by idea of local tribunal. But not the sort of 
person to call people to State House, give parliamentarians money. 
We went on some missions to the ICC, pleading for more time, which they 
gave us. The ICC saying: ‘Come up with concrete legislation and results, we don’t 
have to take up these matters’. But out of stupidity and buffoonery, people felt this 
tribunal not good. 
The ICC [then] made decision that going to indict six Kenyans. Raila told 
Ocampo cannot be talking about six and not tell us, we’re the government. 
[Ocampo] said difficult to mention names when some in envelope. When Kibaki 
heard name of Muthaura, he was furious, like he’d been struck by lightning. 
The ICC would’ve gone in different direction if around Kibaki there were 
discussions that were open and objective. But could see the issue being brought to 
him was give the ICC a little space and you are going to end up there. You could 
see Kibaki fear those consequences. His concern was himself. Uhuru and Muthaura 
second. I’ve never seen Kibaki so scared, at a loss and helpless as when Ocampo 
was in his office. He was furious as had been told would eventually get to him. 
There are things that could’ve been done differently if not dealing with crude 
politicians who, instead of discussing what’s on table, use[d] fear to derange 
process.751 
 
Unfair to blame [the ICC] completely. Had underestimated the witness tampering, 
etc. The witnesses they had, if not tampered with, could’ve gotten their 
indictments.752 
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 Thus, although there were efforts to ensure accountability for the post-elections violence, 
they ultimately failed. That failure has, in turn, not only let down victims and survivors but 
potentially legitimised the use of violence for political ends in the future: 
It was clear that the people wanted peace. The people were concerned about the 
rule of law. About justice and, in fact, with all the discussions on justice and the 
ICC, have always maintained that my concern is for the little people, the 1,300 
killed, the 320,000 who lost their homes. They are not powerful, who speaks for 
them, when will they get justice? Rule of law and justice much more important for 
the little guys.753 
 
Failed to resettle people. Haphazard and delayed.754 
 
IDPs are not going to be given the support they deserve because they’re a threat, a 
reminder to the political elite. There’s been corruption in the way we’ve treated 
victims. There’s been stratification, the same way we instrumentalise our ethnicity 
politically, we’ve done the same thing with victims. Narratives around victimhood 
have been created and we don’t acknowledge some of them. Others get privileged. 
Even where there’s been compensation, people left out. Because on the ODM side, 
perceived as being potentially pro-PNU. From the PNU side, because of their 
nomenclature and part of the country they come from. In the stereotype about who 
suffered, they don’t feature. Groups who are numerically larger, we acknowledge 
what happened to them, they have access. And focus on certain types of violence. 
We know sexual violence the most widely experienced. Yet the focus has been on 
displacement. Even when we respond to victims, that’s least attended to. Because 
victims of sexual violence primarily women and concerns not considered valid. 
Privilege some forms of victimhood over other.755  
 
We’re in a situation where they’ve gotten away with it. The most credible attempt 
to get accountability, it’s failed. The ICC has no appetite to intervene in Kenya 
again. There’s no deterrent. It’s just a question of who controls the machinery of 
power, the Gikuyus control that and will never let go of it.756 
 
Unintended consequences? Jubilee government. The damage that these false ICC 
narratives have done is incalculable. Didn’t realise just how effective constructed 
political narratives can be. Not only propelled these guys to power but makes them 
vulnerable to blackmail by, for instance, bureaucrats who’ve helped them subvert 
the process. What we did was to lower the bar in terms of integrity and standards. 
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If you’re having to pay people to make witnesses vanish, what other standards of 
integrity are there? Stealing money is a small thing. Part of explosion of corruption 
by this government is due to that, trying to get out of the ICC. Unintended 
consequence and serious damage.757  
 
Accountability has been thrown out of the window. The current government feels 
accountable only to the Gikuyu and the Kalenjin, [to] getting their own people to 
eat. They don’t care about accountability. From 2013 to date, this is not a 
government about accountability or justice. Forget it.758 
 
The whole bluff of having a new Constitution has been called. There’s no 
accountability. Not in 2013. Not sure anybody will try to hold a politician to 
account given what’s happened with the ICC. Enjoy your Constitution but, when it 
starts raining, it won’t be your shield. [A parliamentary aspirant can be] identified 
as interfering with witnesses [yet] the High Court can stand up and say [he] can run 
in an election?759 
 
Kenya a test case on how to deal with impunity. Politicisation of cases at the ICC 
frightened tentative supporters of accountability in the AU. The way the Kenyan 
cases have turned out has informed the way the AU is dealing with South Sudan. 
Have these influential voices like Kenya saying the ICC is race-hunting while have 
situations demanding ICC intervention.760 
 
 In the aftermath, acknowledging that accountability was always going to be politicised, the 
question of how to address claims for justice is still awaiting an answer: 
Have to ask what was the alternative? The alternative is not impunity. Whichever 
process we ended up with would’ve resulted in these guys fighting back, other than 
summary execution at an early stage.761 
 
There’s no doubt the violence had to be dealt with. Needed criminal justice within 
a larger social justice thing. If you pursue one at expense of other, can lose both 
and end up with nothing. The big question is how to pursue this together to a 
societal equilibrium. The electoral violence provided opportunity for that. Perhaps 
if took a long-term approach, might have been an avenue to bring leaders and 
society together in a genuine way. But by focusing on criminal justice without the 
larger conversation and allowing outsiders to bring their own perspectives to this, 
lost an opportunity. And possible for the elite, including those governing and the 
well-to-do, civil society, prominent society, neither fish nor fowl, to begin a tussle 
for power, whose voice would be heard more. A new election also got hijacked. 
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To conclude, where’s Kenya? Kenya tried, the initial approach had snippets 
of ‘Africanness’ to it, had snippets of trying to deal comprehensively with positive 
peace, dared to look at root causes. But hijacked by the global template and 
ineptitude amongst African elites.762 
 
 Finally, several of the long-term issues identified by Agenda four were either not addressed 
or addressed so nominally as to fail to deal with the proximate and structural causes of the post-
elections violence. These include economic grievances arising from systemic discrimination on 
ethnic grounds (compounded by systemic discrimination on ability, age and gender grounds), past 
gross and systemic human rights violations and historical dispossession from land:763 
We can call it a victory but it is a Pyrrhic victory that just addressed symptoms of 
the problem. But the structural, root cause remained unaddressed. My fear is that 
that structural, root cause unaddressed may come to haunt Kenya come the next 
elections. A number of issues remain unaddressed despite our quote unquote 
success story. First, the economic causal factors have not been dealt with. 
Unemployment, poverty, inequality, exclusion, in particular affecting women, 
youth, people with disabilities, minorities and other marginalised groups. How is 
the national cake distributed? The grievances that come with that are still there and 
may come to haunt Kenya again.764 
 
[The] TJRC, saw where that went. The land question, not by accident that [the 
National Land] Commission under siege. There was a national land policy [but] the 
public persona of the land question is again politicians handing out title deeds, 
giving land to peasants, [as] a favour. Supposed to have redressed historical 
injustices, not done. Created equity, in terms of land management, not done. 
Transparency, not even close. Have we seen any indictments around corruption in 
land? Not done. It’s reversals we’re seeing. The underlying questions not even on 
a shelf, in cold storage.765 
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 Initiatives to address Kenya’s youth bulge and the question of youth un(der)employment 
were particularly thin for the: ‘Younger generation of people who have higher expectations’.766 
Kenya ‘Missed the opportunity to tackle the youth problem’.767 
Some things we did not do much about but scratched the surface. Youth 
unemployment, Kazi kwa vijana [Work for Youth].768 
 
There’s a generation we’ve lost, the Twitteratti. From 16-30 years, now it’s the 
Kardashians. Where will change come from? A generation bred on the Nyayo 
[footsteps] philosophy [of the Moi dictatorship], Nyayo milk: work with the system, 
don’t be critical, don’t ask questions. Don’t work hard, work smart. Cut corners, do 
deals, tenderpreneurs. That generation has no national principles and values, it 
doesn’t register. Not even talking about reclaiming, lost. Not concerned about the 
commons. Maybe a phenomena among an elite, also an underclass here and in the 
different counties. The forgotten ones. The Mungiki not just as a criminal gang, but 
an ideological space, however illiberal. But this lower-class that would perhaps be 
more agitated was demobilised by the violence when the ceasefire happened.769  
 
More critically is that the sense of political inclusion meant to be fostered by power-sharing 
in the Grand Coalition Government was not realised, given the constant political posturing and 
tensions during its term. The sense of political exclusion only deepened following Ruto’s 
separation from Raila for the 2013 General Election and the rise to power, after yet another 
contested supposed presidential outcome, of Kenyatta and Ruto. The narrative spun was one of 
‘reconciliation’ between the Gikuyu and the Kalenjin, ignoring the analysis of the proximate and 
structural causes of the violence that were meant to be addressed by Agenda four on long-term 
issues: 
The government think[s] it was a conflict between the Gikuyu and the Kalinin when 
it was more fundamental. We’re more divided than we were in 2007. The causes of 
violence in 2007 have been ignored. People are going to hibernate in their own 
counties, give up on the national level and start focusing on the local level. The 
trooping back to our identities. Nairobi is for Gikuyus who are in government. Is it 
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helping the people be vigilant at the county level? No, because the county 
governments are as bad as the national government.770 
 
We never went through those Agenda items. We got peace and forgot about them. 
The only reason we have peace in the Rift Valley is that they’re President and Vice 
President together. If not… We never solved anything, peace is conditional and 
we’ve agreed. The moment we disagree, nothing has changed. We lost a fantastic 
opportunity.771 
 
Diversity and how it’s managed. The salience of the ethnic divide and cleavage is 
very pronounced here. When I was here for the APRM, when I got to the Rift 
Valley, Kenyans would openly talk about other Kenyans as foreigners. I was 
shocked, I had never come across that before in my entire life. They were not 
talking about Ugandans. They were talking Kenyans from another part of the 
country. It has not yet been dealt with. A Pyrrhic victory. Not something we can 
celebrate comfortably.772 
 
Given Kenya’s history (with three Gikuyu Presidents and one Kalenjin President) and 
lingering public anger (over the supposed win of two of those), the sense of political exclusion is, 
in fact, stronger than ever. Also stronger than ever is the sense that Kenyans are expected to align 
behind ‘their’ politicians, purely on the basis of ethnicity: 
How the state is controlled and by whom, for whose benefit, is still a big issue. 
When a political group occupies state power, it’s in whose interest? The nation? Or 
a particular group? By region, by ethnicity, or whatever. Contestation over state 
power has not been resolved to the extent that the state is considered a common 
good for all. It is an exclusive good for those who capture it.773 
 
People are angry and divided. More ethnic distrust. People have grumbled about 
Gikuyus long before the violence. The 2013 election made it acceptable to say 
destined to have a Gikuyu President into perpetuity.774 
 
If don’t respect the current Constitution, might slip back to where we were in 2007-
8. Kibaki tried to do away with ethnic politics. Kibaki, after having seen all those 
things, decided to popularise a political party that doesn’t encourage ethnicity. He’d 
put mechanisms in place for those that voted and didn’t vote for him. He learnt 
from post-election violence, wiser. He toned down issues of tribe. 
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They’ve re-surfaced, we’re back to the KANU days, where we have to buy 
members of parliament (MPs), buy loyalty, wooing people to come to a political 
party, ganging up tribally. Our political parties are ethnically based. JAP [Kenyatta 
and Ruto’s Jubilee Alliance Party] is a composition of tribal parties, what about 
those who will not join it? Those outside will have problems. This might cause us 
problems in the next elections.775 
 
Unfortunately, as they enter parliament, they seem to be captured by ethnic barons 
and fall into the trap of ethnicity. Every appointment we’re looking [at], where’s so 
and so, the three communities, the Kikuyu, the Luo, the Kalenjin, these are three 
communities that have been a problem over the last 50 years.776 
 
Have always known Kenya tribalistic. Had never bothered me as no skin off my 
nose, didn’t operate in ethnic realms, my primary identity was a global intellectual. 
Two things happened. One, the Gikuyu traitor list [drawn up in during the crisis of 
2007-8 to intimidate those Gikuyu not uncritically supporting Kibaki’s so-called 
win]. When did I pledge allegiance to this identity? Have never been to any event 
that would warrant my being owned to extent could betray. Second was that Kenya 
is still a tribal society. 42 tribes and another small tribe of people called Kenyans. 
That’s the smallest tribe, probably not more than 100 people, most endangered in 
times of crisis as most went to their bunkers and people like Muthoni [Wanyeki] 
had no bunker. Being obligated politically for which I could be killed. Being a 
minority and could be persecuted. Those two things changed my view about Kenya 
completely. There’s before 2008 and after.777 
 
 The consequence is that Kenya remains fragile and unstable: 
Whereas the surface has a ceasefire, underneath people are ranging themselves for 
different fights. Following trajectory of Rwanda, which is skirmishes in every era 
and then blow up. Or doing the new Rwanda. Or going the way of Zimbabwe in 
which get so tired, wait for the death of the regime. Not comfortable with it as 
somebody who aspires for more equality. Not sure about the endpoint. How many 
years did we say hakuna matata [no problem] before we exploded? This is a 
temporary respite and rather than using it to fix things, we’re hurting more people, 
creating more animosity. Have you ever been to a blog where people are talking 
about Kikuyus? My god.778 
 
 The worry is that it may take a shorter time to implode than it did before—and that the next 
implosion may not be one that can be stopped in the same way: 
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[Took] about 45 or so years to have a real national stand-off where looked at each 
other and said: ‘No, not working’. Another 45 years? No. This will degenerate 
much faster. All looks calm but if conflict is about two non-reformist political 
caucuses, will remain in the same rut.779  
 
Held as a great success story. A five-year quick win where everything was fixed. 
Kenya restored with dynamic young duo cleared by the ICC, therefore innocent and 
can do business with them. Until the next bout of violence breaks out, which it will, 
because underlying issues not dealt with. Close to the edge. Haven’t addressed 
fundamental inequalities and injustices. Not careening towards violence, we’re 
flirting with it. Don’t like each other. Doesn’t mean you want the whole thing to go 
down the tubes. Some of those people neutralised by the mediation process. Some 
remorse if interview Kibaki. Some learning. Some discontent mitigated by 
devolution. 
The worrying thing about the 2008 violence is that it took us to a new place. 
Once move the line for where violence can happen, easier to do it again. Violence 
used to be in the basement of Nyayo House [a site of torture under the Moi 
dictatorship]. Now can be shot anywhere.780 
 
 Even more worrying is that the political leadership does not seem to have fully grasped the 
extent of Kenya’s fragility and instability, continuing to seek to instrumentalise it for their own 
ends: 
The lesson is have got to be the one that controls it so can address little uprisings in 
the Rift [Valley]. Perpetual violence and instability plays into their hands. Helps 
them delegitimise the Constitution, deal with their political enemies. Violence 
cemented as a strategy for gaining and keeping power. Political assassinations, 
brutality, manipulation of violence to make political points. They think they can 
barricade themselves in and protect themselves against violence as they’re more 
violent, have more of a propensity to use violence. It’s evil.781 
 
What is lacking is political leadership that recognises this fragility and instability and seeks to 
address it rather than instrumentalise it: 
We went through the crisis, we did get a Coalition Government, then we went to 
2013 where again the outcome was disputed. There’s a sense that divided, a lot of 
insecurity. Although got an agreement, a major milestone, did get a new 
Constitution, a major milestone, did not have champions to continue bringing us 
together as a nation. What changes need to happen in institutions, in those heading 
institutions? 
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We have leaders that are not reformist. But the reformists in the two camps 
are being overshadowed by those in those camps who’re trying to survive and, in 
that process, they’re chipping away at the progress we’d made. What people need 
to see is critical debates that make people think and see there is reason in this, not 
hitting out at the other side. Nobody’s saying: ‘As a country, this is where we’re 
headed.’ We don’t have champions of this peace accord, to make sure it’s 
implemented, not only in letter but in spirit.782 
 
The opposition continues to fail to provide alternatives. In Moi’s day, difference 
between the opposition and KANU was night and day. Not today.783 
 
Any major change in a system, must have [a] movement that captures power that 
believes in that change. Kenya has had those constitutional moments, when the 
people, their hopes and desires came together and the spirit of the movement to 
drive the country in a particular direction was not impossible. But the political class 
has always been the same political class, not in terms of individuals and 
personalities but in terms of interests, parochialism, greed. People voted knowing 
they wanted quantitative and qualitative change but the way leadership has emerged 
during and after those moments is always to advantage of the old school. Pressure 
from outside the political class weakens. Which gives space for the intelligentsia in 
the middle class to think and speak the same language [as] the crudest and backward 
elements, those using narrow ethnic interests to advance a political cause.784 
 
 The alternative leadership provided by civil society and the private sector before and during 
the mediation diminished when the political settlement was reached and the Grand Coalition 
Government came into being. Although civil society continued to monitor implementation of the 
mediation agreements, particularly as concerned truth and justice for the elections and the post-
elections violence as well as transitional justice, it did not continue to capitalise to the extent that 
it could have on the coalitions built, particularly with the private sector, and the influence it had 
garnered as a result: 
In societies like ours, where cannot have ideological movements in terms of 
political parties, civil society representative of the middle class. When the middle 
class takes up an idea, articulates it and part of the movement, can influence. 
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Elements in civil society have been consumed. Their troops have been diluted. 
Movement towards progressive political change can only be achieved with stable 
and progressive intelligentsia within the middle class.785 
 
A critical mass of Kenyans will have to force those things. An awakening of 
consciousness and civic responsibility among the middle class. Ours is looking for 
business, for involvement in government. We lost opportunities and we’re suffering 
the consequences in a way we never expected, in terms of security.786 
 
 To build on those positive foundations, however, real internal tensions as well as 
perceptions of political bias, would need to be addressed: 
When thinking about alternatives, not looking for perfection or for purists [but] for 
people who understand where it’s broken and want to fix it. That coalition-building 
between civil society and business, people who do understand we can’t keep doing 
this. Should reconvene, whatever political affiliations, biases, can’t go on like 
this.787 
 
Would’ve hoped the religious institutions would’ve come out, or even civil society 
but, in coming out, important not to be seen on either side, but raising principled 
questions.788 
 
 The question is, however, the extent to which those coalitions and that influence could 
realistically have been sustained past the crisis: 
In terms of how women engage, the same challenges remain. The divisions on 
ethnic and party lines a challenge that’s not been overcome. It is only in moments 
of crisis that women come together, then energy dissipates. There is still not much 
coming together to consolidate gains, push the boundaries and ensure gains retained 
or get even more.789  
 
We dropped the ball but how many are we? We get exhausted. The way our 
organisations, our resources are structured. We had to keep doing our day jobs in 
addition to fighting for the nation. We had this success at the AU and didn’t 
understand we needed to solidify it, get support among countries that are 
sympathetic. Became sporadic. It’s difficult to reach out to the political class 
because we know they have no principles, politicians are like that, ethnic barons 
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[out for] the distribution of spoils. We know we have to become more influential 
what we have to work with [is] a weak political opposition and we hadn’t set out to 
build a social movement.790 
 
Kenyan civil society rallies in a crisis but unable to sustain when not in crisis. 
Didn’t pace itself for a long run. Civil society too small. Strength in past bolstered 
by alliance with the political opposition. Once [the political opposition] moved into 
the Coalition Government, see [civil society’s] limitations, the urban nature, the 
ability of the government being able to pick off individuals, demonise them. 
Sustaining international attention on a single issue, place, hard to do.791 
 
 Another question is whether or not the time-frame was sufficient for the long-term 
transformation envisaged by the mediation agreements: 
Naïve for international community and civil society to believe that battles won so 
easily and in such a short period of time. If you look at arc, steady improvements. 
On whole, moving. Just that set-backs depressing. Could’ve been further ahead. 
Don’t always move in a linear fashion, don’t always improve, but doesn’t mean 
aren’t moving.792 
 
This country is a great country, we’re still on our feet despite the massive looting. 
The economy grows. We still have opportunities and have the right constitutional 
framework. Silver lining today is when the regime wants to suppress you, the 
Constitution gives you many avenues to fight back.793 
 
 The confluence of interests between the domestic and the external also fell apart, initially 
over the ICC and then further to the coming to power of Kenyatta and Ruto and the Executive’s 
winning back of the AU. That said: 
The US has proved itself to be important. Even as Uhuru’s people are saying we’re 
going to go to China, still a yearning for approval from the US. And the US, more 
importantly, wants Kenya. Look at way the Ambassador, as soon as he was barked 
at, the line completely changed. Very different rhetoric from when came in and [US 
President Barack] Obama refused to visit. That’s all shifting. The UK just follows 
suit. They need this country more than it needs them. 
The international community’s not going to come and rescue us twice. 
Certain amount of bloodshed ready to tolerate. But there’s a tipping point. Violence 
has always been used, but always been manageable. What 2008 showed is that the 
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genie can get out of the bottle easily. The indictments have been a check. Even if 
these haven’t gone through, the ICC can still come back.794 
 
 With the benefit of hindsight, given the impacts realised under the mediation agreements 
as well as the real failures of the same, the question is the extent to which they have proven to 
address not just the trigger but also the proximate and structural causes of the post-elections 
violence. The answer seems to be that they did indeed provide a framework for all to be addressed. 
However, the expectation that all could be addressed in the time-frame set was unrealistic. And 
whether or not that framework could or would be utilised for all to be addressed was dependent on 
prioritising accountability, which the continued political leadership enabled by the political 
settlement was unwilling to do. The turning points with respect to the political leadership’s 
compliance with the mediation agreements in fact had to do with accountability—as demanded by 
the new Constitution and, in particular, the international justice process under the ICC: 
The process of a country becoming a nation tends to be a painful process. It’s sad 
that with everything that we did, we haven’t got where we could’ve been. [But] 
don’t think unredeemable. Think just not quick wins. 
We’re still better off than we would’ve been if we didn’t have the National 
Accord. It bought us time. It bought us a chance at creating a democratic state. Look 
at the Constitution. If we didn’t have devolution in place, which was a safety valve, 
we would’ve had an outright conflagration. If we had gone to the [2013 General] 
Elections with the old Constitution, without having had the Waki Commission, 
without having had the few good recommendations out of [the] Kreigler 
[Commission] respected… 
There are many things we gained out of the National Accord. But there are 
also things that, if we don’t address, we could end up with [a] replay of 2007-8 and 
worse. The cost of having not ensur[ed] any justice for victims of the post-elections 
violence and the message that’s been sent is that it’s only people who are able to 
amass the instruments of violence and are willing to use them against citizens who 
are able to enjoy the benefits of power. It also means that people in leadership have 
no moral authority to question anybody else. So you have replication of conduct 
that runs contrary to and undermines the rule of law at all levels of leadership. 
Because the top leadership has no moral authority to say anything. People are 
talking about insecurity. Howe do you talk about insecurity when you have people 
like that in power? Do they respect the right to life themselves? I don’t think you 
can do those things in any country and end up with peace. You can end up with 
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short-term gains for a small elite. All we’ve done is postpone the possibility of 
violence. Unless we check this culture of impunity. Impunity pays off. No use being 
a thief. Just go to parliament. Because then you can ransack legally. The rewards 
of impunity still in place. We haven’t learnt that lesson.795 
 
The dialogue framework provided a basis through which Kenya would get together, 
with help of external experts, to address deep-seated problems. But it can only do 
so much. Point where we had the new Constitution and the so-called envelope [of 
suspected high-level perpetrators of the post-elections violence] was opened, 
marked another turning point. Started seeing reversals. Could feel the status quo 
fighting the emerging order. Since then, the TJRC’s report hasn’t been worked on, 
justice for the victims is off the agenda, yet to set up the International Crimes 
Division (ICD), post-elections violence cases not investigated or prosecuted, the 
focus has been on the ICC, the ICC cases themselves have deepened the 
polarisation, the ICC [suspects] are in government. We have gone full circle. We’re 
back to 2007. 
The mediation process fulfilled its mandate but there’s just so much they 
can do after providing the framework and putting the country back on track. The 
strength of their intervention depends on the goodwill of leadership. The biggest 
challenge is leadership. Action on what we need to do. And to entrench respect for 
the rule of law and constitutionalism. No mediation can do that.796 
 
When [it] come[s] to structural problems, the mediation is not the script. It will 
become indigenised when come to the constitutional outcomes desired, not 
determined by the mediation agreement. It’s superficial, the whole thing was: ‘Let’s 
stop hostilities, fighting’s not the way to solve these things, you guys come together 
and solve your problems.’ The objective is the handshake and power-sharing. 
There’s nothing to stop people from then [on]. What it does is launch processes and 
those processes are no longer bound by the framework of that mechanism.797 
 
Need to calibrate that model [of conflict resolution] to local contexts and local 
needs. Nothing wrong with the model. Institutional reform not a bad thing. 
Worked. But our context is unique. Even when a seemingly reformed judiciary, 
still have gaps that people have can take advantage of to subvert the outcome.798 
 
We’re not finished. We’ve won some battles but not the war. Going to an election 
which will be as fraught as 2007. An energised Odinga and an energised 
government that doesn’t want to lose power. The question we haven’t answered is 
whether those people can be held accountable after they lose power. We haven’t 
addressed the impunity question. The big elephant in the room. The Truth 
Commission didn’t do what Truth Commissions are meant to do, draw a line. That 
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youth that’s around, that’s partly educated and idle and the impunity question and 
the lingering anger in the country. Whether it’s the coast that feels humiliated by 
Kenyatta, or Lamu where land taken by Gikuyus, Luos who feel hated, the Kisii 
who feel neglected. The nationhood project has not started. May postpone the crisis 
but until we address these questions, we’re not out of the woods. Raila epitomises 
the frustrations of the others in this country and the Gikuyu question is not 
unpackaged.799 
 
In conclusion, this chapter has explored the trigger as well as the proximate and structural 
causes of Kenya’s electoral conflict of 2007-8. It has also explained the content of the AU’s 
intervention to resolve the electoral conflict and how that was agreed. The roles played by different 
actors, internal and external, were detailed as concerned both ensuring the intervention happened 
and then informing its substantive content. Particular attention was paid, internally, to the roles of 
non-political actors and, externally, to the AU. Finally, the outcomes and impact of the intervention 
were detailed, in both the short and medium-to-long terms, with the focus being on surfacing both 
what enabled those impacts and reasons for caution about their being termed a ‘success’.  
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5. From the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to the African Union (AU) 
This is another background or contextual chapter. It focuses on the transition of the OAU to the 
AU as well as the political, economic and institutional imperatives for and expectations of that 
transition. It spells out the normative and institutional differences between the OAU and the AU, 
in preparation for an assessment of the effectiveness of the new AU. This assessment is then made 
by using the research findings on the implications for (electoral) conflict resolution arising from 
the AU’s intervention in Kenya’s electoral conflict of 2007-8. 
 
5.1 Origins of and visions for regional integration 
5.1.1 The ideology of pan-Africanism 
The ideology of pan-Africanism has underlain efforts at regional integration since at least the 
1940s. It has been given expression in the work of African artists, creative writers, intellectuals 
and politicians from both the continent and the broader Diaspora—not as a comprehensive, 
singular or unitary ideology but nuanced in differentiated ways according to other ideological 
beliefs and theories of state formation and organisation. Whether it harks back to pre-existing unity 
prior to the arbitrary borders imposed by European colonisation is questionable.800 Less 
questionable is that it is rooted in the experience of the African Diaspora, Africa’s colonial past,801 
the education and encounters of African nationalists’ abroad, and also in ideas of race. This is not 
to deny that the Maghreb or north Africa has always been engaged with pan-Africanism, but it has 
also always had other affiliations.802 
                                                          
800 Emerson, Rupert (1962) ‘Pan-Africanism’, International Organisation 16:2 March 1962, p 276; Nyerere, Julius 
(1963) ‘A United States of Africa’, Journal of Modern African Studies 1:1 March 1962, p 3. 
801 Nyerere (1963), p 1. 
802 Emerson (1962), pp 281-3. 
183 
 
Pan-Africanism has been termed essentialist, evoking as it does ‘African-ness’, mutual 
involvement and emotional unity,803 a spiritual affinity across the continent. But it has also been 
deemed—by the first generation of African nationalists as well as by postcolonial Africa today—
a historic necessity to harmonise relations, both politically and economically,804 to extend anti-
colonial emancipation and to defend Africa’s sovereignty.805 It is invoked to address Africa’s 
underdevelopment, seen as resulting from the nature of Africa’s political and economic relations 
with Europe which date back to the 15th century and were shaped by the transatlantic slave trade, 
colonialism and neo-colonialism.806 It is thus a pragmatic ideology, based on an awareness of 
African interdependence, the need to mitigate the potentially conflictual effects of Africa’s 
arbitrary borders and find collective solutions to African underdevelopment.807 
Its early goals thus focused on developing and leveraging African unity to raise African 
living standards by concluding Africa’s decolonisation, ending apartheid,808 minimising the effects 
of Africa’s arbitrary borders, maximising its human and physical resources and asserting influence 
globally while maintaining neutrality during the Cold War.809 African nationalism was viewed as 
meaningless if it was not also pan-Africanism.810 Thus, it is unsurprising that, post-independence, 
all independent African states became involved in one or more forms of regionalism.811 
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As regional integration could be achieved only by negotiation and not through conquest,812 
disagreements on the process towards and shape of regional integration soon emerged despite 
agreements on the goals of pan-Africanism. However, these disagreements, on close examination, 
had less to do with the personal conflicts between different African nationalists at the time, and 
more with how these African nationalists viewed the possibilities and strategies for achieving 
‘relative’ economic independence and advancing development.813 For, to address and alter the 
nature of Africa’s political and economic relations with Europe, there were essentially three 
choices: to de-link from Europe; to obtain additional leverage with Europe by pursuing additional 
or alternative bilateral relations with other overdeveloped states;814 or to pursue bilateral relations 
with other underdeveloped states, horizontally within Africa as well as beyond.815 While the first 
choice was unfeasible, the differing preferences of the first generation of African nationalists with 
respect to the second two choices were soon evident in the different pan-Africanist groupings that 
emerged. 
 
5.1.2 The early Pan-Africanist political and economic project 
The Pan-Africanist political and economic project had its basis in the 1945 Pan-Africanist 
Nationalist Conference held in Manchester, UK. That conference was followed by a series of 
Conferences of Independent African States, the first being held in April 1958 in Ghana, followed 
by Algeria in 1959 and the (then) Congo in 1960. That series was, in turn, followed by a series of 
All-African Peoples’ Conferences, the first being held in December 1958, also in Ghana. In 
contrast to the Conferences of Independent African States, the All-African Peoples’ Conferences 
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included non-governmental as well as government participants, and observers from the Soviet bloc 
to channel Soviet financing for decolonisation.816 Under the leadership of Kwame Nkrumah, thus, 
Ghana was central to the pan-Africanist political and economic project on the continent.817 
From those series of conferences, different pan-Africanist groupings soon emerged. One 
reading has it that three geopolitical groups emerged: the first anglophone, intent on 
disengagement from European dependency; the second francophone, intent on maintaining its 
political and economic relations with the French metropole; and the third ‘Arab’, viewed as distinct 
from sub-Saharan Africa and having different priorities, such as the Palestinian cause.818 Other 
readings, however, are less essentialist and more detailed or nuanced about the three pan-Africanist 
groupings that emerged, showing them to be both more heterogeneous across the supposed 
Maghreb/sub-Saharan divide as well as with differences based on the differing preferences 
outlined above. 
The first pan-Africanist grouping eventually came to be known as the Casablanca powers. 
At its core was the Union of African States formed by Ghana, Guinea and Mali. The Union agreed 
to develop a Charter of Union, providing for mutual defence, common parliamentary institutions 
and common economic policies (including a loan from Ghana to Guinea) although it never did 
develop common institutions.819 The Casablanca powers expanded to include the Maghreb. They 
were anti-colonial, pan-Africanist and socialist. However, the Casablanca powers internally 
differed, primarily on Mauritanian independence (opposed by Morocco) and unity within the 
Maghreb (and competition over the same between Egypt and Ghana). 
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The second pan-Africanist grouping came to be known as the Monrovia powers. Ivory 
Coast, together with what was then Dahomey (now Benin), Niger and Upper Volta (now Burkina 
Faso), participated in the Conseil de l’Entente, which aimed to develop a customs union and a 
solidarity fund.820 But at the core of the Monrovia powers was the African-Malagasy Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation formed by the Ivory Coast and what was then Malagasy. It had a 
common development programme and a common bank, the latter providing for investment and 
trade in coordination with the European Common Market. It also initiated what was to become the 
infamous Air Afrique (commonly known as Air Peut-Etre [maybe], due to its infamous 
unreliability).821 The Monrovia powers expanded, however, from central and west Africa, to 
include what was then Brazzaville, Ethiopia, Liberia, Nigeria and Somalia.822 They took a 
functional and gradualist approach to the pan-Africanist political and economic project.823 
It was on the notion of Eurafrica and the ostensible complementarity and interdependence 
of this grouping with Europe that the sharpest division emerged between the Casablanca and 
Monrovia powers. While the Monrovia powers moved to consolidate political and economic 
relations with Europe through the trade agreements of the Treaty of Rome (later Yaounde I and 
II), the Casablanca powers viewed this consolidation as the rationalisation of neo-classicism and 
the international division of labour,824 as well as the multilateralisation of bilateral dependency 
which would preserve colonial and linguistic cleavages, impede regional integration and prevent 
development.825 The Treaty of Rome and Yaounde I in particular were seen as accomplishing 
nothing but a move from colonial divide and rule with no horizontal trade to perpetuating non-
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viable states.826 This division between the Casablanca and Monrovia powers did not subside until 
their much later joint negotiations of Yaounde II, together with Caribbean and Pacific states. 
The third pan-Africanist grouping included central, eastern and southern Africa.827 At its 
core was the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East, Central and South Africa, which included 
the nationalist movements of east Africa. These movements spanned the ideological range except 
with respect to anti-colonialism. Like the Monrovia powers, they also urged moderation on the 
pan-Africanist political and economic project.828 This is perhaps unsurprising given that a more 
intergovernmental institution already existed in east Africa, initiated during colonialism. The East 
African Common Services Organisation (formerly the East Africa High Commission) provided 
for the joint administration of communications, transport, customs and currency as well as 
cooperation during the transition of east African states to independence. While a political and 
economic federation was discussed, aimed at settling intra- and inter-state difficulties posed by the 
status of the Buganda Kingdom in Uganda, the future of the ‘Arab’ coast (then under the Zanzibari 
Omani Sultanate) and the future of the Maa,829 the discussions faltered following independence. 
From meetings of and between these three different groupings, there was agreement in 
principle that mere cooperation was insufficient830 and thus on the ultimate shape of regional 
integration. Politically, a unified foreign policy and defence strategy, together with African 
Military High Command, were seen as ultimately desirable.831 Economically, an integrated 
industrial structure, communications network, intra-African and external trade policy, market and 
currency were also seen as ultimately desirable.832 In practice and in the short term, however, few 
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African nationalists and newly independent states were prepared to commit to a ‘leviathan’ over 
collaborative arrangements,833 or to complete regional integration over functionalist ‘concentric 
circles’.834 Nevertheless, as best articulated by Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere, this lack of agreement 
was not important.835 He stressed the need to draw lessons from the African nationalist 
decolonisation efforts—where lack of clarity about the exact destination was not as important as 
advancing, however was possible, with each African state adopting its own strategies.836 He 
stressed the need for newly independent African states to act as if already unified, avoid judgement 
of each other and, when disapproving, to avoid public disagreement and address newly 
independent African leadership directly and privately.837 Doing this would increase knowledge 
and understanding of one another and consciousness of Africa’s interdependence.838 
It was in this spirit that the OAU was finally born, as an intergovernmental organisation, 
with its founding treaty, the Charter of the OAU, entering into force on May 25, 1963. It was also 
in this spirit, however, that the OAU was later to flounder. 
 
5.2 The OAU: 1963-2002 
The Organisation of African Unity provided for the membership of all sovereign African states. 
Although it was geographically defined, membership was not open to colonial, settler-controlled 
or white regimes in Africa, implying its definition was also partially racial.839 Its basic objective 
was achieving total African liberation840 through negotiated settlements where possible and armed 
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struggle where not.841 Some of its early positions included: the non-recognition of apartheid and 
settler-controlled, white-minority-dominated South Africa; the non-recognition of Israel in 1973; 
trade relations with the European Economic Community (EEC) through Yaounde II; and non-
alignment in the context of the Cold War.842 
 
5.2.1 Achievements 
The OAU is credited with providing an African political and economic centre in the postcolonial 
period.843 It kept meeting,844 providing a venue for the release of intra-African tensions as well as 
the forging of common African positions and policies.845 In this sense, it contributed to 
postcolonial institution-building and international law-making.846 
 As to its basic objective—African decolonisation and ending apartheid—one reading has 
it that its Liberation Committee did not end the rivalry of nationalist movements in Angola.847 But 
other readings credit its position on no negotiations with Portugal until the Angolan nationalist 
movements had a united front as being achieved.848 It undertook quiet diplomacy with South 
Africa to enable settlement talks on what was then Rhodesian independence. While one reading 
has it that South Africa’s transition to multiracial democracy cannot be attributed to its Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism,849 it is evident that its Liberation Committee provided the channel for 
diplomatic recognition and support, as well as funding, for South African nationalist movements. 
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 In terms of leverage and global influence, the OAU is also credited with ensuring a 
common African position on and cohesive and skilled negotiations with the EEC on Yaounde II 
and its successor, Lome I.850 
 
5.2.2 Challenges 
Realist interpretations 
Early predictions for the prospects for regional integration were fatalistic, seeing this endeavour 
as ill-fated if not doomed. Africa was seen as too complex, heterogeneous, large and unprepared 
for unity in the form of political and economic federation, 851 due to language barriers, the 
Maghreb’s identification with the Mashreq or west Asia852 and ideology.853 In addition, African 
nationalism was considered recent and not deeply rooted, given its colonial roots and the continued 
relations of newly independent and peripheral African states with their former metropoles rather 
than one another.854 Their sovereignty was considered a legal fiction,855 particularly as 
postcolonial leadership began to shift from the early African nationalists to military 
commanders.856 Thus, it was considered that there were no ‘natural’ political communities 
between ethnic communities across the continent as the pre-colonial African kingdoms and 
empires were gone, the newly independent African states were essentially imposed and emerging 
sub-regional groupings were new and unclear.857 
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Institutionalist interpretations 
Later assessments of regional integration focused on the implications of the move from the Pan-
Africanist political and economic project to multilateral diplomacy through the OAU.858 The 
unlikely efficacy of any IGO was attributed to the constraint of consensus on mutual interest.859 
As Africa was assumed to have no hegemons capable of or willing to impose their will, the 
outcome was assumed to be adjustment to the lowest common denominator in terms of decision-
making.860 
The constrained powers of the OAU’s Secretary-General,861 the OAU’s lack of educated 
and experienced administrative staff (particularly at its inception, given the education levels and 
experience available within African state bureaucracies post-independence, with any surplus 
gravitating more towards to the UN)862 and the OAU’s limited financial resources all mitigated 
against its optimal performance.863 
The mismatch between the OAU’s institutional design and its desired functions was also 
noted.864 The initial assumption of zero or low transaction costs by the OAU’s founders meant that 
compliance by its member states was also assumed, with no Executive being put in place to 
monitor and enforce its decisions, leading to opportunistic behaviour.865 Over time, the OAU also 
faced competition from the relatively more effective RECs with respect to provision of public 
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goods (such as on security and trade).866 For example, the armed conflicts in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone were addressed not by the OAU but by the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS). Similarly, the armed conflict in what had become the DRC was addressed by the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC).867 
Thus, it is argued, the OAU suffered from both the ‘tragedy of the regional commons’ and 
the ‘anticommons’. With respect to the former, with no rules on entry into membership, free-riding 
occurred, leaving the OAU dependent on only a few policy entrepreneurs or hegemons (such as 
Nigeria and South Africa) to ensure the consistent supply of public goods (such as regional 
peacekeepers and movement on economic integration).868 With respect to the latter, the 
assumption that all member states were both sovereign and equal led to consensus decision-
making, with no provisions for decisive action and the OAU’s under-utilisation869—an 
institutional design that led to the OAU’s paralysis.870 Given this, the OAU’s persistence was 
attributed to historical institutionalism and path dependence871—with its pursuit of international 
rents (in the form of ODA and military aid) being beneficial in the shape of increasing returns.872 
 
Structuralist interpretations 
Persistent assessments of the OAU’s challenges have defined the original divide between the 
Casablanca and Monrovia powers over the OAU’s objectives and the pace at which regional 
integration was to be achieved873 as being essentially a divide between radicals and conservatives, 
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contextualised and framed by the Cold War. Despite the OAU’s position on neutrality and non-
alignment, some newly independent African states were aligned with the Soviet bloc, others with 
their former Northern/Western metropoles (for example, under the notion of Eurafrica)874 and yet 
others used the Cold-War divide for leverage.875 
 The desires for etatism or state consolidation on the one hand and pan-African unity on the 
other hand were, over time, viewed as being more contradictory than complementary876—as the 
national interests of newly independent African states became increasingly defined and 
extended.877 The early generation of African nationalists, once in power, began to focus 
increasingly on domestic affairs878—or disputes with neighbouring states, often over borders and 
territory.879 The Pan-Africanist political and economic project was effectively relegated to 
meetings of the OAU and UN or other elite encounters,880 failing to build popular support.881 
 There were thus early disagreements within the OAU over addressing both inter- and intra-
state armed conflicts in Africa (for example, in western Sahara, the Shaba rebellions, Benin’s 
invasion and the Ogaden war). Despite the OAU’s later position against ‘unconstitutional changes 
of government’,882 military coups d’état were not prevented in Guinea Bissau, Niger and Sierra 
Leone. And neither was armed conflict prevented in Burundi, the DRC, Liberia, Rwanda or 
Somalia.883 
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5.3 Reform and transition 
5.3.1 The rationale for reform and transition 
 Political rationale 
With Zimbabwean independence in 1980, the end of apartheid and South African multiracial 
democracy in 1994, the OAU had achieved its basic objective.884 While it still had a potential role 
to play, its Charter did not allow it to effectively play this role,885 particularly as concerned its 
protection of sovereignty and non-interference.886 The postcolonial African state was still in 
principle viewed as the illegitimate product of the balkanisation of European colonialism. 
However, the practical implications of postcolonial respect for the international legal principle of 
uti possidetis were now evident,887 given gross and systemic human rights violations within most 
African states and the armed conflicts of the 1990s—many having to do with secession and almost 
all internal, although with external involvement.888 
Pending reform of the UN Security Council and its lack of attention to conflict resolution 
in Africa, it was clear there was a need for a pax Africana and preventive diplomacy beyond the 
capacities of the OAU’s dormant Commission for Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration.889 To 
meet this need, the OAU’s inadequate financial and logistical capacities needed to be boosted.890 
 
 Institutional rationale 
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To address the OAU’s perceived irrelevance in the face of the growing role of the RECs,891 it was 
evident that the OAU needed to address its lack of enforcement capacities.892 A different, new 
approach was needed to strengthen the organisation, including through partnerships with emergent 
African civil society.893 
 
5.4 The AU: 2002-present 
Thus the African Union was established in 2001 and launched in 2002, with the basic objective of 
meeting Africa’s challenges in the context of globalisation,894 through, eventually, bringing into 
being a borderless Africa. The approach adopted, however, was gradualist, this being deemed more 
rational and realistic than the Libyan proposal for a United States of Africa.895 Regional integration 
was to occur through the coordination, harmonisation and integration of Africa’s seven recognised 
RECs: the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU); the Common Market of East and Southern Africa 
(COMESA); the EAC; the Economic Community of Central African States (CEEAC); the 
Economic Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD); the ECOWAS; and the IGAD.896 
Politically, the RECs were to assume first responsibility for preventive diplomacy while the AU 
was to better guarantee human rights897 as well as peace and security on the continent.898 
 
5.5 Differences between the OAU and the AU 
5.5.1 Normative provisions 
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Emerging as it did during the period of Africa’s decolonisation, with territorial integrity being a 
priority for Africa’s newly independent states,899 the OAU’s Charter gave primacy to the principles 
of self-determination, sovereignty and non-interference in member states’ internal affairs.900 
Externally, given the Cold War context, it also stressed the need for non-alignment (despite 
existing defence pacts with France in former French colonies).901 Internally, it emphasised 
consensus decision-making and politics.902 
 In comparison, the AU’s Constitutive Act, notable for the speed of its entry into force,903 
waters down the principles of sovereignty and non-interference.904 It stresses the need for 
democracy, gender equality and human rights,905 providing for popular participation by ordinary 
Africans in the regional integration process.906 It provides for a common defence policy907 and, in 
an unprecedented manner, for the AU’s right to intervene in grave circumstances, initially 
including crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes.908 It is thus the first regional or 
international treaty to enable ‘humanitarian intervention’ (and the exercise of R2P) although it 
does not specify whether such intervention shall be by diplomacy (including sanctions), mediation, 
peacekeeping or use of force.909 Neither does it clarify the UN Security Council’s role, even though 
a literal or strict reading of the UN Charter, to which all AU member states also subscribe, makes 
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clear that the onus for authorising use of force against any UN member state lies with the UN 
Security Council.910 
 It is the AU’s right to intervene in grave circumstances that is held up as representing the 
most significant normative difference between the OAU’s Charter and the AU’s Constitutive 
Act—the shift from non-intervention to ‘non-indifference’911 and from sovereignty as control to 
sovereignty as responsibility.912 Thus, the AU’s Constitutive Act enables the AU to engage where 
the OAU had been hamstrung by non-cooperation,913 potentially addressing the political rationale 
for the transition noted above. 
 The 2003 amendments to the AU’s Constitutive Act provided for the establishment of the 
AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC).914 They also, at Libya’s behest, prohibited the use of 
member states’ territories to subvert other member states and expanded the AU’s right to intervene 
to member states where legitimate orders are under threat. While this expansion has been critiqued 
as moving the AU away from interventions’ based on human security to those based on state 
security,915 a positive reading is that the AU will not intervene when illegitimate orders are under 
threat.916 
 In terms of addressing the institutional rationale for the transition noted above, the AU’s 
Constitutive Act contains no provisions for financing the AU.917 It thus does not address the 
financial constraints experienced by the OAU (although this is now being addressed by a 2016 
decision on taxing imports). However, in terms of enforcement, it provides for the AU to suspend 
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participation in the AU by any government coming to power by unconstitutional means.918 It also 
provides for the AU to impose sanctions on member states for non-compliance with AU 
decisions919 as well as for the non-payment of dues.920 
 
5.5.2 Institutional arrangements 
A key question is whether an IGO is intergovernmental or supranational,921 the criterion being the 
extent to which delegation can be said to have occurred. In this sense, the OAU has been described 
as being purely intergovernmental.922 It had a single source of authority,923 the Assembly of Heads 
of State and Government, assisted by the Council of Foreign Ministers. The role of its Secretariat, 
headed by an elected Secretary-General, was implementation.924  
As concerns its basic objective, while its Coordination Committee for African Liberation 
did have a fund, this was not established under the OAU’s Charter but through resolution in 
1963.925 It also had a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration, with 21 elected 
members, as well as other specialised Commissions. 
 In comparison, the AU is now described as being both intergovernmental and 
supranational.926 It has more sources of authority,927 including not only the Assembly of Heads of 
State and Government, assisted by the Executive Council of Foreign Ministers and a new 
Permanent Representatives’ Committee (PRC) of Ambassadors, but also its Commission, which 
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has its own authority,928 supported by seven specialised technical committees.929 In addition, it has 
a new Pan-African Parliament (PAP), to provide for legitimacy and popular participation and, 
eventually, legislative authority.930 And, finally, it has the African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights, with judicial authority to provide judicial recourse.931 
The OAU’s Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution has been 
replaced by the AU’s PSC. An additional Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) 
provides for the participation of African civil society (including women and the Diaspora). The 
NEPAD also, through its APRM, provides for monitoring and evaluating the AU member states’ 
normative commitments on political, economic and corporate governance as well as socio-
economic development.932 
Thus, political considerations are taken into account institutionally.933 And although the 
AU’s Constitutive Act was initially described as a shell requiring additional protocols to establish 
the institutions it promised,934 it is clear that the AU is institutionally stronger than the OAU.935 
 
The human rights architecture 
Gross and systemic human rights violations occurred throughout the 1970s in the Central African 
Republic (CAR), Equatorial Guinea and Uganda—with the first African intervention in the same 
being Tanzania’s intervention in Uganda in 1978.936 The OAU then provided for the promotion 
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and protection of human rights through the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights 
(ACHPR), which was adopted in 1981 and entered into force in 1986. 
The ACHPR was the first regional and international human rights law to guarantee 
collective peoples’ rights, prohibit the use of member states’ territories for terrorist acts and 
provide for the right to national and international peace and security.937 However, the Commission 
established to monitor it was inhibited by the principle of non-intervention, as was the OAU,938 
with even its ability to study the human rights situation within a given member state being 
dependent on that member state’s consent.939 In 1998, the OAU established the African Court on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights by adoption of a protocol which came into force in 2004. 
 In contrast to the OAU, the AU, through the objectives and principles of its Constitutive 
Act, recognises the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) as well as 
the ACHPR. While respecting human rights is listed among member states’ obligations, the AU’s 
Constitutive Act also provides for the AU to guarantee respect for human rights within Africa, 
implying positive action that is both generic and specific.940However, the Constitutive Act does 
not provide for the right of the AU to intervene in respect of gross and systemic human rights 
violations (intervention is only in respect of the listed international crimes of: crimes against 
humanity, genocide and war crimes).941 Neither does it provide for financing of the Commission 
and the Court.942 
 
The peace and security architecture 
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IGOs can provide for collective security (dispute-settlement among member states without the use 
of force except when a rule is broken) and collective defence (assistance through the use of force 
when a member state is under attack).943 
 The OAU’s Charter provided for collective security, rather than collective defence, through 
coordination and harmonisation. However, the nature, extent and utility of this coordination and 
harmonisation remained unspecified—again due to upholding the principles of sovereignty and 
non-interference.944 The functions and roles of the OAU’s Defence Commission were 
undefined.945 Dispute-settlement amongst member states was meant to be by peaceful means, 
through the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration.946 The Commission’s 
intervention was dependent on invitation and consent by the member states concerned,947 as well 
as its (limited) financial resources.948 
The OAU’s first breach of the principles of sovereignty and non-interference took place 
only in 1981, through the deployment of the joint OAU/French peacekeeping force in Chad. It then 
also intervened in Western Sahara in 1984, leading to Morocco’s formal withdrawal from the OAU 
(although Morocco continued to participate in the OAU as an observer and, in 2017, resumed its 
seat within the AU). The OAU later approached Nigeria with respect to the intervention in 
Liberia,949 which took place under the auspices of ECOWAS. 
The Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, established in Cairo 
in 1993, defined the OAU as the ‘premier organisation’ with respect to peace and security in 
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Africa, without, however, assigning legal implications to this definition,950 leaving primary 
responsibility for the same with the UN Security Council. (In 2017, however, the AU and the UN 
finally agreed on a MoU that provided for this subsidiarity.) What it did, however, was outline a 
‘pyramid’,951 with the OAU as an intermediary between the UN and the RECs952—with the RECs 
having de facto and necessarily assumed responsibility for preventive diplomacy and the UN 
retaining responsibility for preventive observation, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and 
peacebuilding missions.953 While this division of labour had the advantages of leveraging the 
RECs’ familiarity and more immediate interest in given armed-conflict situations, it also 
sometimes lent itself to partiality.954 
With time, it was evident that most African conflicts were internal, even if externally 
supported, and directed at governments, even if ordinary Africans bore their brunt.955 With that in 
mind, the OAU’s Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa 
(CSSDCA) Declaration upheld human security rather than the state security inherent to the OAU’s 
Charter.956 However, the Declaration was adopted only in 2000. 
 As distinct from the OAU’s Charter, the AU’s Constitutive Act provides for common 
defence. It also limits non-intervention to member states,957 providing for intervention by the AU 
itself as well as the right of member states to request intervention—in other words, by the AU’s 
own initiative or by a given member state’s request.958 This right is outlined in the principles of 
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the AU’s Constitutive Act, a source of law-making.959 And it is outlined as a right—although more 
than a privilege, a right is not a duty and thus is still discretionary.960 However, consent from the 
member state concerned is theoretically now not required.961 Therefore, the member state 
concerned can avoid AU intervention only if there is no decision to that effect or if it withdraws 
from the AU.962 In this sense, this delegation of sovereignty963 imbues the AU with more 
supranational than intergovernmental authority—with the AU having more authority than a given 
member state in the ‘grave circumstances’ enabling AU intervention.964 
 These provisions, it has been noted, essentially develop new international norms, in 
principle empowering the AU to intervene without UN Security Council determination, 
authorisation or reporting requirements.965 
 The Peace and Security Council (PSC) is responsible for monitoring peace and security on 
the continent and for initiating responses by the AU. But questions remain as to how to effect the 
right of AU intervention.966 Will threshold criteria be established or will the determination 
continue to be case by case?967 What shape will intervention take in what situations, given that the 
means to intervene could include: diplomatic or economic sanctions (the suspension of 
membership, expulsion, the withdrawal of diplomatic representation, restrictions on travel and so 
on or restrictions on production, imports or exports); or military sanctions (ending military 
cooperation and training, arms embargoes and so on)?968 If intervention is military, through use of 
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force, questions need to be defined of: right authority, just cause, right intention, last resort, 
proportional means and reasonable prospects, as well as conflict of interest.969 
 
5.6 The potential effectiveness of the AU relative to the OAU 
Given all the above, the AU has been characterised as having moved away from the constraints on 
action imposed on the OAU.970 The principles of sovereignty and non-interference have been 
diminished and intervention has been enabled. The question now is the extent to which this 
allowance addresses the political and institutional rationales upon which transition from the OAU 
was deemed necessary. 
 
5.6.1 Addressing the political rationale 
Theoretically, earlier pre-conditions for successful regional integration included geographic 
proximity, common historical background, political congruence and economic size. More recent 
pre-conditions include political stability, good governance, economic growth and institutions. One 
reading has it that the nature of institutions will impede regional integration in Africa.971 However, 
issues related to earlier and more recent pre-conditions—particularly political congruence and 
political stability—could mitigate against Africa’s regional integration. The capacities of almost 
all African states with respect to internal security are limited and all are now also experiencing the 
privatisation of security provision (to both formal and informal actors). The AU aims to provide a 
countermeasure by building a larger security regime but as its foundational member states are 
problematic, this countermeasure may prove ‘hollow’ and ‘fruitless’ without intensified state-
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building.972 In addition, in the context of new nationalisms and xenophobia, freedom of movement 
is more constrained than previously.973 Thus, whether regional integration can be achieved without 
national integration,974 or whether regional integration will enhance national integration, remains 
to be seen. The question of potential conflict with the UN Security Council as to the normative 
and practical basis for AU action on African peace and security remains live,975 as most recently 
evident in Libya. 
Practically, as concerns both promotion and protection of human rights and peace and 
security, the extent of member states’ surrender of sovereignty vis a vis the AU is likely to continue 
to be negotiated. As the exercise of the AU’s right to intervene is on decision by the Assembly, 
the risk of inaction remains—although it is suggested that, as the Assembly’s decision-making is 
now by either consensus or a two-thirds majority, this risk may be mitigated. In addition, it is 
expected that African popular opinion, as expressed by the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) and the 
ECOSOCC, may increasingly influence the Assembly’s decision-making.976 This is also the case 
with the risk posed by intervention by request aimed at upholding an illegitimate government or 
instrumentalising the AU to achieve internal ends,977 as has been most recently evident in Kenya. 
 Beyond agreement on intervention, the AU will need to develop agreement on an 
intervention’s objectives, strategies, mandate and duration978—particularly as the nature of armed 
conflict on the continent requires more than short-term military intervention.979 Normatively, the 
AU’s right to intervene where a legitimate order is under threat (while not defining a ‘legitimate 
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order’) presumably will extend to unconstitutional changes of government, including military 
coups d’état, mercenary overthrows, replacements of governments by armed groups and refusals 
to relinquish power by losing electoral incumbents.980 ‘Threat’ too is undefined,981 but presumably 
is understood as threat from external intervention.982 This differs from the other ‘grave 
circumstances’ allowing AU intervention in that it is not an international crime and could be used 
to violate human rights.983 As already noted, it moves from human security back to state security—
the original Libyan amendment covered both civil unrest and external intervention.984 
Finally, it has been argued that the OAU’s ineffectiveness vis a vis human rights and peace 
and security was less normative and more about implementation/praxis.985 As the AU’s member 
states remain the same, many with low legitimacy986 and many themselves repressive,987 political 
will may arguably continue to mitigate against intervention.988 This is particularly so given that, 
despite the AU’s commitments to public participation, the AU was launched in the absence of the 
same amid little public knowledge of, and therefore apathy about, the reasons and hopes for the 
transition.989 
 
5.6.2 Addressing the institutional rationale 
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Despite the AU having more of a supranational character than the more purely intergovernmental 
OAU, the AU remains prone to the problem of acting according to its lowest common 
denominator.990 Initial uncertainty about the harmonisation of old OAU structures with new AU 
structures991—such as the future of both the CSSDCA and the NEPAD992—have been resolved 
over time. However, despite recognition of the seven RECs, the question of overlapping 
memberships within the different RECs persists.993 In addition, as concerns peace and security, 
ECOWAS, IGAD and SADC remain more engaged than the other RECs,994 due at least in part to 
the difficult fit between structure and function (with some of the RECs geared more towards 
investment and trade than conflict).995 Within the AU, as already noted, the institutionalisation of 
crisis-prevention and management mechanisms has yet to be completed, meaning that intervention 
remains ad hoc without standardised procedures.996 
Capacity too remains a concern.997 Commitments of financial resources are insufficient for 
the scale of costs required for effective intervention,998 implying that external financing remains a 
necessity.999 And, as concerns human resources, political appointments persist,1000 compromising 
staffing,1001 particularly in light of the legacy of bureaucracy and communications inherited from 
the OAU.1002  
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Relative to the OAU, however, the AU has improved means of monitoring and ensuring 
compliance, ranging from suspension and expulsion to sanctions, and thus transaction costs are 
better worked in.1003 However, with respect to monitoring, the NEPAD’s APRM is both voluntary 
and technocratic.1004 
 
5.7 Implications for electoral conflict resolution from the AU’s intervention in Kenya 
Many implications can be drawn from the AU’s intervention in Kenya. First, intervention by the 
AU in an African electoral conflict is preferable to intervention by the UN. If motivated sufficiently 
to act, the AU can be less bureaucratic and its intervention put in place more speedily. African 
interveners may also have more contextual knowledge and encounter less resistance from the 
parties to the electoral conflict (although not necessarily from the people): 
An AU mandate. The mandate was broad, basically saying do whatever you can to 
calm the situation. From my point of view, it was better that way because Terms of 
Reference sometimes tie you up and remove the flexibility you may have had in 
being creative in resolving the situation. Time is of the essence and should avoid 
being too bureaucratic as that delays actions and decisions and can get people killed 
in the meantime. In Kenya, we had the room for manoeuvre and freedom of action 
without being limited by a resolution and, working with people on the ground, we 
were able to move. If a UN mandate, probably would’ve had a UN Security Council 
resolution and would’ve have to go to them and so on. 
Didn’t [otherwise] matter that the mandate was from the AU. For the 
people, didn’t matter, they wanted peace and whoever could bring that was 
welcome.1005 
 
Intervention by the AU is not, however, as envisaged by the African Peace and Security 
Architecture (APSA), necessarily best carried out by the relevant REC given that the interests and 
perceived bias of neighbouring countries may create resistance among one or more of the parties 
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to the electoral conflict. For a REC’s intervention to be successful, its members must share a 
common vision and strategy for resolution of the electoral conflict: 
An interesting contrast between Kenya then and Burundi now. The fact that we are 
failing to contain that situation is the fact that we allowed the EAC to get involved 
and it got involved in a manner that did not open the doors for the AU. The EAC 
member states are not agreed on a strategy for Burundi. The fear was that if allowed 
the REC to intervene, we would not succeed and the Burundi case proves the case. 
Continentally, we are more effective when a REC is unanimous and proactive on 
the issue without prompting from us. [The] ECOWAS is the best model of 
subsidiarity. It is seamless. We don’t need to prompt ECOWAS, it prompts us. 
Where the REC is proactive and there’s unanimity, no contradictions. Where there 
isn’t, it’s better for the AU to intervene disregarding the REC. The only REC with 
best practice is ECOWAS and, to some extent, the IGAD.1006 
 
Whether the relevant REC or the AU itself leads, a single mediation process, fully backed 
by the UN and influential member states, is necessary to prevent mediation forum-shopping by 
parties to the electoral conflict and to provide carrots and sticks to support the mediation process 
when necessary: 
I reached out to everybody because it was an AU mandate and believed must have 
one process. Stands a better chance of success. If too many mediators, the parties 
play with you and forum-shop. Can go in circles. Look at the number of people 
trying to get involved in Burundi. Also the CAR. Can list whole groups of Special 
Envoys and can lead to complications. 
Given previous experiences, I insisted in Kenya, one process. Museveni 
came in and said had a solution, Kibaki accepted it, Raila wanted to go to the White 
House and said: ‘How can I agree with a solution I haven’t seen?’ Has to be clarity 
and the mediation process shouldn’t be loaded with too many mediators. 
Right from beginning, when got the mandate, was calling around to key 
countries, the EU, the UN and saying to work together. They were calling when I 
was in Kenya and said they were coming in and I said: ‘Not now, I will tell you 
when’.  
It was unusual in the sense that the whole world was focused on what going 
on and when sensed a possibility for resolution, everybody rallied and supported it. 
Can’t think of any country that tried to create difficulties for us. We all worked 
closely together and that’s a reason why the Kenyan experience was the first 
effective implementation of R2P.1007 
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 That said: 
Can’t claim purity of an African approach. Why? Because embedded in a global 
frame. We built a global agenda and claimed legitimacy, a two-pronged legitimacy. 
The AU, the appearance of an all-African mediation team was necessary for 
building legitimacy. At the same time, a bigger body, a universal body, 
demonstrated massive interest for all its own reasons. Albeit had the image of an 
African solution.1008 
 
Second, the ground was laid for an AU intervention’s success by domestic actors, notably 
civil society and the private sector. In advance of the AU intervention, civil society and the private 
sector had already mobilised and organised, engaged the public and begun a back-and-forth 
between the parties to the electoral conflict on finding accommodation: 
The use of the media was significant at the beginning. People were very 
appreciative of the statements we [CCP] were making. For the reason that there 
seemed to be a vacuum in the country, the country was leaderless, Kibaki was there 
but not speaking, Raila was speaking, but about election being stolen and asking 
people to go to the street. People wanting a message of hope.  
We used all the talent. The writers. The spiritual. The political scientists. 
We took the initiative, we did not wait. When we see a problem, let’s start. Don’t 
hold onto it, let people run with it.1009 
 
This is a role that is critical (if insufficiently acknowledged) for a mediation process, going 
beyond substantive participation of non-political actors in the actual negotiations during a 
mediation process. Substantive participation can be facilitated even when actual negotiations may 
be limited to parties to the electoral conflict and assists not just with content but also with 
leveraging those parties. Civil society and the private sector are more interested in definitive 
resolution beyond political settlement but their engagement must be sustained if the political 
settlement is not to become an end in itself: 
Important that bring in the people, even if not at the table. Have to carry them with 
you and explain and not create the impression you are cooking up something behind 
closed doors for politicians. 
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Civil society played an important role. The credit goes to the Kenyan people 
who were shocked and determined to redeem their country and get it back. We 
couldn’t have achieved what we did without the support of the people and civil 
society.1010 
 
Would’ve been good to have civil society in the room. Ended up being a negotiation 
between two sides. Business in the mix. Religious groups in the mix. Other players 
beyond political players. Maybe some sanity pushed in those things. Not just a 
political negotiation any more. Had to push agenda through negotiating team or one 
of the players.1011 
 
The ruling elite started to dominate, capture, the state. And large parts of society 
got excluded from it. Kenya was hijacked in a sense. Liberal peace and that form 
of state-building, where superimposing these solutions, this medicine, this kind of 
state. Not challenging fact that, in own right, not legitimate. In the African context, 
something else needs to happen. As long as everyone feels represented.1012 
 
Third, electoral, justice and security-sector institutions need be credible and independent 
of the Executive and other political influence to be able to, ideally, prevent electoral conflict. When 
they are not able to do so, non-state institutions, including civil society and the private sector, as 
well the public services, must be able to pick up the pieces further to an electoral conflict. In that 
sense, the Kenyan case may not be comparable to situations of electoral conflict that have 
deteriorated to the point where institutions become non-functional and thus unable to move on 
agreements reached through a mediation process: 
There are key institutions involved in the stability of the nation and dealing with 
disputes. The frontline should be at the community level, they need to keep their 
eyes open and deal with issues as they arise. Secondly, the Judiciary is the 
peacemaker and we need to do everything we can to give it support to effectively 
and efficiently deal with disputes. Because when not dealt with, people take the law 
into their own hands. When have a Judiciary that’s independent, it stabilises 
elections. If Judiciary can do its work properly and if people believe in it. But 
behind the Judiciary will be the police and the army.1013 
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Kenya was a peculiar peace process. We were not changing a regime forcefully, 
not coming out from a full-blown war, had our systems in place, had a functioning 
government, a well-educated middle class. We can call it successful [in] that 
reached an agreement and had structures to carry it through, a Judiciary, ministries. 
Could begin implementing and not too difficult for Kenya. However, in emerging 
democracies, especially in Africa, we need a leader for continuity, for 
implementing these peace agreements, people that were figures in this peace 
agreement, [like] Kibaki and Raila.1014 
 
Fourth, political settlements, while apparently now the standard solution to resolving 
electoral conflicts, are at best a means to an end. Political settlements are a double-edged sword. 
They further weaken already weak political oppositions, removing a critical yet fragile check on 
the Executive. They depend on the sacrifice of accountability for electoral malfeasance and the 
instigation of political violence and, by doing so, incentivise the same. And they can serve to 
prolong political commitment to structural transformation: 
We were definite that we do not want to create another problem, like removing the 
sworn-in President. Power-sharing is just a way of managing conflict, not 
satisfactory. Nobody in Africa accepts that elections are lost or won. People will 
not agree or acknowledge they’ve lost an election or they have been removed from 
positions of authority legally. This is the biggest problem. It’s not in us. We’ve not 
reached that stage where we’ll gracefully walk away. Look at what happened in 
2007 and 2013. Just a repeat. 1015 
 
Can only look at it as a success if power-sharing a means to an end, not an end in 
[itself]. Laid the groundwork for reforms in many sectors, even if didn’t succeed. 
[But] allowed the Coalition to continue for too long. The moment we had a new 
Constitution, should’ve gone straight to elections to elect people to carry reforms 
forward.  
A good template for solving conflicts that entail violence and deaths and 
you need a quick fix. But without resolving the larger constitutional questions, it 
may become a template that you create a problem to have a working arrangement 
like in Zimbabwe, Kenya, now Burundi, Ivory Coast. You lose the bigger picture 
in the comforts of the immediate solution.1016 
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We [the AU] keep doing [power-sharing] even though we know it’s wrong. We are 
supposed to be investing more in prevention. There are two types of prevention of 
conflict. Direct or operational prevention, which is the most popular: mediation, 
elections, peace support operations. It’s not sustainable. Structural prevention is 
more long-term and addresses the root causes. We need to invest more in structural 
prevention which addresses development failures and governance failures. 
Deal with socio-economic issues, ensuring inclusion, equal distribution of 
the national cake and deal with poverty, inequality and exclusion. Deal with 
governance issues, a state that’s inclusive, participatory, responsive, responsible. 
Create a people’s state instead of an elite state. Move to diversity, say to all 
Kenyans: ‘How can we all belong to Kenya?’ The way we manage diversity is 
destructive. Diversity has now become adversity. We turn it into an adversarial 
weapon. It generates adversity. Diversity should be an asset. Well-cultivated, well-
harvested.1017 
 
The need not to deal with the issues superficially but to tackle root causes. May not 
always succeed but have to try. To tackle root causes and not just get a quick fix 
because could’ve walked away after the Coalition Government was in and said 
work done, patted ourselves on the back and declared victory. But a lot to be 
done.1018 
 
We’re in a bad place. Government came in with such a majority, no check on them, 
no restraint. Have done so much damage. The economy. The country’s reputation 
and standing. Security. They had one agenda, the ICC and nothing else. Everything 
they do has been ham-fisted, pushed aggressively with short-term goals in mind. 
Cannot think of one thing they’ve done that has a long-term view, where they’ve 
tried to persuade people. Everything rammed down people’s throats with short-term 
aim of staying in power and making as much money as possible. They’re going to 
leave this country broke, polarised, in terms of security, they’re out of control, don’t 
know what the KDF’s doing in Somalia, probably brutalising people the way they 
brutalise people here. The coast, their response has increased secessionist 
sentiments. They’ve not dealt with any grievances. There’s no single area of policy 
these people have impacted positively. They’ve ruined so much. By 2017, I don’t 
know where we’ll be.1019 
 
Finally, accountability is the last frontier. Resistance to accountability, especially enabled 
by and following a political settlement, cannot be under-estimated. Admittedly, the international 
justice process in Kenya had its weaknesses: 
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International justice needs to be swifter. I [also] don’t understand why these 
offenses are bailable. How can crimes against humanity be bailable? I mean, we 
deny chicken thieves bail.1020 
 
 But international justice was resorted to only when the Grand Coalition Government had 
also successfully thwarted all efforts at domestic justice, meaning that answers to the question of 
accountability are still unclear: 
The way the PEV [post-election violence], the Waki thing, went. Meandered off in 
directions nobody would have anticipated. Would a different school of thought 
[have] led to a different outcome?1021 
 
 The thwarting of both domestic and international justice was, ironically, supported by the 
very AU that had put into motion the intervention that had held out the promise of accountability. 
For the resistance to accountability is shared by an increasing number of African leaders: 
The AU is slowly being influenced by the fourth generation of African leaders, 
Uhuru, Kagame, this Ethiopian. It doesn’t respect accountability. It does not see 
impunity the way we see it. It is much less about democratic ideals and more about 
social development. That’s the crisis the AU is in. It’s given up on democracy.1022 
 
 These African leaders draw on both reactionary and legitimate critique of the aims and 
reach of a purely criminal justice approach to accountability from African intellectuals: 
The Left doesn’t have any respect for the West as an answer or answers that borrow 
anything from the West. Take, for instance, [Professor Mahmood] Mamdani’s 
views on Kenya and the ICC, he was categorical that ICC was a bad thing for 
Kenya. [Ade]Bayo Olukoshi himself thought good [Uhuru was] mobilising against 
the ICC. His argument was that mobilisation against the West was a good thing, to 
tame it. The Left is happy that, for the first time, Africa can call the shots on the 
international arena and be listened to. To teach the West a lesson. But a lesson to 
what end is important.1023 
 
The infiltration of the global narrative into that emerging African approach. 
Quickly needed to seek a particular kind of justice. Where locals had a 
comprehensive picture, framed the injustices that led to conflict comprehensively, 
not only immediate injustices but the roots of it. They wanted, they demanded, a 
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conversation around it. That two-pronged thing brought a particular kind of 
hybridity and demonstrated tensions between the local and international.1024 
 
In conclusion, this second background or contextual chapter has focused on the transition 
from the OAU to the AU, and on the political, economic and institutional imperatives for and 
expectations of that transition. It has spelt out the normative and institutional differences between 
the OAU and the AU, the purpose being to assess the effectiveness of the new AU. This assessment 
has highlighted the implications for (electoral) conflict resolution arising from the AU’s 
intervention in Kenya’s electoral conflict of 2007-8. 
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6. ‘African solutions for African problems’ 
This chapter explores and problematises the notion of ‘African solutions for African problems’. 
Using the research findings, it shows the different ways in which the AU’s intervention in 
Kenya’s electoral conflict of 2007-8 is understood as being an ‘African solution’ (or not). It 
explains factors that lead, in practice, to a decision by the AU to intervene, as well as what 
makes a member state agree to such an intervention. It outlines the objectives, model and 
advantages of such interventions and surfaces determinants of an intervention’s ‘success’ (or not) 
as well as measures of such ‘success’. It also explores the evolving relationship between the AU 
and the UN as concerns conflict resolution in Africa. 
 
6.1 An African solution (or not)? 
The AU intervention in Kenya, despite problems of implementation as well as problems arising 
from the political settlement that lay at its heart, was largely seen as a success because that political 
settlement ended the violence and enabled—or at least laid the ground for—structural change. If 
it provides an abiding example of an ‘African solution to an African problem’, it provides too the 
opportunity to explore what made it ‘African’ beyond the fact that it was initiated and legitimised 
by an AU mandate. 
Curiously, however, within the AU itself, as well as outside, the perception exists that while 
the face of the Panel of Eminent Personalities was African, it was less an ‘African solution’ than 
a Western intervention legitimised by the AU’s mandate for the intervention. The AU’s Panel of 
the Wise under the APSA had not yet been operationalised at the time of the intervention, the AU 
could neither financially nor technically support the intervention and it also couldn’t provide the 
leverage—carrots and sticks—necessary to ensure the parties to the negotiations agreed: 
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The UN Secretary-General was anxious not to tangle with Kenya. That was the 
attitude and the AU should take credit. It gave us the mandate. While they’ll say it 
was not their intervention, their mandate made a difference. If they wanted to own 
it, be involved, what would they have done and what resources would they have 
put in? Got one or two people seconded from them, the rest I had to raise. We had 
an office in Nairobi under [Ambassador] Nana [Effa-Apanteng]. Reported 
faithfully to them on a monthly basis [and] hardly got feedback.1025 
 
The AU was less than ten years old [at the time] and its Secretariat support was 
limited. The AU was going to deploy the Panel of the Wise but hadn’t at the time 
operationalised it.1026 
 
The AU didn’t have any money, it was the UN that serviced them [the Panel of 
Eminent African Personalities].1027 
 
Initiated by the AU, suggested by the AU, but the push and pull not from the AU 
but the West. Remember Condoleeza coming. By the time the talks end, Kufour 
has left the AU, Kikwete comes over when there’s a stalemate and brokered the 
final deal with Raila and Kibaki. So see AU at the beginning and at the end.1028 
 
When look at the leadership of the AU then, you’ll see a leadership that would listen 
to Western voices and Western voices clear that what going on untenable. Don’t 
think the AU did this as concerned Africans. The AU was a convenient proxy. The 
AU could play ball where your big superpowers, where your big bilaterals, didn’t 
want to be seen supporting either side. In most other contexts, the AU supports the 
status quo.1029 
 
AU a good cover for the international community to be involved.1030 
 
 Within the AU Commission, this perception seems to be based on some of the very factors 
that, in the end, were also cited as making the AU’s intervention a success. These include the 
gravitas and stature of the lead mediator and his ability to ensure that the rest of the international 
community got behind the AU mandate financially, technically and politically. The tension felt by 
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some within the AU Commission is, in this sense, more about their lack of engagement with the 
mediation process as it unfolded, their sense that the lead mediator wasn’t beholden to them and, 
as implementation of the mediation agreements rolled out, their apparent support for Kenya’s 
growing resistance to accountability for the post-elections violence through the ICC: 
It was the stature of Kofi Annan.1031 
 
There was consensus among the PSC that Annan be the head. As a former UN 
Secretary-General and someone who remains engaged internationally [as my senior 
says, he was] ‘not patriotic enough’. [When] he deployed to Kenya, he did not see 
this as an AU initiative. Saw it as an initiative driven by the international 
community. 
He couldn’t cope with the limited capacity at the AU at the time and decided 
to divorce himself. He deployed his own Secretariat from Geneva to support the 
process. We [the AU] had no political engagement with his office.1032 
 
Annan was not just seen as an AU personality alone. The UN also saw him as their 
own. Fully supported by both. The UN provided technical support throughout.1033 
 
Look at the AU Commission and member states separately. Of course, he was 
required to submit reports. But reports were sent as a way of informing the PSC, 
not for them to take decisions on how unrolling.1034 
 
We had a little problem with Annan, he started reporting to the UN and others, not 
much input from the AU. It’s about the primacy of the AU. Who gets the report 
first? Maybe we [the AU] said: ‘He’s telling more to these ones than us, we don’t 
see him often.’ He did report, but not as frequently as wished.1035 
 
There’s contention around whether the response to Kenya was led by the AU. 
Especially in light of embarrassing disassociation of Kofi Annan with the AU’s 
political objectives in Kenya [later, in respect of the ICC’s taking up of the Kenyan 
situation].1036 
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But he came here [to the AU] when he closed his files and gave them to the Chair. 
He said: ‘You’d appointed me, here are my final reports.’ [The Special Envoys] 
usually brief the Chair, because the Chair is the conveyor belt. [She] appoints them 
but has to account to the policy organs, the Executive Council or the Assembly.1037 
 
Within Kenya, however, the perception is that the AU intervention was ‘African’ in that 
the groundwork was laid for it by domestic constituencies and the participation of the same in its 
content, acceptance and implementation enabled it to succeed: 
Kenyans actually resolved their own conflict. We resolved it. The way we did it 
was to put Kenyans together and look for solutions. Those papers were being 
written by our own professionals as to what we wanted or what was a citizens’ 
agenda. Kofi Annan told us [CCP]: ‘Why do you want me here? You have the 
solution.’ We were honest with ourselves and said: ‘Yes, we know we have the 
solution, but we can’t do it because everybody thinks we belong to one of the sides 
in contention in this election.’ And he says: ‘OK, what you need to do is to help 
me, what do you want?’ 
 
I don’t know why we haven’t built a monument for the people, not anybody else. 
The AU mandate was a cover for Kenyans.1038 
 
6.2 What informs the AU decision to intervene? 
The AU intervention in Kenya also provides an opportunity to surface the reasons that inform the 
AU’s decision to intervene or not. Factors both internal and external to the AU inform a decision 
to intervene. 
The first internal factor is leadership, of both the AU itself (which Head of State chairs the 
AU Summit) and the AU Commission: 
There was, at that time, leadership. [Former Malian President] Alpha Konare, 
Obasanjo, who were keen to get involved.1039  
 
[The then AU Chair] Kufour had a keen interest in what was happening in Kenya, 
shared history with Kibaki and had also been the mascot of a new benchmark for 
governance in Africa because Ghana among the first to take part in the APRM. So 
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emblematic of the new Africa, not the Paris Club giving rankings on whether we 
were a risk.1040 
 
In addition, under the design of the APSA, not only the PSC but also the AU Commission 
Chair has the discretion to act based on information arising from the Continental Early Warning 
System (CEWS): 
Article 12 of the PSC Protocol establishes the CEWS. Rarely do we [the AU] miss 
a situation that’s escalating. In Kenya, had been monitoring from the beginning, 
from reports about armed youth groups in the Rift Valley. Once there’s early 
warning, it goes to the Commissioner [responsible for peace and security], who 
brings it to attention of the Chair. The Chair can decide to take it to the PSC, which 
decides whether intervention can occur or not. Or the Chair herself has the authority 
to undertake preventive diplomacy and intervene.1041 
 
 A second internal factor is the normative basis for intervention provided by the Constitutive 
Act and the design of the APSA as well as an awareness in both the AU’s political leadership and 
the AU Commission of the historical reasons for the design of the APSA and the desire to avoid 
another Rwanda-like situation: 
The AU having ‘African solutions to African problems’ rhetoric.1042 
 
The OAU was guided by non-interference. After the genocide in Rwanda, it became 
clear certain principles had to be put aside when threats of genocide or massive 
violations of human rights existed. The foundation is in the Constitutive Act and 
the sub-articles under Article 4. The doctrine of non-indifference. African 
solidarity. We [the AU] cannot let an African country go down the drain.1043 
 
The AU has learnt lessons from the genocide in Rwanda. The AU was developing 
its theory of non-indifference. If there are war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
genocide, it doesn’t need the authorisation of the country, it has to go in and find a 
solution. [In Kenya, there was already] a massacre, 1,000 people.1044 
 
The AU Constitutive Act is specific about that. It needed to be stopped and was an 
opportunity to test our APSA. Four pillars, the peace fund, the CEWS, the Panel of 
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the Wise, the PSC and the African Stand-By Force (ASBF). That’s what we were 
trying to do. There was also the human factor in that, after the 1994 genocide in 
Rwanda, seeing machete-wielding people is in itself traumatising. I fought in 
Rwanda in 1994, I was with the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF). For anybody from 
that region who sees these things, we’re affected at a personal level. Talking about 
Burundians and Rwandans.1045 
 
Kenya thus provided a test case for the AU in terms of its new doctrine of non-indifference, 
its APSA and its belief in preventive and proactive diplomacy before escalation and in lieu of a 
purely military response: 
[Kenya was] associated with other, related cases. Cote d’Ivoire and, to some extent, 
Burkina Faso. If one looks at the three, what you find is the AU is increasingly 
playing an important role in mediation. The AU has consistently tried to promote 
conflict management through mediation. Even if [one] look[s] at Libya, which 
wasn’t an electoral crisis. Of course, if escalates, possibility of deployment of 
forces. Kenya not an exception. Kenya represented opportunity for the AU to 
demonstrate its ability to mediate conflict.1046 
 
 Outside the APSA under the PSC, however, were parallel and related normative and 
institutional developments under the DPA. These have to do more directly with elections in and 
of themselves, not just elections as a potential trigger for conflict: 
The AU’s standpoint about no illegal taking over of government, the treaty on 
democracy and good governance. The role the AU played in Kenya reinforced its 
resolve against illegal takeovers of government. [That is] why it had the courage to 
tell Egypt [following the military takeover that it] will suspend you. [It’s] tried to 
enforce that everywhere, Mali, Burkina Faso.1047 
 
The AU deploys observers before elections, long-term and short-term. Long-term 
observers go a month in advance, sometimes longer if we sense it’s going to be 
complicated, not just the ballot but the outcome and acceptance of that. In Kenya, 
it was clear there would be clashes after the elections. We were on the alert and it 
turned out to be as foreseen. So immediately after, when trouble began, the AU was 
able to mobilise because it had foreseen trouble.1048 
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They [the AU] didn’t want that type of problem to spread because there were a lot 
of elections in Africa, particularly presidential elections, and many ended in 
crisis.1049 
 
 As for external factors, the first has to do with the country involved. The AU’s alacrity 
with respect to Kenya was not just because of Kenya’s economic importance for countries in the 
hinterland who depend on transit trade through Kenya: ‘Let’s not forget the strategic importance 
of Kenya in the region’.1050 It was also because of the historical perception of Kenya as being 
secure, stable and on an upward trajectory and the idea that it couldn’t be allowed to fail: 
Kenya was seen as a stable economy, with a stable government. It’s the biggest 
economy in east Africa, it’s the entry point for so many countries, it’s the port, it’s 
the hub. Therefore, this unexpected eruption of violence in Kenya—it was sudden, 
it was quick and very ferocious—in a country not expected to go into an ethnic type 
of attack. If Kenya, the implications for others in the region would be disastrous. 
That’s the reason people rushed in quickly. The consequences were too much for 
anybody. If Kenya, considered stable, were to go up in flames, where is the end?1051 
In Kenya, the AU moved fast as Kenya’s an economic powerhouse in east Africa 
and knew that, should Kenya burn, the ripple effects on neighbouring countries 
would be huge. The prices of fuel went up in Burundi and Rwanda as rely on the 
port of Mombasa.1052 
 
What Rift Valley means, the highway through, if collapses, East Africa 
collapses.1053 
 
At the regional level, people didn’t want to see a civil war in a country seen as a 
success.1054 
 
The idea that Kenya would disintegrate was scary. Like Ivory Coast, a pillar of that 
region. Many regional and international bodies in Kenya. Kenyan exceptionalism. 
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Stability in bad neighbourhood. Sense that Kenya on the move. Had been possible 
to make positive changes and have an outcome. Not a DRC, Somalia, Liberia.1055 
 
The AU responded the way it did because of Kenya’s standing within the African 
continent. Kenya had this exceptionalism going for it that provoked reactions from 
everybody, including the AU. Can have countries like Congo, Somalia failing, but 
not Kenya. Kenya too important in the sub-region and Africa itself to be allowed to 
fail.1056 
 
Partly the shock of Kenya becoming Burundi, Rwanda. The AU likes these islands 
of stability. So many factors appeal about Kenya, things function. So when things 
went wild, they took the right step.1057 
 
Kenya’s regional position. It’s cliché when people keep saying Kenya is not 
Zimbabwe. But that did play out.1058 
 
 Arising from this was the related fact of the response of the sub-region, on grounds of both 
immediate economic impacts and potential political implications if Kenya collapsed: 
There was a mobilisation of the region, with the involvement of Kikwete.1059 
 
Rwanda and maybe Uganda played a role in pushing the AU to resolve this given 
the movement of their goods.1060 
 
 The second external factor has to do with the response from domestic constituencies, 
including civil society, and their ability and contacts to encourage a vigorous AU response:1061  
[It was] also capacity of Kenyan groups to make the AU take Kenya more seriously 
than it would’ve taken other countries like Congo, Somalia.1062 
The advocacy worked, the focus on the AU. KPTJ was setting the agenda. Pushing 
for negotiations that were credible, strong and high-profile and making that work. 
That battle won in Addis Ababa as the AU took a position which was unusual as 
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usually status quo. Kenyan civil society has got tremendous respect across Africa. 
Has good links across Africa and those links used.1063  
  
[Civil society] is important. Particularly in the case of massive violence. [We get] 
calls from the ground. Letters from civil society saying please help us. We have to 
be careful not to react emotionally and rush in before we’ve controlled the 
parameters. Much is done quietly and not in the public eye. Can’t rush as could go 
and do more harm than good. It takes time as government might prevent [our 
Special Envoys, human rights monitors and observers] from coming in, as in 
Burundi and Egypt. Sometimes it’s not the number one making problems. Usually 
it’s somebody around him, as in Egypt. In Libya, it was external factors. The 
delegation was refused entry as NATO [the North Atlantic Treaty Organization] 
was about to bomb it. In Kenya, we were lucky. Annan was appointed, dealt with 
the region and came in with force.1064 
 
 A third external factor is the response from the rest of the international community 
(although, as the Libyan example also illustrates, the AU may differ from the UN and decisions of 
the UN Security Council in particular on how to intervene). In Kenya, however, the interests of 
the AU were well aligned (at least initially) with those of the rest of the international community 
and the AU felt the pressure to respond: 
The interests of the international community within Kenya. The leverage the 
international community had and the interests it had in getting Kenya resolved 
correctly, applied also to the AU.1065 
 
The AU was under pressure. Because the Americans had said it won’t let Kenya go 
the Rwanda way.1066 
 
The AU itself feels that time has lent itself to three different models of intervention: direct 
(through, for example, the AU Chair); indirect (through its high-level Special Envoys, many 
members of the Panel of the Wise); or through the sub-region: 
                                                          
1063 Interview with Maina Kiai, former Chair, KNCHR, Nairobi, February 4, 2016. 
1064 Interview with Dr Musifiky Mwanasali, Special Advisor for Political and Diplomatic Affairs, Office of the 
Chairperson, AU, Addis Ababa, February 25, 2016. 
1065 Interview with George Kegoro, former Executive Director, the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ)-Kenya, 
Executive Secretary of the CIPEV under the Grand Coalition Government, Nairobi, January 15, 2016. 
1066 Interview with Francis Atwoli, Secretary-General, COTU, Nairobi, January 12, 2016. 
225 
 
Have direct involvement, [indirect involvement] and the third type [of intervention] 
comes from the region, with the AU giving support to the region, as in Burundi 
now.1067 
 
However, that typology explains the messenger, not the message. The content of what’s 
sought remains consistent—with averting or ending violence being key and that being seen as best 
achieved through a political settlement. In addition, the internal and external factors taken into 
account to provoke the sending of the message, regardless of the messenger, do not all pertain in 
the same kind of alignment at all given points in time. And the message or the model for 
intervention through mediation may have run its course: ‘[That was] the era of transitional justice, 
coming in and salvaging places with a formula’.1068 It was: ‘Different from what’s happening now. 
Look at Burundi’.1069 And: ‘Also just a lucky moment. If doing this now, don’t know if would 
have the same intervention’.1070 
 
6.3 What makes a member state accept an AU intervention? 
The AU’s intervention in Kenya provides the opportunity to tease out the factors that influence a 
member state’s acceptance of an intervention. The first factor concerns the member state’s 
normative commitments, failure to adhere to which has consequences:  
A country will accept intervention because all 54 states of Africa are AU members, 
except Morocco. Decisions of the PSC are binding on member states under Articles 
7 and 16 of the PSC Protocol. Otherwise, they face sanctions.1071  
 
The AU had been rejected by Kibaki’s people but the message got through that 
wouldn’t get recognised.1072 
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The second factor is the domestic acceptability of the face and leadership of the 
intervention. Here, there is a preference for peers perceived as politically neutral: ‘The AU came 
in as had that distance and the one convenient place where could do this thing’.1073 
The leadership, you had the Chair, the President of Ghana. Had also Mkapa, part of 
the Panel of the Wise, or Salim [Ahmed Salim], people from region. At the time, 
Kofi Annan was still a well-respected figure of international relations.1074 
 
Kufour said important to agree who’ll facilitate the talk and he suggested his 
countryman, Mkapa, Graca and said would check with the other side [the ODM]. 
As [he was the] respectable head of AU, we [the PNU] accepted it and the 
opposition also accepted it.1075 
 
The fact that was Annan himself, a man of such stature, who came to mediate. He 
had the respect of everybody else and they all pushed behind him.1076 
 
The third factor is the calculation of the balance of power domestically by the incumbent: 
 
Do you think Kenya had a choice [about accepting the intervention]? The guy 
[Kibaki] knew he’d lost the election, everybody knew he’d lost the election, but 
had the army, the influence of the Gikuyu leadership and needed an exit strategy. 
The streets were also organised. The more they were organised, the balance of 
power was not in their favour. Most people were killed by the police and that only 
encouraged the people in the streets.1077 
 
Kenya did not oppose that as found itself in a situation where it had no other option. 
There was no functioning government. There were massive violations. There was 
no way they could refuse. I wouldn’t say they accepted but they consented.1078 
 
The strength of the opposition cannot be discounted. [The] balance of power may 
have been the case in Kenya.1079 
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Then the opening of a front where Raila is seen to be talking to some of these people 
[the AU and key member states]. A moment they [the PNU] would have been loath 
to allow to happen. Imagine if front page was Raila meeting with all these 
international names.1080 
 
 The fourth factor is the calculation of interests domestically by the incumbent, including 
on how to best preserve itself, whose intervention may enable the least ceding of power and what 
could be lost through a mediated negotiation with the opposition: 
The elite are unified, they understand their interests, are cohesive. They go to a 
certain limit, but not to an extent that’s disastrous for all of them. The fight was in 
the elite but the consequence was in the population. When that consequence was 
big and people were taking matters into their own hands, the elite in both camps 
felt they could lose, it would be a mutual disaster if could no longer control what 
was going on. The aftermath, what happened, like wildfire, threatening the elite 
from both sides. They recognised the conflict couldn’t easily be resolved unless 
they made a deal within the elite. Made a compromise as going all the way would’ve 
brought new forces into play that would take power from their hands.1081 
 
The AU looked like a friendlier space as has always tended to err on the side of 
incumbents. African leaders are all too aware of their governance flaws [and] would 
be more tolerant of deficiencies.1082 
 
A misreading by PNU and those in power at the time of the shape and form that 
mediation would take. If they’d known that this would acquire a life of its own, for 
example, the Waki Commission, even with all its problems, the Kreigler 
Commission. Were basically told: ‘You didn’t win the election’, which isn’t a 
statement of endorsement. Nobody at the point of saying: ‘Let the AU come in’ had 
envisaged AU ballooning into all that then took off.1083 
 
 A fifth factor was pressure from the AU, the region and the rest of the international 
community: 
Most [member states], if not all them, unless they request that intervention, resist. 
Burundi and many others would say: ‘No in the name of national sovereignty, can 
solve own problems.’ That’s the standard answer. But that doesn’t discourage the 
AU. We can send Special Envoys. Usually, they don’t accept they have problems 
but eventually they do when receive the high-level delegations. So they resist, many 
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if not most, but we don’t give up. The only place we gave up was with [Muammar] 
Gaddafi for external reasons as the NATO had decided to bomb it.1084 
 
Ultimately was the willingness of the parties involved to sit down. Goes back to 
consent. Consent the basis on which the mediation kick-started. The particularities 
of Kenya aside, could not have happened without consent of the government. Of 
course, lots of pressure.1085 
 
It’s the political pressure, economic pressure and nobody wants to be a pariah, 
simply put. Can be as tough as want to be, but interconnected, part of the region, 
the world, and will accept that.1086 
 
The fact of how quickly and how big the response was from the AU and UN.1087 
 
Don’t forget Museveni had been here, Kagame was talking to him, so there was 
pressure to talk. Pressure from the region.1088 
  
External actors had huge stakes in forcing the government to the process.1089 
 
 The final factor is pressure from domestic constituencies, including civil society and the 
private sector: 
[Civil society] was important. They did play an important role in pushing for a 
peaceful solution. They did not participate much in the negotiations [which were] 
between the two blocks of parties. What we suggested at that time and afterwards, 
although it may be difficult to bring all civil society into the negotiations as a third 
party, was consultation. Annan and his team were dealing with all relevant 
stakeholders in the country. They must be brought in as guarantors of whatever 
peace is reached. They had a stake in peace and they had to be involved in 
implementation, in making sure the parties stuck to whatever they signed or else 
there’d be political consequences.1090 
 
6.4 Objective/model of an intervention? 
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The design of the APSA is clear, premised on subsidiarity, with the first level of intervention being 
the relevant REC. However, in practice, the AU is flexible and has evolved a three-pronged option 
for intervention: intervention by the relevant REC; what it terms indirect intervention through a 
high-level mediator, mediation team or Special Envoys, both from and external to the Panel of the 
Wise; and what it terms direct intervention through the AU Commission Chair and relevant senior 
staff:  
There are cases we intervened directly, like in the Comoros. There are cases 
where we appointed somebody like Kofi Annan, who ran the show in Kenya and 
we were not involved directly.1091  
 
There are also cases where intervention is through the sub-region. 
We [the AU] have offices in some places [but] even if we have an office on the 
ground, it’s constrained, it can be accused of bad reporting and kicked out. [So] we 
send high-level delegations. That’s why we use neutral Special Envoys. It’s not 
easy, I can tell you.1092 
  
The AU is also careful about enabling incumbents to save face by ensuring those leading 
the high-level delegations are often peers:  
When it’s difficult, [we use] Heads of State. Let him [the incumbent being 
encouraged to consent to an intervention] talk to his peers, feel glorified.1093 
 
Otherwise, the AU is not directive with those leading the intervention, who are assumed to know 
what to do and how to do it:  
The people appointed are meant to know the issue. We’re not directive, there’s a 
broad framework and they’re free to do whatever within that. Some like that. They 
have the walls and the room is empty and they have space to manoeuvre. That’s 
worked well. The imagination of the Special Envoys. Unless there’s a complication, 
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unless they [parties to a conflict] cannot agree among themselves, it’s up to the 
facilitators. The mechanics, we leave to them.1094  
 
This changes only if those intervening on behalf of the AU want more direction: ‘Others like 
guidelines, [for example] Kikwete said: ‘Tell me what to do.’1095 
‘Intelligence [is] crucial. Because, if right intelligence, can pre-empt.’1096 Analysis and 
intelligence to inform the AU and its high-level delegations can come through internal 
mechanisms, such as the CEWS under the APSA, the long- and short-term electoral observation 
teams under the DPA or AU offices. But it can also come from external sources, including civil 
society:  
On analysis, we get information directly or [from] reports [by] AI [Amnesty 
International], Human Rights Watch (HRW), local organisations and even people 
travelling here. It can be overwhelming, we have to sort it out.1097 
 
The AU’s objective in intervening is clear, regardless of what may have provoked the 
conflict. Whatever the trigger, proximate or structural causes of a given conflict, the objective is: 
‘Always, if fighting, stop fighting. It’s always to restore peace and stability.’1098 Although military 
deployment is possible both normatively and in terms of the institutional developments towards 
the ASBF, mediated negotiations are the first and preferred option if conflict and violence have 
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not already set in: ‘The objectives are to end the suffering of the people. Stop the violence. Then 
move onto dialogue.’1099 For example: 
[At the end of 2015 and in early 2016] in Burundi, we told them you need to 
dialogue. [But] they’re sliding into hell. Appealing that the AU should have a stand-
by contingency force to intervene if need be. That’s a country that requires a stand-
by force which needs to move quickly.1100 
 
The AU Commission’s proposal to intervene militarily in Burundi was, however, rejected 
by the Heads of State at their January 2016 Summit. That the proposal was even tabled, however, 
seems to have impressed upon the incumbent that dialogue was a better and unavoidable option. 
Similarly: 
For the DRC, it’s the same thing. It’s not into serious fighting so need immediately 
serious dialogue. If not, violence will set in. Stop violence, restore peace and 
stability, dialogue and come out with an outcome that you agree to by 
consensus.1101 
 
 The critique that has arisen as to the extent to which political settlements can compromise, 
addressing not only the trigger but also the proximate and structural causes of conflict, is seen by 
the AU as both secondary to its over-arching objective as well as, if important, something that can 
and should be addressed by the detail in the agreements reached:  
[A political settlement] is sometimes confused as a return to the status quo. That’s 
left to the mechanisms, the modalities, of the agreement signed.1102  
 
The priority of structural change potentially enabled by constitutional revisions envisaged in the 
agreement is also impeded by the focus on enabling political settlements to hold: 
Constitutional review is always a first step. When a power-sharing agreement is not 
provided for, need to start the process of looking carefully at how to accommodate 
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agreement in the Constitution. The second is about resource-allocation [for new 
political offices that may be established] and constitutional review covers that too. 
Certain resource implications. Constitutional implications. The resource one’s not 
substantial, so intangible. But reviewing the Constitution—have only started in 
Somalia and has taken three years to set up review committee.1103 
 
 Critique on the extent to which political settlements can compromise accountability 
between immediate and longer-term issues is similarly seen as secondary to the overall objective. 
A trigger to conflict could include, for example, constitutional amendments unfairly weighting the 
electoral playing field or electoral malfeasance. Other concerns for accountability include 
consequences of the conflict, such as gross and systemic human rights violations, for example 
breaches of international humanitarian law. The search for accountability is also seen as leverage 
to get parties to the table. This is evident from acceptance of the notion of sequencing—that is, 
peace first, justice later—even when the AU itself has commissioned investigations into such 
violations and breaches. For example, in South Sudan: 
[The] IGAD had to plead with the AU not to release the report [of the AU 
Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, AUCISS]. The opposition wanted that 
report because thought would touch the President and his people and they’d be free. 
But we know that both sides are in. We cannot go forever without getting peace, 
and when we do, the first thing should be to bring people to answer why they killed 
one another. Want it to be sequenced. In [Kenya], well done. Most of those who 
negotiated were part of the discussions and eventually ended up being asked to 
account for themselves.1104 
 
 The mediators have the leeway to run the mediation as they see fit and content arising is 
left to them and the parties but the AU does, however nominally, sign off on the same:  
Every decision made has to go to the policy organs, the PSC and, if [it] can’t do it, 
we call a special ministerial or a Summit.1105  
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Heads of State Summits are normally held only twice a year, in January and June. 
 
6.5 What determines success? 
There are several implicit determinants of an AU intervention’s success. The first determinant of 
success is whether or not the AU can wholly occupy the space for intervention, to ensure there’s a 
single intervention that both the relevant REC and the rest of the world get behind: 
One of the continuing questions is how Kofi Annan and his team managed to muster 
the process without the destruction you find in mediation, forum-shopping, when 
the parties feel they’ve been pushed to the extreme in one particular forum and then 
[the] process starts all over again. In case of Kenya, one of the amazing things is 
how had a single mediation process that was well-managed, focused pressure on 
parties [and] everybody lined up behind [it].1106 
 
 Related to this is the need for agreement between the relevant REC, the AU and the rest of 
the international community on both analysis of the conflict and what needs to be done to resolve 
it. This requires alignment of the interests of all three groups: 
Where there is a convergence of opinions on the problem and the solution, it has 
worked. Where the strategic interests are not so divergent, it has worked. 
South Sudan took many years to accomplish. Independence was successful 
because those divergent didn’t have critical roles to play. People agreed on 
separation from the Sudan. Contrast that with what happened after. Different 
interests—internal and external. The Chinese, the Americans, the Norwegians. In 
the neighbourhood, Uganda supporting one side, Kenya, Sudan. Definitely not 
going to get a common solution. Same as Burundi, where majority of neighbours 
favour [President Pierre] Nkuruniza’s illegitimate process. Difficult for the rest of 
the world to engage. 
[On the other hand,] take Mali, there were no divergent interests as far as 
terrorism is concerned, at least on the surface. So could get all forces working in 
one direction. In Kenya, the same thing. High-level appointee to mediate and 
facilitate, region mobilised, and the AU and the international community on the 
same page. Remember the pictures at the signing ceremony, they were happier than 
the people signing themselves. Uganda, despite the disgraceful nature of the 
elections, is an expression of the strategic interests concerned. 
This is why when there’s a crisis that the AU is involved in directly, through 
Special Envoys, through a region, we always say: ‘let’s speak with one voice’. We 
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are calling on the others to respect that. Because when interests are not aligned, we 
have a problem.1107 
 
 The AU is proactive about trying to ensure member states of the relevant REC do align as 
necessary. It can either displace or take over from the relevant REC, as in Kenya, where there 
were: 
sub-regional dynamics. For example, Museveni show[ed] not everybody on board 
with same approach, sense of partisanship. [So] didn’t bring in sub-regional leaders. 
West Africans brought in.1108 
 
 Or the AU can engage to bring recalcitrant members on board: 
 
If there’s misalignment, it’s to work on it. If resistance [by] a member state, is to 
work on it. Have been to meetings on South Sudan. Even when [US President 
Barrack] Obama came, he said: ‘Oh, the region, you’re divided.’ Museveni said we 
shouldn’t be airing differences in front of [him]. It was embarrassing. 
 
The way the AU does it in difficult situations like Libya or Burundi right now, to 
avoid the problem of different interests, because countries have their own 
relationships, is through those Heads of State who head the regional groupings. 
Those chosen [as Special Envoys] are meant to bring the regional perspective on 
this and negotiate a compromise. So even if one country has particular relationship, 
the region has to develop a common approach consistent with what the Heads of 
State have decided. In Burundi, they must stop the fighting, they must stop the 
escalation between Rwanda and Burundi. They must be aligned to that. 
Individually, they can have their own relationships, but they must respect the 
AU.1109 
 
 Both the AU and the UN have also taken steps to ensure better alignment between them. 
These steps include institutional arrangements for information-sharing, improving common 
analysis and then agreeing on the comparative advantage of intervention by either the REC, the 
AU or the UN: 
Today, what the UN trying to do with the AU is joint horizon-scanning at the onset 
of any crisis, joint analysis between the sub-regional organisation, the AU and the 
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UN, meeting regularly to analyse threats, identify danger spots and work together 
to agree on common solutions. Within that joint-ness, subsidiarity can work. Can 
say to the sub-region: ‘You’re closest to the theatre, so take the lead, but within a 
common framework.’ [If the REC is] not going in, then the AU, then the UN. [For 
example,] when obvious IGAD couldn’t resolve South Sudan, the question was 
whether to replace it. Our conclusion was that, if IGAD [was] side-lined, it was 
going to be a spoiler. That’s where IGAD+ came from, to keep it engaged. That’s 
moved it forward.1110 
 
 That said, the challenge of alignment with the rest of the international community remains, 
particularly as concerns permanent member states of the UN Security Council: 
The other [question] is how strategic is that crisis. The more strategic it is, the less 
chance there is of having consensus. It is about containing the crisis, not resolving 
it. And any small trigger can re-launch the crisis at any given time. The DRC is 
having that problem. There is no unity of purpose. If there was, the DRC wouldn’t 
be at war from independence to now. [But this is] not only in Africa. Syria today is 
demonstrating that. The international community has divergent views on how to 
resolve the Syrian crisis. So the more strategic a situation is, the more divergent 
opinions you’re going to get on it because of divergent strategic interests in the 
crisis.1111 
 
 A second determinant of success is the balance of power domestically. This is the balance 
between the opposition and the incumbent, as well as in terms of the general sentiment of the 
population as expressed by civil society and the private sector: 
Balance of power. In Zimbabwe, although a part of the population supported the 
opposition, it was not enough to displace ZANU [the Zimbabwe African National 
Union]. But [in Kenya], there was a well-organised opposition, structured, with 
support of the population. Kenya wanted to change.1112 
 
Where you have unity of purpose at the grassroots, pushing in one direction, it is 
difficult for the AU or UN or whatever to adopt a position contrary to the same. An 
example is Burkina Faso, where the people said never. [The] ECOWAS, the AU 
and the UN had to follow the people’s line. They were organised, they knew what 
they wanted, it was impossible to do otherwise. This is not the case in South Sudan 
[or] in Burundi, [where] civil society is divided down the middle, there is no critical 
mass within the country to dictate what outsiders should do to resolve the crisis. 
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Once the internal constituencies are united in what they want, with a republican 
democratic platform, not an ethnic one, they’ll end up dictating the response of the 
international community. Where the people are united around broad democratic 
principles, have a chance for success because then the international community has 
the base to help them succeed and prevent a shift of focus away from what the 
people want. We must build the critical mass internally around democratic, human 
rights principles, not religious affiliations or ethnic belonging. Then every chance 
for success.1113 
 
 A final determinant of success is the sustained commitment of the parties to 
implementation of the agreements reached after a political settlement. The sustained engagement 
of the mediators in monitoring implementation can assist with this: 
The problem is that mediations are political and eventually politicians will be in 
charge of what’s agreed, implementation. But this always held up by political 
dynamics. Can only do so much if political actors go back on what agreed. And 
elements of that did happen. One plus [in Kenya] was the mediation team was 
willing to stay for an extra number of years monitoring implementation.1114 
 
 
6.6 How is success measured? 
The evident measure of success, related to the AU’s primary objective in intervening, is whether 
or not mediated negotiations ensure the violence ends or escalation is forestalled: 
Those are the benchmarks. Talking about visible, massive violence. Dialogue, 
return of refugees, compensation. In a sense, Kenya was successful as met those 
benchmarks.1115 
 
Beyond the obvious, however, the first measure of success is reaching a political settlement, 
usually including accommodation of the opposition by the incumbent in power-sharing: 
Success criteria are traditionally defined in terms of a peace agreement. [In] the 
Kenyan crisis, the agreement that led to power-sharing was a benchmark for 
success. Secondly, the narrative about what could’ve happened without the 
agreement. The jury will always be out as to whether or not there’d have been a 
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large-scale crisis, but the agreement was seen as a preventive response that helped 
reduce the scale of violence. The third aspect is linked to how the agreement was 
used as a model for addressing similar crises on the continent even though the [AU] 
Charter [on Democracy, Elections and Governance] is clear that a winner should 
be seen as the legitimate authority.1116 
 
Do you think the Kenyan experience is enough? Another situation, more complex, 
is Zimbabwe. The same problem, a ruling party refusing an election result. Some 
similarities in the way they dealt with the issue in that region and here. 
Governments of national unity.1117 
 
 A second measure of success is the extent to which the mediation agreements go beyond 
addressing the trigger of the conflict to addressing its proximate and structural causes. In this sense, 
the political settlement is ideally not an end in itself but a means to an end: 
Can only look at it as a success if look at power-sharing as a means to an end, not 
an end in itself. It disciplined politicians for some time, brought them to the table 
to discuss and agree. Laid the groundwork for many reforms in many sectors, even 
if didn’t succeed. Reform of the state and its institutions.1118 
 
Less power-sharing and more the will of actors to impose a re-start from zero. 
That’s what didn’t exist in Zimbabwe or in Cote d’Ivoire. The actors reached an 
agreement on reconstruction. Power-sharing was a means of sharing responsibility 
for that reconstitution. In 2005, there was the [failed] constitutional referendum. To 
return to that question in a manner that was more constructive was important. That 
was the spirit of the deal.1119 
 
The mediation process in Kenya tried to go an extra step in terms of focus on root 
causes, which doesn’t always happen around, for example, electoral disputes, long-
standing conflicts like in Sudan, South Sudan.1120 
 
 There are longer-term measures of success, however:  
Can only measure success over a decade, not after a political deal’s signed. Look 
at South Sudan, just signed and still going downhill.1121 
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The first of these longer-term measures of success is implementation of agreements 
intended to address proximate and structural causes of the conflict:  
The process is never perfect, but must have a minimum, that people are free to 
express their views, and inclusiveness, political and economic.1122 
 
Why did Burundi go bad [again]? Structural issues, of course, low growth and so 
on. Keep looking at Rwanda, the jury’s out. People say: ‘Oh Kagame’s done so 
much for his country.’ But unless there’s real democracy and people can voice their 
anger, it’s not sustainable. 
[So] how do you measure if successful? When a country shares equally 
resources and power and everybody feels included in the system. Ultimately, what 
all looking for is a government that’s inclusive, accountable and that delivers basic 
services to its people. But also, more and more, want the right to voice opinion 
without being sent to jail. Cannot have prosperity without democracy and vice 
versa. The two are linked.1123 
 
In recognition of the drop in the parties’ interest in resolving these proximate and structural 
causes of conflict beyond the political settlement, clarifying the reform mandate of governments 
formed through the same by limiting their terms of office may be necessary: 
We may have failed. Had we had power-sharing for a shorter period of time, the 
moment we had a new Constitution, should’ve gone straight to elections to elect 
people to carry the reforms forward.1124 
 
A contrary view is, however, that transitional leadership committed to reform may need to stay on 
to conclude resolution of the proximate and structural causes: 
When look at Rwanda, Uganda, or even Liberia, people key when peace agreement 
signed [have] stayed on and although we don’t agree with people changing the 
Constitution and staying on longer, need people who’ve brokered that deal to 
continue for at least ten years, especially if genuine in terms of wanting to see 
change in their own country.1125 
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 Whatever the transition period, whether or not there is a recurrence of conflict at the end 
of the same—and over the same trigger—is the final longer-term measure of success: 
Burundi had done all of this, gone into post-conflict and boom, it came back. 
Burkina Faso, the same thing. Elections alone is not a determinant as you can have 
escalation afterwards. For the CAR, we say congratulations, it went peacefully. Not 
that you have elections, but that it went peacefully.1126 
 
 
6.7 The evolving relationship with the UN and subsidiarity 
The AU has been assertive about its responsibility and right to intervene in response to both a lack 
of UN interest in some African conflicts and an inappropriate interest in others:  
There are extremists on both sides. The big countries used to pursue their own 
interests and didn’t take African interests into consideration. Look at Somalia. 
Would’ve been abandoned until a threat to them.1127 
 
However, over time, both the AU and the UN have recognised the challenges posed when the two 
intergovernmental bodies are pulling in different directions during a conflict:  
The UN/AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) [for example], wasn’t good practice, 
but was the first [attempt at a collaborative intervention]. Obvious mistakes that 
could’ve been prevented.1128 
 
The UN and the AU policy, decision-making, organs, particularly the Security 
Council and the PSC have gone a long way in recognising that collaboration in 
addressing challenges to peace and security in Africa is the only way to go. We’ve 
seen that attempts by the AU alone or the UN alone are not successful. The Security 
Council has recognised it’s impossible to address peace and security challenges 
without the AU. And the AU also has found it difficult without the participation of 
the UN and the RECs because they have the resources and the readiness to engage 
[respectively].1129 
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The AU’s intervention in Kenya has, in fact, been termed the first example in which the AU and 
the UN were completely aligned: 
[Kenya] was one of the first [crises] where the AU and the UN collaborated fully. 
There’d been cases before where it was either the AU alone or the UN alone or the 
AU and UN deploying mediators, facilitators, in situations in crisis. That one of the 
first where the AU and UN fully worked together. Did become part of a necessary 
pattern for the future.1130 
 
 Kenya thus set the stage for a new understanding and practice of subsidiarity as concerns 
the AU (as well as its RECs) and the UN. The AU’s intervention in Kenya was: 
Followed by the Sudan. IGAD did it but there was support for [the] role of Kenya, 
[of General Lazaro] Sumbeiywo, in the peace process that led to the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (CPA). After that, the UN fielded the AU High Level 
Implementation Panel (AUHIP) headed by [former South African President Thabo] 
Mbeki, [former Burundian President Pierre] Buyoya, there was no way the [UN] 
Secretary-General could’ve fielded a stronger team. When I was appointed [UN] 
Special Representative for Sudan/South Sudan, I recognised the lead of the AU and 
supported the effort of the AUHIP. It was led by the AU but supported by the UN 
and IGAD. It was the first collaboration where one organisation took the lead and 
all other organisations supported and participated.1131 
 
 The change in practice and recognition of the benefits of the same has led to new 
institutional arrangements with respect to AU/UN collaboration and cooperation on interventions 
in conflict situations. These go beyond joint horizon-scanning to a new strategic framework, 
benchmarking, capacity-building, technical support and, in at least one instance, financial support 
through UN assessed contributions: 
We’ve gone a long way. We’ve come to agree the two organisations should have a 
framework for their cooperation, to systematise it. Start from beginning all the way 
through. The partnership has been ad hoc at the beginning but, over time, the 
recognition that it had to be more predictable, sustainable, strategic is gaining 
ground. Trying to be systematic, to identify a common understanding of the cause 
of these conflicts [so] we can go into pre-emptive measures. If understand, all right, 
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what to do to prevent them? [If] it erupts, [how] to address? Then identify relative 
advantages Africa has, the AU, the RECs, the UN. And design a way of engaging. 
The AU has political officers on the ground, [the UN] does too, they could 
have consultations to find facts, to exchange ideas to interpret those facts and then 
come with proposals to the two Secretariats before decision-making bodies here 
and there…the more we do that and propose the same, the more similar the 
approach on how to deal with it. That’s what we’re trying to do right now. 
Secretariat to Secretariat, that framework is drafted already, both have contributed 
and it’s ready as a basis for collaboration.1132 
 
Cooperation between the AU and the UN in a number of areas. The UN has 
established an office in Addis Ababa on capacity-building for the AU, the 10-year 
capacity-building programme. It’s just gone through a review process. At a 
technical level, strong cooperation [as with the] AMISOM. The AU and UN have 
conducted numerous benchmarking exercises in Somalia. The UN is using assessed 
contributions to support. Unprecedented.1133 
 
 This has led to on-going discussions on how to further institutionalise AU/UN 
collaboration and cooperation through acknowledged subsidiarity arrangements with respect, first, 
to a shared understanding of the normative basis for the same under the UN Charter: 
It is within the framework of Chapter 8 that the AU’s engaged. Increasingly, its 
engagement is military, peace-enforcement or peacekeeping and that requires the 
endorsement of the Security Council. The simple logic is that both the Security 
Council and the PSC consider challenges to peace and security as their challenges. 
They are collaborating to address a common challenge. If common, shouldn’t be 
left for Africa to look for solutions and implement. A joint responsibility. 
Hopefully, an example for the UN’s collaboration with other regional 
organisations. We’re not in 1945 anymore, the world’s changed and the way the 
UN does business with regional organisations that are taking more responsibility, 
that recognition is necessary and must be accommodated in this global 
architecture.1134 
 
This shift has been enabled by improved relationships with and respect from the AU’s increased 
bilateral relationships: 
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It’s moving better because of our relationship with key member states, China, 
Russia, the US. But also because the relationship between the PSC and the UN 
Security Council has improved. The AU doesn’t need [then UN Secretary-General] 
Ban Ki-Moon to bring issues to the UN Security Council. All [its permanent 
members] have missions to the AU. All we can call directly and goes straight to 
capital. That’s improved compared to the OAU and the early times of the AU.1135 
 
Commitment to these new subsidiarity arrangements are evidenced through new financing 
proposals for AU interventions now on the table: 
There has to be burden-sharing, financing. Should the UN [be] considering this is 
an African responsibility? It is the responsibility of the UN as well. Trying to get 
to that level where both working on challenges in Africa, how best to address them 
and how to share the burden, including financial[ly]. It is not that the UN is 
‘helping’ Africa. But contributing so that Africans do what best at doing or are 
ready to do in addressing these challenges.1136  
 
The funding of AU operations, like in Somalia. The UN Security Council came 
here when coming back from Burundi and had an informal session here on Burundi 
and Somalia. The PSC said: ‘We’re doing your job, you have to pay us back for 
doing this job, don’t ask us to bring 25 per cent.’ The issue of funding is more 
important than Chapter 7 and Chapter 8. The problem is on peace operations. Most 
UN missions are stabilisation missions under Chapter 6. When the AU deploys, it’s 
for peace enforcement. Funding, equipment, all that gets involved. That’s not 
moving.1137 
 
[Is Somalia] an exception rather than an emerging rule? The need for the UN to 
authorise logistical support to the AU from the UN once there is a mandate from 
the UN SC. Also, talks on how to improve funding. The US is pushing for 75 per 
cent from the UN and 25 per cent from member states.1138 
 
 Financing is one challenge, about which, however, proposals are on the table. Other 
challenges remain, including on Africa’s standing demand for UN reform, particularly as concerns 
the permanent members of the UN Security Council and the fact that while encounters between 
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the PSC and UN Security Council have now been regularised, decisions arising from those 
encounters are not binding. There is still no joint decision-making process: 
The clamour for UN reform from African stakeholders is not getting the necessary 
momentum and attention. Politically, still some friction. The UN would always 
want to be recognised as the primary if not only decision-making organ. The PSC, 
on the other hand, sees itself as a primary decision-making organ as far as African 
conflicts are concerned. The PSC and the UN SC, they meet every now and then to 
exchange views but most views exchanged are not binding as don’t have joint 
decision-making processes. So still some disagreements. But have seen progress. 
There is a continuous conversation to improve, harmonise.1139 
 
 Trickle-down through the two Secretariats is also a challenge: 
It’s the UN Secretariat [that’s the problem] more than the UN Security Council. It’s 
more institutional. The UN Secretariat believes it has primacy over everybody else. 
You can see it in their interactions. It becomes difficult. We said: ‘Why don’t you 
follow the new trends in the AU? How can you propose a framework [for 
collaboration with the AU] that doesn’t mention Silencing the Guns, Agenda 2063? 
Try to relate. Try to make sure you know what you’re doing. Otherwise, will reject. 
They still have work to do. They need to connect properly at the AU, even at the 
highest level.1140 
 
 
6.8 Advantages and distinguishing characteristics of the model 
The question arises as to whether or not the objectives or model of AU interventions are more 
advantageous than or any different from external unilateral or UN interventions. For one, having 
an African face to the intervention is preferable for practical and strategic reasons that are as basic 
as language and, more fundamentally, understandings of the political culture at play: 
The composition [of non-African interventions] is problematic. In Burundi, why 
bring somebody from Uruguay, who doesn’t even speak the same language? When 
can ask the Ugandans, who speak same language, who are more or less the same 
people? We know each other better, we approach each other differently. You don’t 
know the cunning ways people have to mislead you. Ban Ki Moon was misled in 
Burundi. The President spoke in Kirundi. The Foreign Minister translated. Ban Ki 
Moon said he’s accepted inclusive dialogue. Nkurunziza said except with people 
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who tried to overthrow him. It’s a trivial example but important. They laughed at 
him, the Secretary-General.1141 
 
 While the objectives and models may be universal, having an African face—and preferably 
a senior one—to the intervention may also assist with acceptance of the intervention and ensure 
better contextual knowledge and empathy on the part of the mediators: 
I was looking at the Kenyan situation. Success is related to the weird notion of 
solidarity which exists among Africans. If they’d brought a mzungu [white] guy 
there, they wouldn’t have accepted him. It was the authority, the African-ness, the 
solidarity. A key factor in the acceptability of the mediation. First Kufour and later 
on Kofi Annan.1142 
 
Involvement of the AU was critical in sense that if internally initiated, would have 
been too many roadblocks. President Kufour put his credibility [behind the 
process], having come from a country which had those difficulties, then they 
overrode those problems and became a democracy. His person contributed 
significantly. The mediator was an independent person who was not necessarily 
interested in who the victor was, the loser, but a process to bring the country back 
to sanity and stop the violence. The level and authority of the intervention was 
important. Kofi had just been Secretary-General of the UN and was highly regarded 
and the AU had chosen somebody with those credentials. 
Kibaki happier with an African process than a non-African process. The opposition 
and civil society were seen as amenable to the West. So that intervention that came 
from the AU was critical in the sense that Kibaki would find it easier to talk to his 
colleagues, President Kufour and ultimately Kikwete.1143 
 
It is similar models. [But] there’s better knowledge, empathy, when it is people 
who’ve faced similar problems next door. That’s why see African former leaders, 
African personalities, being appointed by the AU or even the UN to facilitate, 
mediate. The solutions may be similar. How you reach them, however, would be 
different given knowledge of that context.1144 
 
There is now a pool of such senior Africans for the AU to draw upon: 
We’re lucky. We’ve plenty of former Heads of State that are credible. Like 
Kikwete. We called him to say: ‘Take up Libya.’ He was in retirement, milking his 
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cows, but now works for this thing. Konare was there, taken for Egypt. Mogae for 
South Sudan. They’re ready, Heads of State who finished their terms. In terms of 
mediation, facilitation, high-level delegations, we have no problem. The staff, 
usually from Peace and Security, are attached to the high-level delegations in terms 
of keeping track of what they’re doing. If not sufficient, we hire people from 
outside. Because finally, they’re acting on a decision of the AU Commission that’ll 
be presented to AU policy organs.1145 
 
 It is not that external unilateral or UN interventions cannot also ensure the face of the 
intervention is African, however. It is more that the AU, as the continent’s IGO, is able to easily 
convene and deploy such senior Africans with the weight of the continent behind it: 
Who else would do it? Who else would provide cover if we’re not in a regional 
body? I’ve worked for the UN in eastern DRC with General Obasanjo, was a senior 
advisor. They had to call us in. Don’t think anybody from anywhere else would’ve 
put those Congolese together. See Museveni trying to do it again.1146 
 
 One distinguishing characteristic of an AU intervention is that if mediation fails, it is 
quicker to move to military intervention not to hold the peace but to gain the peace, despite abiding 
difficulties with obtaining consent from the member state in question to do so: 
 
The UN is engaged in peacekeeping which pre-supposes there’s peace to keep. May 
have little peace, 60 per cent, 80 per cent, but not 100 per cent. Therefore necessary 
to engage in both peace-enforcement and peacekeeping. In enforcement, Africans 
are more willing to engage. They are next door, they are ready to intervene when 
conflict erupts to protect civilians, to ensure humanitarian access and contain, 
prevent, disasters in-country and spillover into the neighbours. The AU is more 
ready to engage at earlier stages of the conflict and, once some stabilisation, then 
the UN has a greater capacity to deal with the multifaceted engagement necessary 
to stabilise conflict areas. That has happened in Mali, in the CAR and in Somalia. 
The UN recognises the importance of this and that’s why it has been approving 
enforcements. A pattern is developing. We recognise the reasons for this pattern, 
count the advantages of engaging at different periods of a conflict and recognise it 
as beneficial to both.1147 
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Traditional peacekeeping is tied to consent, interposing between warring factions 
[to] get a peace agreement. What we do at the AU is almost the reverse. Consent 
difficult but leverage. Deploy in high-intensity situations [and] that’s not the norm. 
Look at Mali, Somalia. Offensive operations. The same in Bangui. If went there in 
2013, wouldn’t have been able to leave the airport. But the AU disarmed. It is a 
comparative advantage to deploy in high-risk areas. It is not what troops are used 
to doing and it is unlikely [many troop-contributing] countries would allow, like 
India and Bangladesh. No peace agreement? We force an agreement. So it is a 
partnership of necessity, not altruism.1148 
 
Not the example of Rwanda, that the UN was there when the mayhem started, never 
intervened, lost millions.1149 
 
 
6.9 Challenges to and critiques of the model 
Despite normative commitments under the Constitutive Act enabling AU intervention in a member 
state to prevent or given the commission of crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes, 
total abandonment of notions of sovereignty in such cases has not occurred and obtaining consent 
of incumbents is still a challenge. There are many facets to this challenge. First are purely logistical 
considerations, including obtaining an Article 4 decision from the AU’s highest policy organ, 
which meets only twice a year under normal circumstances, and then obtaining support for 
offensive deployments from the UN Security Council: 
Article 4h can only be evoked by the Assembly of Heads of State and requires a 
two-thirds majority to say yes. Heads of State meet only twice a year. If a crisis is 
happening or there are imminent violations, how can you have an extraordinary 
session in time to prevent another Rwanda? 
Divisions in the UN Security Council also expose the difficulty of 
deployment without state consent. [For example,] the AU was going to rely on the 
UN to endorse the PSC’s [proposed] mission for prevention in Burundi 
(MAPROBU). We needed the UN to provide logistical support—such as airlift[ing] 
troops from Entebbe to northern Burundi, provid[ing] them with food, water. 
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Difficulty to deploy because of lack of consensus within the UN Security Council. 
It did not think that unilateral intervention was a good option.1150 
 
More profoundly, however, is interpretation in practice of the norm, not as to standards of 
proof of the potential commission or commission of international crimes but at the political level, 
within the AU policy organs: 
It is not about proof of violations. If there is a credible basis an intervention would 
prevent violations, Article 4h can be evoked. Not just in response to genocide, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity. 
One area we’ve seen challenges in terms of implementation is Article 4h of 
the Constitutive Act. There is a gap between what member states have signed onto 
and challenges they face, especially when have a relatively stable state in question. 
In 2007, when IGAD intervened in Somalia, there was a political vacuum so it was 
easy to intervene without consent of the Government of Somalia as, at the time, 
there was no government. Going back to 2013, when deployed in Mali or the CAR 
in the same year, those interventions were in support of efforts by the Lake Chad 
basin states and Benin. These interventions [were] with consent of the target state. 
In Burundi, the AU invoked Article 4. However, it would be impossible for the AU 
to intervene without the consent of the government of Pierre Nkurunziza. This is 
over and beyond procedural implementation—that’s technical—the political 
requirements are more important. The AU has not aspired to that political state of 
mind to intervene without consent. 
For an intervention to be possible—not even if it works—it could be in 
either one of these scenarios. A gap or failure in governance and lack of state 
capacity as in Somalia or when have consent of state. That’s as far as the AU can 
go.1151 
 
 There are also problems of norm conflict and precedence, as evidenced by tensions within 
the AU Secretariat itself—between political norms falling under the DPA’s mandate and peace 
and security norms falling under the PSC’s mandate. There have been: 
A number of declarations by DPA on interpretations of Charter that are dissonant 
with what the PSC wants. That was the case in the Sudan. The DPA said not sending 
observers as the election won’t be fair or credible. But the PSC mandated the AU 
Commission to do so. The same in Egypt. The AU, based on strict interpretation, 
advised the PSC that [what’d happened was] an unconstitutional change of 
government and Egypt should be suspended. Two days later, the AU was going to 
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deploy a high-level representative to Egypt and the interim government was willing 
to negotiate and dialogue with the AU and other parties. On basis of which Egypt 
could be reinstated. A mismatch between what have embraced as legal documents 
and what we do politically.1152 
 
These political problems of interpretation are arguably rising as the leadership of the AU gradually 
changes too: 
The AU is slowly being influenced by the fourth generation of African leaders, this 
group of Uhuru, Kagame, this Ethiopian. It doesn’t respect accountability. It does 
not see impunity the way we see it. It is less about democratic ideals and more about 
social development. That’s the crisis the AU is in. It doesn’t think about democracy. 
It’s given up on democracy.1153 
 
It’s a reflection of the contradictory trajectory Africa has gone through since 
independence. At independence, had visionary leaders almost everywhere, they had 
ideas which they put on paper and tried to implement. What was lacking was the 
cadre corps, which was absent to extent that many leaders had to import Africans 
from the Diaspora as colonial education didn’t create that cadre corps. Today, it’s 
the exact opposite. Visionless leadership. And an educated, talented cadre corps 
without guidance from the top. Important to push for visionary leadership. That is 
lacking. Always at two extremes. Abundance of this and lack of that. And reversals. 
The relationship between leaders and followers that we have today.1154 
 
In addition, solidarity amongst the current crop of leadership can be blind: ‘This is our African 
brother, if doing it, doesn’t mean evil.’1155 
 Thus the Burundi example highlights the persistent challenge of AU intervention under 
Article 4: 
The AU was faced with about three different political challenges. In-house on 
reaching consensus. With the Government of Burundi on obtaining its consent. And 
within the UN Security Council, on consensus to allow for extension of its logistical 
support to MAPROBU. Broader lesson is that consent is still the name of the game. 
We haven’t matured as a political organisation beyond that.1156 
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Beyond the political difficulties of realising the intentions of Article 4 are design questions. The 
APSA’s design is based on subsidiarity, with the relevant REC meant to step in before the AU. 
Neighbouring countries to a country in conflict may have divergent interests in the country at stake 
or in the normative principle which may have triggered the conflict. This is especially so with 
conflicts arising from electoral contestation:  
Yes, there’s critique that neighbouring countries are intervening but have vested 
interests, are not impartial and should therefore be carefully weighed.1157  
 
For example, in Burundi: 
There’s a misalignment of interests between Rwanda and Tanzania. The division 
among Heads of State was visible at [the 2015] EAC Summit, which ended with 
Kagame leaving, saying: ‘These guys going downhill.’ Kenyatta said: ‘We’re not 
going to stand by for that to happen’ but then stood by. It took the [AU] Chair to 
intervene to move away from their own internal difficulties.1158 
 
Similarly, in:  
South Sudan, the same thing, IGAD was divided. If the agreement was signed, or 
initialled, in August [2015], it was because the [AU] Chair insisted. Because IGAD 
was paralysed.1159 
 
The options when this happens are either that: ‘The region must accept that the AU will deal with 
it’1160 or the AU must play a role in ensuring that the responsible REC does. The AU can sometimes 
add its weight to the REC’s intervention, as in Burundi, or can expand those at the table, as in 
South Sudan: 
Neighbouring countries have vested interests, they will pursue them and engage 
anyway. It’s better to recognise that and have their participation based on same 
principles, values, that interventions are based on everywhere rather than just let 
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them be. May not be able to contain if don’t give expression through positive 
engagement.1161 
 
 A further challenge can be posed by the choice of mediators and their history with the 
country in question. A history can give contextual knowledge but it can also mean that the 
mediators do not begin with a clean slate as to the particular iteration of the conflict at hand. 
Further, a history with the country in question can mean that the parties are able to run rings around 
the mediators. Again, this challenge emerged with respect to South Sudan: 
One year I’ve stayed in Addis [as an IGAD mediator], I’ve learnt a lot of things. 
Ethiopians not mediators. They can’t mediate anything, they can prescribe. South 
Sudanese, however weak they are, they will not accept any prescription. They’d 
rather discuss, talk, come to an agreement on their own. [One of the mediators, 
former Ethiopian Minister for Foreign Affairs Seyoum] Mesfin was being helped 
by Khartoum to host [former Ethiopian President] Mengistu [Haile Mariam] who 
established the Sudanese Peoples’ Liberation Movement (SPLM) in Ethiopia. Not 
a good choice. To make it worse, have a General [Mohammed Al-Daby] from 
Khartoum [which] controls most of Riek Machar’s militia generals. Ethiopia has 
said if doesn’t work, will hand over to AU. Nigerians. Egyptians. South Africans. 
They won’t understand this region, the South Sudanese. Without bragging, if I 
pulled out, that thing collapses the same day. If Kenya pulls out, that thing 
collapses. The South Sudanese are there only because Kenyans are there. And they 
believe that we will do justice to their cause.1162 
 
 Beyond the potential interests of the RECs are interests of the rest of the international 
community. For example, again with respect to South Sudan, the:  
Americans are the ones who decided this should go to Addis [Ababa]. We’d 
organised to do it here [in Kenya]. There are always external interests.1163  
 
We lack the wherewithal to make sure what we’re talking about we’re able to 
implement without external assistance. The moment external assistance comes in, 
talking about conditionalities, whether subtle or direct.1164  
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Who pays the piper calls the tune. IGAD cannot support itself. It depend[s] on 
handouts from other people. The Troika, the IGAD partners’ forum, the Chinese. 
They call the tune.1165 
 
 Then there are challenges posed by parties to the conflict themselves. In some conflict 
situations, the parties do not have clearly defined interests amenable to being negotiated through 
mediation. In South Sudan, for example: 
The CPA negotiations were about ideology. In the CPA, they understood what they 
wanted. The others wanted to block as much as possible. The current situation is 
different. Dealing with people whose capacity is under question on both sides. They 
don’t know what they want. The government wants to hang onto power by whatever 
threats that exist. The opposition doesn’t know what it wants. Just wants to be part 
of government. When we started these negotiations, they were saying [South 
Sudanese President] Salva [Kiir] must leave. There’s no constitutional way of 
removing a Head of State other than by elections or overthrowing them, which is 
unconstitutional, using military power. They weren’t able to remove him using 
military power and they’re waiting for his time to run out. He’s being clever. He’s 
going to use parliament to extend his life. I don’t know where we’ve going.1166 
 
In other conflict situations, there are parties who’ve learnt how to effectively ‘flip the 
script’ by framing their resistance to the intervention itself, to the nature of the intervention or to 
its content—particularly as concerns accountability—in terms of a new and populist supposed anti-
imperialism. In Kenya, for example, the PNU was initially taken aback by the AU’s response as:  
They hadn’t focused on [the AU]. They didn’t take it seriously. They didn’t 
understand the process. [But] after that first triumph [at/by the AU], they learnt the 
lesson, got smart people to help them and flipped the script. Kenya instrumentalised 
the AU. [But] their so-called ‘pan-Africanism’ has no lasting quality, [it’s] 
instrumental and a chip on the shoulder.1167 
 
What this new framing of resistance to intervention, its nature and its content draws upon is, 
unfortunately, legitimate critique within the African academy of external interventions and the 
recent shift from notions of state responsibility to individual criminal responsibility as concerns 
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accountability for gross and systemic human rights violations and breaches of international 
humanitarian law: 
The [African] Left doesn’t have any respect for the West as an answer or answers 
that borrow anything from the West. Take, for instance, Mamdani’s views on 
Kenya and the ICC. He was categorical the ICC was a bad thing for Kenya. Bayo 
himself thought good [Uhuru was] mobilising against the ICC. His argument was 
that the mobilisation against the West was a good thing, to tame it. The left is happy 
that, for the first time, Africa can call the shots on the international arena and be 
listened too. Some happy China’s in place now to teach the West a lesson. But a 
lesson to what end is important.1168 
 
This sort of instrumentalisation of the AU and denial of domestic demands for accountability have 
negative impacts on domestic constituencies’ belief that the AU can and will deliver ‘African 
solutions for African problems’: 
It lacks traction at the grassroots. Deep inside, they feel the brotherhood, the 
sisterhood. But they are also aware their political leadership is cynically exploiting 
that sentiment, they have used that since independence to entrench themselves in 
power. Those championing this are those whose backs are against the wall at home. 
People have refused to buy into it. The population is cynical. People don’t believe—
not because the concept is bad but because it has been exploited shamelessly for 
the political leadership to entrench itself in power.1169 
 
 Yet, as seen in Kenya, domestic constituencies are an invisibilised but necessary part of 
the success of any AU intervention. They lay the ground for the intervention, provide pressure for 
an intervention to happen, substantive inputs when it does and pressure again for its agreements to 
be accepted. But the capacities of domestic constituencies vary across the continent, meaning that 
this hidden piece is not always able to complete the puzzle: 
It doesn’t work in countries with low levels of literacy. Would not work in Somalia, 
would not work in South Sudan. South Sudanese will not resolve their problems on 
their own. They were telling us: ‘The leaders are the ones who led the people into 
war and their leaders are the ones who’ll lead their people out of the war.’ Those 
leaders couldn’t lead us out of war. Don’t expect civil society in South Sudan to. 
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South Sudanese civil society are the weakest link. It’s not developed. It’s part of 
government.1170 
 
 Most importantly, however, are challenges that arise from what is the core of the mediation 
agreements, the political settlement. That this continues to be the core of the mediation agreements 
is not inevitable given the flexibility the mediators have:  
The mediation team, when deployed, what are options on the table? Don’t think 
about textual interpretation. Politically practical.1171  
 
But accommodation in some sort of power-sharing arrangement has become almost formulaic even 
where it has no contextual basis, as in South Sudan: 
Power-sharing has no basis in South Sudan. [Kenya]’s had a basis, a contested 
election. This is a removal from office of some people. But also about power. And 
power is control of resources. We haven’t succeeded in de-linking political power 
with control of resources.1172 
 
If one looks at Zimbabwe, after Kenya, a similar model. Initial proposal on how to 
address crises in Libya and Cote d’Ivoire [were also] linked to power-sharing. 
Linked to how it worked in Kenya and how was seen as an effective model for 
crisis-management in the continent. In discourse on R2P, always say that Kenya is 
a classic example because of its preventive nature. The success tied to the peace 
agreement, the preventive aspect and how used as a cascade to similar crises.1173 
 
[Power-sharing] may become a popular template that creates a problem to have a 
working arrangement like in Zimbabwe, Kenya, now Burundi, Ivory Coast.1174 
 
 The first problem is that power-sharing undermines democratic principles and the notion 
of fair electoral competition:  
Power-sharing [is] becoming a problem to the AU as undermining the Charter on 
Democracy[, Elections and Governance.1175  
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Power sharing is a postponement of the crisis. Democracy itself is power-sharing. 
But where you name it power-sharing because there is no decisive victor and people 
agree to disagree, it’s shaky. Sooner or later, going to collapse. Long-term, it’s not 
a solution.1176 
 
Although contestation of electoral processes and outcomes is valid more often than not, as 
in Kenya, the danger is that the trend towards power-sharing does not address the difficulties of 
dealing with unfair electoral processes and outcomes. Kenya, for example, was: 
For everybody, a five-year project that ended with the elections. In 2013, when 
allegations of electoral fraud came up without widespread violence, feeling that 
Kenya had been fixed, had had a peaceful election. Whether free and fair, that 
wasn’t the question. Donors all over the place and not a single one had proper 
evidence about electoral fraud. That was success, from a violent election to a non-
violent election and, at that point, not interested in hearing about election fraud.1177 
 
What [the AU] hasn’t done consistently, due to capacity and self-interest, is 
consistently and systematically look into democratic practices within countries. So 
long as countries have had elections, any kind of elections, too complicated for the 
AU to get into the quality of elections. That’s the problem the AU has to address 
and the push for it to do so is not strong enough right now as panders to wishes of 
Presidents so no clear way of making progress on it.1178 
 
 What this does is incentivise violent electoral contestation: 
When have a customary practice of power-sharing, find the opposition wants to 
attract the international community even if it knows, reasonably, it’s not going to 
win. Listened to opposition leader in Uganda and what’s being said by the EU EOM 
about its doubts and rigging of elections. Don’t discount that. But would you have 
honestly felt Museveni would have lost? Impossible. If one looks at the role he 
plays in the region and the support he gets from the international community. It has 
to be a context-driven if power-sharing is contemplated as it is not part of our legal 
instruments and have to be careful in terms of practice so that the opposition doesn’t 
create artificial violence to ensure that the international community creates the 
same.1179 
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 The second problem is that the focus on power-sharing can mean that the mediation process 
doesn’t provide sufficient attention to the proximate and structural causes of conflict: 
Looking at peace settlements of different kinds, asking whether a difference where 
people made own peace in own way and where peace imposed externally, whether 
regionally or internationally. [First] when violence ended on the battle field [as in] 
Rwanda and Ethiopia. [Second] where there was external intervention, the UN 
came in, the AU came in, devoted a billion a year for peace operations, 15,000 to 
17,000 troops [as in] Sierra Leone, DRC, Cote d’Ivoire. Third, almost hybrid [as 
in] Kenya. Which forms of political settlement have demonstrated the potential for 
sustained peace? What features separate one form of peace settlement from [the] 
other[s]? forms. If turn to Kenya, Rwanda, an eerily stable peace and yet victor’s 
justice prevails. To what extent did they return to conversations that led to war to 
settle things? Same for Ethiopia. To what extent is [peace] a foregone conclusion, 
seeing the conflicts now in Ethiopia? Victor’s justice does not settle the issue 
permanently. If you look at Cote d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone, had massive 
investments, occurred when the UN was critiquing its own work: ‘Why do we keep 
returning to the same places and can’t make lasting peace?’ That was the first time 
there [were] elections as an exit strategy, field missions without troops, a focus on 
peacebuilding and peace-consolidation. Yet did not return to substantial 
conversations. When look at Sierra Leone today, peace was consolidated but 
negative peace. Likewise in Cote d’Ivoire. 
[Yet] when looking at massive violence, fixated on ending violence as end 
in itself. Negative peace, the absence of violence, dominates the template. The idea 
that we can have stable peace through positive peace or social justice is always 
window-dressing. The UN has disaster responses, does the same things, scratches 
the surface of what happens.1180 
 
[Power-sharing] may slow down progression towards a lasting constitutional 
settlement. In Kenya, if we [the opposition]’d stayed out of government, a more 
lasting solution may have been found, not in 41 days but within a year or two years. 
The problem may be deeper than resolving the problem of political players. Where 
there are deep and historical conflicts and hostilities, sharing of power may be a 
postponement of those problems. A reactionary regime can use sharing of power as 
a temporary respite and emerge out of those difficulties. They can always pay the 
price to fight, engage, disengage and it becomes a perpetual cycle. Which Kenya 
may turn out to be [in] if things go on the way they’re going.1181 
 
The rise and fall of violence across time [is like] a bell curve, where have no 
attention to resolving issues as haven’t manifested themselves, then escalate to a 
crisis at top of curve and depending on how resolved, de-escalate. Mediation 
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responds to moments of crisis and doesn’t usually address itself to latency, root 
causes.1182 
 
 The focus on power-sharing also lends itself, in the medium and long term, if not in the 
short term, to the sacrificing of accountability. In Kenya, for example: 
The first hole is justice. All this started with the killing of people. Up to now, don’t 
know who killed them and IDPs are in limbo. In a society without justice, people 
deliver justice themselves. Can disrupt the country. All these negotiations have not 
allowed justice to be done. In all cases, Zimbabwe, Cote d’Ivoire, victors’ justice. 
Up to now, Africa doesn’t know what to do with massacres. Despite the Charter. 
Article 58 of the Protocol on the PSC. Still have long way to go to believe people 
have to pay for massacres.1183 
 
Justice was part of the agreement, that there’d be redress for the victims, guarantees 
of it not happening again. That’s what said, don’t know how much that’s been 
pursued, not fully pursued. People were horrified by what happened and don’t want 
to see a relapse. Therefore, even if what should’ve been done has not been done, 
people would rather not see conflict again by having to push for redress. Don’t want 
to open wounds.1184 
 
The sequencing now commonplace but proven ineffective—peace before justice—
arguably needs to be reversed: 
In the short-term, [power-sharing] calms things down. Cannot use the South 
African example. In South Africa, had one party come to power with an 
overwhelming majority. Not where the vote is split down the middle and we’re 
asking those with 51 per cent victory to oversee justice and reconciliation. 
Sequencing needs to be looked at critically. What comes first? Elections before 
justice and reconciliation or vice versa? Justice and reconciliation should precede 
power-sharing, elections. [Not] rush to elections and leave justice and 
reconciliation to the victor when the victor’s a party to the conflict. If you want 
justice and reconciliation, then go into elections not as a contest of yesterday’s 
armed groups but political entities, having resolved issues that brought about war. 
Otherwise, only pushing the country back to the pre-conflict period.1185 
 
The focus on power-sharing in that sense is not sustainable: 
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While have seen progress in terms of immediate crisis-management, not sure 
whether, in the next eight to ten years, there won’t be reversal of those gains. That 
timeline as coincides with political transition and, when have political transition, 
there’s always the potential for crises. That tells a story. That we need to invest in 
long-term durable solutions rather than short-term ad hoc solutions to simply 
stabilise situations. Our entire architecture is driven more by stabilisation than by 
change.1186 
 
Why is it that countries in post-conflict situations are relapsing? What is it we’re 
doing right, what is it we’re doing wrong? Has to do with the way we do business, 
always looking for quick fixes. A political problem, so a political settlement. Not 
enough security, so peacekeepers. After, costing too much, so need an exit strategy. 
What’s an exit strategy? An election. But an election creates winners and losers and 
that’s why there are relapses. The sequencing should be reversed, need the politics 
last.1187 
 
 The problem of relapse relates too to the duration of the intervention beyond the political 
settlement: 
 
People, organisations, run to help parties in conflict make peace. After that, 
implementation is left up to the parties and they don’t have the commitment to 
continue. That’s why you have conflicts that linger or there’s a relapse. Good that 
it hasn’t relapsed in Kenya with same velocity.1188 
 
 What all of these challenges have forced, despite the AU’s intention to work on preventive 
diplomacy, is an increasingly militarised response to conflicts in Africa, which poses even more 
challenges: 
What we’re doing in Somalia, with Boko Haram, the Lord’s Resistance Army 
(LRA) do[es] not address the root causes. Trying to degrade al Shabaab. Kill or 
capture [Joseph] Kony. Eliminate Boko Haram. Do[es] not address root causes that 
are driven by political economy of those countries. Difficult for us to continue not 
to have precarious peace on the continent.1189 
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Growing militarisation of the APSA response to crises on the continent. In last five 
years, have deployed more than 100,000 uniformed personnel and 500 civilians. 
The amount spent in Somalia, in-kind and direct, exceeds a billion dollars. 
Prioritising deployment of forces on the ground is not only expensive but makes us 
divest efforts from trying to improve conflict prevention.1190 
 
 
6.10 African solutions? 
The assessment of the AU’s intervention in Kenya and how that has informed continually evolving 
practice with respect to more recent AU interventions provides the opportunity also to assess the 
notion of ‘African solutions for African problems’. Behind this idea are impulses and motivations 
about self-determination that are both reactive and proactive. 
Reactively, the notion was initially:  
 
A reaction to Western countries not only choosing when to engage and when not to 
engage but also how to engage. Many African countries felt not taking into 
consideration African concerns.1191 
 
Where does this come from and in whose interest was it authored? African solutions 
have to be premised on pan-Africanism from [Kwame] Nkrumah, but also well and 
alive before him in the Diaspora. Some have added another notion of African 
renaissance. It comes from the outside trying to hide external interventions in Africa 
behind the veil.1192 
 
This is especially so given the failure to respond to African calls for reform of the UN 
Security Council: 
You have the first generation of African leaders, [Zimbabwean President Robert] 
Mugabe and company, still calling that Africa must have at least two permanent 
seats on the UN Security Council. It is for Africa to be the pen-holder on African 
matters instead of the UK, France.1193 
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It’s saying: ‘Let’s implement Chapter 8 [of the UN Charter]. Let us try first. Give 
them [Africans] the mandate and let them try. If we have complications, then will 
call. This is often misunderstood. Because of the perceptions outsiders have of 
Africans’ ability to handle our own issues. They say: ‘We cannot trust them 
[Africans], they’ll do nothing.’ The question is the stereotyping of Africans as 
incapable. There’s a basic wisdom in Chapter 8. The UN doesn’t lose anything.1194 
 
The whole concept’s about ownership. Can see where Africa’s coming from, a 
feeling of subjugation among some of the African elite. It is born out of a frustration 
with the West, who’s imposed its will. The concept of subsidiarity is at risk. If 
there’s a problem, Africa should have the first shot. The UN shouldn’t come in 
unless Africa exhausts its means. The whole concept of Chapter 8 of the UN 
Charter, ownership of regional organisations without the use of force. Going 
beyond abstaining from use of force.1195 
 
‘African solutions to African problems’ is a [resurgence] of anti-colonial 
sentiments still pervasive in Africa, particularly in the remainder of the first 
generation of freedom fighters, like Mugabe, and entrenched in liberation 
movements in South Africa, Namibia, Algeria that used armed struggle. Today, it 
is taking the form of anti-neo-colonialism on one hand and, on the other, the 
assertion of sovereignty. In this lies the contradiction, because pioneers of the anti-
colonial struggle saw sovereignty through the prism of a continent-wide agenda, 
not those of individual states. That was the dividing line, the Casablanca and 
Monrovia groups. At the centre was the sovereignty of the African continent, not 
African states. Today, it’s a lot of words and not a lot of substance because ruling 
elites are entrenched in what they can get in micro-states rather than the continental 
agenda. 
Then there are the examples. Libya, where ‘African solutions’ were swept 
aside by Western powers, then they went it alone. Africa is still bitter about the way 
[former Libyan President Muammar] Gaddafi was removed ignoring the African 
position. Some of us still believe Gaddafi was not removed because he was a brutal 
dictator suppressing his people but because he was carrying a dangerous message 
about turning the AU Commission into an Authority and putting his money where 
his mouth was.1196 
 
An evolution of the idea of ‘African solutions’ from the postcolonial period to now, 
five decades later. From the OAU because of shared history, shared experiences, 
the pursuit of African liberation, seeking freedom from European domination. But 
divorce came right after. Colonialism and the two publics: the civic public and the 
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primordial public. The primordial public was moral and connected to the private 
realm. The civic public was amoral and disconnected from the private realm. The 
elite never [had] a conversation about this and move[d] to a new contract. Went to 
the primordial public to seek validation for themselves. The OAU became a club of 
many dictators internally suppressing their people yet sitting at the table 
representing them. 
The Cold War ended and Africans realised we were on our own. The OAU 
Charter couldn’t be sustained on the basis of non-intervention. Turnaround in the 
1990s. The Constitutive Act a function of different leadership, no more than six 
Presidents, who had the idea we should begin to re-structure conversations, 
amongst Africans, but also between Africans and externals. The new AU, NEPAD, 
the PSC Protocol and Architecture, new. A normative framework that altered the 
Charters of different regional institutions radically. Starting with ECOWAS. In 
1993, a new treaty that said can go into a neighbour’s country and rescue people 
because of Liberia and Sierra Leone. 
The international [community] is not the best place to do this. They’ll never 
be part of it completely. The UN won’t have a lot in common with the locals. If not 
violence, doesn’t matter.1197 
 
 There are, however, contradictions to the manner in which this self-determination is being 
sought: 
Africa’s not saying leave our problems to us. If so, wouldn’t have come up with the 
NEPAD. NEPAD is Africa going to the Group of 7 (G7) saying we want to become 
a power to challenge your dominance and we’re coming to partner with you to make 
sure it works. Mix human rights, democracy, governance and give the powers you 
want to challenge the stick to beat you. A neo-colonial project if you compare it to 
the Lagos Plan of Action which was more Afrocentric. The Lagos Plan of Action 
was looking at how Africa could mobilise continental resources to develop, 
independent of outside forces. NEPAD a proposal to the outside world to have 
outside world help Africa rival it.1198 
 
Regardless of those contradictions, proactively the notion has increasingly: 
Meant not only to utilise the knowledge, understanding, that neighbouring countries 
have in trying to understand and resolve causes of conflict. Better understanding, 
closer knowledge of conflicts next door by those culturally, in terms of geography. 
But also that Africa must be first in line in resolving its own problems. Doesn’t 
mean Africa has nothing to learn from the rest of the world, the good, the bad. 
We’re part of this globe, we learn from each other, we gain from experiences 
elsewhere. Knowledge of the culture, the societies, the forces in conflict, comes 
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into play when designing, approaching solutions. Not just in Africa, 
everywhere.1199 
 
They are our neighbours. Whatever happens affects us immediately. We know them 
better. When the neighbour’s house burns, can’t call 911 which doesn’t exist in 
Africa, we have to run with our buckets of water.1200 
 
This knowledge and understanding is assumed to come from the use of African 
personalities and institutions in AU interventions and to result in greater acceptance of, legitimacy 
for and ownership of these interventions: 
What are we trying to do now? Recognise the importance of African experience, 
African personalities, African institutions without losing sight of fact there are 
tested methods, generalities, applicable anywhere. Africans seen as important to 
give an African character, better understanding, better empathy, better acceptance 
by those in conflict.1201 
 
When have these Heads of State going to Bujumbura, Nkurunziza will listen to 
them more than Ban Ki Moon.1202 
 
Something about Kaunda in the room that would make Kibaki behave. Would be 
different if had a Japanese, an American. This is purely cultural. A bunch of African 
elders has a different thing to it than a bunch of mzungus. Particularly when dealing 
with that kind of emotive [issue]. The peer thing. They are likely to understand their 
peers better, they can put themselves in their shoes: ‘If I was in their shoes, what 
would I accept?’ Something to be said to be done by Africans. Especially now as 
building a critical mass of African statesmen and distinguished Africans from 
African institutions, [former head of the African Development Bank, AfDB] 
Donald Kaberuka, a critical mass. The tendency of things to get lost in translation. 
Even when occurs, the tolerance is higher as can throw in a couple of Bantu 
proverbs and gloss over things. An international norm process, but run by Africans. 
The label is helpful. ‘African’ has more political resonance than ‘global’. Some 
sense of responsibility. Ownership. Have to make it work. More pressure to deliver. 
‘International’: don’t have to make it work, can blame other people.1203 
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 With that in mind, some of the institutions and mechanisms under the APSA have 
consciously been designed in a manner that essentially re-imagines and re-invents ‘tradition’, 
including on accountability: 
Africa has got a rich mosaic of traditional practices in conflict resolution and these 
have to be instrumentalised today. The symbol of womanhood, the symbol of the 
elder. Consultation, consensus-building, peer pressure, peer influence and the use 
of traditional approaches. The military is the last resort. That is the software Africa 
is propagating.1204 
 
Remember the days of Nyerere and then [former South African President Nelson] 
Mandela in Burundi. At point when involved, not Presidents in their respective 
countries, not sponsored by the AU. Representing themselves, seen as guys who 
could walk into a room and get people talking. The model of a single Eminent 
Person presenting themselves as an Elder, using that authority, rather than an 
institutional base. Would be an African approach.1205 
 
‘African solutions?’ Africans have tried to adapt institutions, including through 
using traditions. Culture plays a role. For example, the Panel of the Wise, including 
within the regions. [The] ECOWAS, [the] SADC, all have Panels of the Wise. That 
wasn’t there in Katanga and Biafra.1206 
 
This is African, when we sit under the tree, everybody including the ignorant are 
allowed to say what they want to say. You don’t reject them, you’re trying to build 
a consensus, so at the end of the day, everybody says, ‘yes’.1207 
 
The approach, how we do business. Africans, we talk to each other: ‘My brother, 
my sister’, that’s an African way of doing things: ‘I feel your pain’.1208 
 
In the [Eritrean] society I come from, if somebody killed somebody, the father of 
the murderer would come to the bereaved’s family with a big stone on his neck, 
bow down, say: ‘Remove the stone and kill me.’ It was an expression of remorse, 
a way of saying: ‘I’m sorry’. The father was never killed. Compensation was agreed 
upon, unfortunately usually in the form of a girl, to have the two families intermarry 
and leave it behind them. That’s a bigger atonement than money. 
We have something to offer. Reconciliation is an African contribution, 
dating back to South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). 
Would’ve been difficult to resolve through legal means only. Now, there are new 
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Truth Commissions everywhere. Reconciliation is an important element of 
peacemaking. It’s impossible to redress through punishment alone. That’s not 
justice unless it’s perceived as such by the victims. [Former Chadian President 
Hissen] Habre, being tried 15 years after, far away. The ICC. We need it more. But 
the way it’s pursued, with trial way away in The Hague and victims don’t know 
what’s going on. Africa has healing as well as justice.1209 
 
Rwanda and the Gacaca system. Much as it has weaknesses, a solution to problems 
in that country. Mato Oput in northern Uganda to address problems linked to the 
LRA atrocities.1210 
 
 Other than the use of African personalities and institutions, including those drawing on and 
re-inventing African ‘tradition’, three things distinguish an ‘African solution’. The first of these is 
speed. In part, this means being able to deploy relatively quickly: 
Even the problems we’re having in Burundi, if the AU had moved fast, as they did 
in Kenya, Burundi would be quiet. The way they moved into Mali, it was fast. If 
the AU can do it the way they did to Kenya, Mali and what’s happening now in 
Burundi, would be in a better position as a continent.1211 
 
Yet, the speed of an ‘African’ approach also means being willing to take the time that an 
intervention needs to succeed, as in Kenya but also in the Sudan: 
The Thabo Mbeki Panel demonstrated ‘Africanness’ in the Sudan by saying: ‘Not 
going in quickly to mediate this crisis. Going to take all the time have in the world. 
To understand it. To build trust and trust-building takes a long time.’ The UN 
approach is blinkered when comes to things like that, there’s no money to invest in 
long processes of trust-building.1212 
 
 Second, when preventive diplomacy fails, the AU is more prepared for peace-enforcement 
rather than peacekeeping alone: 
The Constitutive Act and the normative embedding of the idea of the protection of 
people and non-indifference. ‘African’ idea. The readiness to intervene and use 
force is an African approach. African interventions do not shy away from the use 
of force if they have to. They abandon neutrality to rescue people. ECOMOG [The 
Economic Community of West African States’ Monitoring Group] in Liberia, 
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ECOMOG in Sierra Leone, ECOMICI [The Economic Community of West 
African States’ Mission in Cote d’Ivoire] in Cote d’Ivoire. The AU trying to 
respond to Darfur. Something ‘African’ in the idea of intervention, that compelled 
the UN to change its own approach. A uniquely African contribution to the global 
UN architecture. 
Different than the UN Charter. Because of the principle of non-intervention, 
at end of the Cold War, with all these crises happening, the UN was ineffective. 
The UN has had to rely on regional actors to do that. A scramble for UN credibility 
through the idea of joint, hybrid, re-hatted missions. Africans go in and, when 
stabilised, the UN comes in. The UN needs troop-contributing countries, Africans 
plenty among them.1213 
 
On Burundi, people are saying, ‘Why not deploy the force?’ The Heads of State 
considered it and said that if deployed without consent, people will die. Nkurunziza 
would go for the people first, not the force. What if he shoots our planes in the air? 
They knew that when dealing with a madman with a knife at his throat, when you 
advance, he can kill himself. They gave him some rope and will secure more that 
way. That’s an African way.1214  
 
The approach used is different in the sense that when a UN peacekeeping mission 
is deployed, even if with a protection of civilians mandate, it’s more or less 
military.1215 
 
 Third and perhaps most importantly is whether the intervention both draws upon and 
enables resolution to be found based on the wishes of the population in question: 
Kenyans resolved their problem. We didn’t discriminate against anybody coming 
in with ideas but eventually people were tasked according to their experience and 
knowledge. Everybody brought in something. Kenyans themselves coming 
together, saying we’ve reached the precipice and we want to go back. On both sides 
of the divide, everybody wanted a solution.1216 
 
Have more and more think-tanks, universities, Africans themselves critical of their 
own societies. They have an influence and actions are taken from the same. People 
taking own responsibility rather than people telling them what to do. Not just about 
democracy, but unconstitutional changes of government. For example, in Egypt, 
can’t say an uprising. When [Burkinabe President Blaise Compaore] decided to go 
for a third term, people started demonstrating every day. The regional Heads of 
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State said can’t be silent. Many examples where populations force leadership to 
take responsibility. Those also lead to ‘African solutions’.1217 
 
The dominant narrative and approach, the liberal peace, the building of a particular 
kind of state, in the absence of own internal narrative, rarely produce results. 
Without re-visiting internal narratives [about] what led us to violence, cannot build 
stable peace. At centre of national conversation, always identity questions, 
ethnicity. One question [is] to what extent [peace] settlement returned to issues that 
pre-dated the conflict? At the start, Kenya got it right in terms of what looking at. 
That’s an African approach, having that conversation.1218 
 
 But the objectives and the model of the intervention are universal: 
It was an ‘African solution’ in the sense that the AU acted quickly, gave us the 
mandate and designated the Panel without waiting for the UN. Took initiative to 
resolve the problem. When it comes to the agreement reached, was it strictly 
African, can it be replicated, had it been done elsewhere? Can be seen as broad and 
has happened in other parts of the world. Sat and talked for six weeks, then they 
continued for some time and that’s ‘African’. But, in any situation, have to talk, 
whether in Syria or the DRC.1219 
 
What is an ‘African solution’? What’s the ‘African-ness’ of the solution? If you 
look at Kenya, sponsored by the AU, with support by the UN, what was ‘African’ 
about it? Was it Kofi Annan? Was it the other regionals involved in it? Was there 
an African theory, a theory of the ‘African-ness’ of this thing? When think about 
the KNDR, it functioned within the realms of what would be mediation anywhere 
in the world. [It was] under the AU [but the] resources, technical support not from 
the AU. Is there a theory about the African-ness of the solutions we’re talking 
about?1220 
 
Unfortunately for us, international defaults to Western. Once that happens, get 
historical baggage. The African thing removes those dynamics. We must not 
underestimate the fact that being done by Africans. [But] why should an ‘African 
solution’ to conflict be different from a European solution to the Yugoslavia 
conflict? Ethnic conflict, electoral fraud, not African but universal. Historical 
injustice, human rights abuses, what’s African about those things? Obviously it is 
not African. It is an international thing done by Africans for themselves. Where we 
go wrong, because it’s Africa, has to be some voodoo thing under a tree. [And] 
doesn’t have to be rigorous. 
When people come to structural problems, the mediation is not the script. It 
become[s] indigenised when come to the constitutional outcomes desired, not the 
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mediation agreement. It’s superficial, the whole thing was: ‘Let’s stop hostilities, 
fighting’s not the way to solve these things, you guys come together and solve your 
problems.’ The objective is the handshake and power-sharing. [But] what it does is 
launch processes and those processes are no longer bound by the [mediation] 
framework.1221 
 
 
6.11 A new regression? 
Given the challenges arising from the objectives and model still largely pursued by the AU with 
its interventions—including those arising from political settlements, the risk of loss of focus on 
the proximate and structural causes of conflict, the lack of attention to accountability and the risk 
of relapse—there is reason to believe the AU’s trajectory towards realising its reactive and 
proactive intentions has now diminished, if not reversed. In addition, new conflict risks have 
emerged, including those arising from civil and ‘uncivil’ society’s resistance to the ignoring of 
these challenges. This kind of resistance was not foreseen by the AU’s normative framework, and 
use of its APSA to address them is proving insufficient: 
‘African solutions’ evolved at different times, have entered a new period. The re-
emergence of conflict. Conflict relapse has reared its head in different ways. People 
taking on their governments in untidy ways. Unconstitutional change of 
government. Start barring coups and then ordinary human beings take to the streets 
in Tunisia, then in Cairo. Burkina Faso recently. The AU asking itself how to deal 
with this. When people non-violently arguing against these years of separation of 
the state from the people, don’t feel part of the state. Terror. The Sahel. The Horn. 
Boko Haram, al Shabaab. The local fallouts that confirm these states have not 
worked, are hardly viable. A reversal where the UN’s gone. Burundi. South Sudan, 
where had new state on the basis of the liberal peace and the illiberalism of that 
peace. Incomplete conversations about the ICC: ‘Why only Africans before the 
ICC?’ But justice is needed in African countries. African instruments have been 
called into question. Our normative framework [on] unconstitutional change of 
government is threatened, the APSA is used for terrorists, without looking at the 
social base. Our architecture is challenged. We’ve come full circle. Two steps 
forward, two steps backward. 
Despite evolution over time, it’s falling flat on its face, it’s slipping away. 
Intervening narratives suggest African solutions are pathetic as the UN bears 
primary responsibility for peace and security globally and should be involved and 
                                                          
1221 Interview with Dr David Ndii, economist and member of KPTJ, Nairobi, November 17, 2015. 
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why should Africa do it alone? Africa relegated, side-lined. Just like the UN, we 
run quickly to the low-hanging fruit, start retreating to the military as the default 
solution, become seduced by the UN’s own instruments when dealing with failures 
of the UN itself.1222 
 
 There is also a shift in the collective leadership of the AU, from the leadership that brought 
in the normative and institutional transformations under the Constitutive Act to a leadership that 
saw these transformations as at least practically beneficial to the current leadership, that 
intrumentalises these transformations to its own benefit. This last leadership’s reaction to the 
promise of accountability initially envisaged by the AU’s intervention in Kenya is seen as 
particularly damaging: 
Have to look at AU in older, broader context. South Africa helped: ‘Come on, 
Africa cannot be the backwater it’s always portrayed as and needs to deal with own 
issues like corruption, like elections.’ A Mbeki-type moment, philosopher-
presidents, like 2003, Mbeki, [former Senegalese President Abdoulaye] Wade, 
Kufour. Had AU troops intervening in a muscular way in Sudan because of Darfur 
as didn’t want a genocide on its watch. Same logic re: Somalia. Hissen Habre. 
The Kibaki, Kufour generation were believers in RECs. Boots on the ground 
to protect economies in the region. ASBF to say: ‘Can’t have instability as has 
negative economic outcomes.’ Involvement to protect economic interests. 
That logic is no longer there. Except Museveni and Kagame’s cheeky 
interventions in DRC. The Kenyan case has messed that up. Because people like 
Uhuru went into the AU not with an ideological stance but as a barricade against 
the ICC. We’re the poorer on accountability, especially for violence. The positions 
that African leaders took, subsequent to the peace, weakened the hand of the AU. 
This imperialist, race-hunting conversation that Uhuru began at the AU is 
dangerous. It frightens off everybody who might want to get involved. And says: 
‘If going to get involved, just bring your money and leave us alone.’ A departure 
from R2P. If the AU said it has R2P, it would throw doors open for everybody else. 
The EU, the US, sensitive to being accused of neo-imperialism. So can talk about 
‘African solutions to African problems’ but it’s closing everybody off, cooping in, 
creating a space for impunity. 
A spanner’s been thrown into the works. Continent in contradictory 
situation. Have an AU that’s neither fish nor fowl. Have a hiatus. We’re the poorer 
for it.1223 
 
                                                          
1222 Interview with Professor Funmi Olonisakin, founding Executive Director, the ALC, London, April 11, 2016. 
1223 Interview with Kwamchetsi Makokha, journalist and member of KPTJ, Nairobi, April 23, 2015. 
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 There are, therefore, several issues to be addressed, in order to better and more fully realise 
the promise of ‘African solutions’. The first is to shift the focus from development and enforcement 
of the AU’s peace and security architecture to development and enforcement of the AU’s 
democratic norms and institutions: 
Would appeal to the AU to move fast where there are political problems and change 
the political culture on the continent. See what Kagame has done, Rwandans are 
afraid, should leave instead of amending Constitution to let rule for life. When 
leaders want to disrespect the Constitution, the prime duty of the AU is to intervene 
at the beginning of the problem. It starts by amendments of the rules [of] the game. 
The AU shouldn’t wait, it should be proactive, it should monitor to see which 
country wants to deform the Constitution.1224 
 
Africa has a way to go. The AU can be made more inclusive. As long as African 
Presidents feel they should be allowed to do what they want, as long as former 
radicals like Museveni end up being more conservative than Moi, people like 
Kagame who are smarter than the others. Hard to think of Presidents without 
starting at the bottom. As long as process leading to [current Nigerian President 
Muhammadu] Buhari, to [current Senegalese President Macky] Sall, OK. But if 
process leads to a [current South African President Jacob] Zuma or a Mugabe, need 
to start at the bottom, making African countries more democratic, a sense that 
Presidents not indispensable.1225 
 
Some of the problems? Sovereignty. Second, leadership. Third, citizen 
engagement. Fourth, subsidiarity. Fifth and finally, the state, the extent to which 
the continent is democratising. How are we creating open societies? The extent to 
which the state is controlled and managed but also the space for citizen engagement. 
These factors conspire to constrain the extent to which the Union is able to achieve 
its mandate.1226 
 
 The second issue to address in order to realise the potential of ‘African solutions’ is to use 
the AU’s democratic norms and institutions to foster leadership in line with the same as well to 
challenge the perceived autocracy of the AU leadership: 
Some initiatives not AU per se, driven by particular individuals within the AU. 
With regard to the NEPAD, certain personalities, for example, Mbeki, Obasanjo, 
                                                          
1224 Interview with Francis Atwoli, Secretary-General, COTU, Nairobi, January 12, 2016. 
1225 Interview with Maina Kiai, former Chair, KNCHR, Nairobi, February 4, 2016. 
1226 Interview with Dr Khabele Matlosa, Head, DPA, AU, Nairobi, May 7, 2016. 
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took initiative. [The] AU tends to be driven by personalities, including at the 
Secretariat.1227 
 
A mediation that allowed changes in society. A Constitution. What has changed is 
the normative framework that allows people fighting for their rights to use it. 
Separation of powers between parliament and the presidency. The counties. 
Decentralisation is remarkable. The population feels it’s playing a role. But success 
means boundaries move in terms of conduct of politics. That hasn’t changed. 
Politicians haven’t changed. They’ve just moved their madness to the local 
level.1228 
 
People say the AU is a club of dictators. The AU’s not a people’s organisation, it’s 
a member states’ organisation.1229 
 
 The third issue is to address openly the institutional design problems that arise from the 
principle of subsidiarity in the APSA, including through sharing comparative experiences of the 
RECs: 
Need leadership. Don’t have it. Not nationally. Not regionally. Two, conflicting 
agendas. [On Burundi, for example], definitely the EAC agenda is different from 
that of the AU.1230 
 
In West Africa, always to try to find solutions that are more positive, based on a 
long tradition of interaction, learning from problems of the 1990s. West Africa has 
no work permits from January [2016]. Leaders play a role. ECOWAS was created 
by two military leaders and transformed after. Don’t know why EAC hasn’t learnt. 
Who solved situation in Uganda, Tanzania! That’s no longer happening. That needs 
to be looked at.1231 
 
We have centripetal forces in Africa calling for a united African approach. Difficult 
with the micro-states that we have. Economy of scale is the whole continent of 
Africa, not micro-states coming together. Then have centrifugal forces of the micro-
states pulling apart. In that lies the contradiction of African ownership of African 
problems. As have seen in South Sudan and other places, Africa doesn’t speak with 
one voice. Saw the positions of Uganda and Kenya in South Sudan. Not an African 
position. Their strategic micro-interests were playing out in Juba and other places. 
Not a single African solution. Same in Burundi now. Tension between centripetal 
                                                          
1227 Interview with George Wachira, member of CCP, via Skype, April 28, 2015. 
1228 Interview with Ibrahima Kane, Head, AU Advocacy Programme, OSF, Nairobi, February 1, 2016. 
1229 Interview with Ambassador Frederic Gateretse-Ngoga, Acting Head, Conflict Prevention and Early Warning 
Division, PSD, AU, Addis Ababa, February 24, 2016. 
1230 Interview with Ibrahima Kane, Head, AU Advocacy Programme, OSF, Nairobi, February 1, 2016. 
1231 Interview with Ibrahima Kane, Head, AU Advocacy Programme, OSF, Nairobi, February 1, 2016. 
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and centrifugal forces and interests that go with them. That’s the key challenge 
facing that whole concept.1232 
 
A clash between Chapter 7, requiring endorsement of the UN Security Council and 
Chapter 8, going ahead without any dictate. Africa usually look[s] for an 
endorsement, not because it needs it, but because having the endorsement gives 
legitimacy, because Africa depends on external funding. This is the challenge 
between asserting ownership and imposing ‘African solutions’ without means of 
backing them up. You expose yourself to conditionalities, we saw it in Mali, in the 
CAR.1233 
 
 Fourth, is to address the continued powerlessness engendered by reliance on external 
sources of financing for the AU. This lack of power is seen in the objectives and models of African 
intervention as well as the incapacity to assert consistently the APSA’s supremacy in conflict 
resolution in Africa: 
 
Frankly, we can talk as much as we want about ‘African solutions’ but we need to 
be mindful of the international system. It is not amenable to Africa expressing its 
own system. It would be an incomplete story without an interrogation of the 
international order dominated by powerful actors whose interests by and large are 
to reduce Africa to a sphere of exploitation of natural resources rather than Africa 
becoming an influential player. 
The way we’re dealing with our conflict situations is problematic. We’re 
still pursuing the liberal peace model. These are foreign-imposed, not endogenous, 
don’t have roots in Africa. Why is this the case? We don’t use our own resources. 
We rely on the Western world and their resources come with ideas as 
conditionalities, [their] ideas now rule the world. 
We have what we call the African governance architecture. The same on the 
peace and security side. The development side. Agenda 2063. The challenge 
affecting all architectures is that we can go so far but no further. As you push, 
there’s a limit. Our programme budget is funded by our partners to upwards of 90 
per cent. Frankly, our agenda is not our own.1234 
 
The money’s external, belongs to the EU, the P5, belongs to everybody but 
Africans. We have failed to put money where our mouth is. This is the biggest 
problem with the APSA. Six states contribute 75 per cent of the assessed 
contributions. South Africa, Algeria, Nigeria, Ethiopia, used to be Libya, don’t even 
                                                          
1232 Interview with Dr Abdel Fatou Musah, Director of Political Affairs, UNO to the AU, Addis Ababa, February 23, 
2016. 
1233 Interview with Dr Abdel Fatou Musah, Director of Political Affairs, UNO to the AU, Addis Ababa, February 23, 
2016. 
1234 Interview with Dr Khabele Matlosa, Head, DPA, AU, Nairobi, May 7, 2016. 
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think Egypt anymore, maybe Angola. Just manage to pay the day-to-day costs of 
the institution, staff salaries. But all the lofty peace and security projects, from 
mediation to the use of force, are paid for by outsiders. That’s the shame of the 
continent. Remember who paid for Kofi Annan? When Libya was being bombed, 
allowed NATO to decide the fate of Libya. Wrote to the EU to ask for 320,000 
Euros because needed to travel to Libya to talk to Gaddafi. Of course, the EU said: 
‘No’ because taking its own position and warned, if take one more step, cannot 
guarantee safety as will be bombed out of existence. 
The disconnect between ruling elites and their societies. Self-interests, 
group interests, first. Peacekeeping resources also include the ability to maintain 
their regimes in power. Costs money to maintain a military. If look at what gets 
funded in the APSA, it is the ASBF, yet has never been operational, used to 
maintain national armies. The Peace Fund has the least. The Panel of the Wise has 
the least. That money needs to go where the mouth is.1235 
 
If you’re going to propagate [‘African solutions’] but do not have the means to 
implement [them], what then? That’s what happened in Libya. Nobody prevented 
Africa from asserting its solutions in Libya. The truth of the matter is that Africa 
did not have the means to impose its will. If you don’t have an army, a military, 
you can shout and nobody’s going to listen to you.1236 
 
People think donors play a role. Not invalid, but less than before.1237 
 
 There are numerous proposals on the table on decreasing the AU’s financial dependence 
on the West, concerning both internal resource-mobilisation and the diversification of sources of 
external financing. The resolution from the June 2016 Summit adopting Kaberuka’s proposal on a 
tax on all imports into Africa needs to be pursued: 
Trying to increase the internal mobilisation of resources. In June [2015], at the 
Johannesburg Summit, Africa [determined]—based on Agenda 2063 adopted at the 
50th anniversary—to make sure that, by 2020, Africa’s able to fund 100 per cent of 
its operational budget, 75 per cent of programmes and 25 per cent of peace 
operations. Intended to reduce dependence and avoid conditionalities. Today, 
external sources fund 80 per cent of its budget. The Obasanjo report on alternative 
sources of funding for the AU. Options. Taxing hospitality. Taxing oil producers. 
All options he came up with are facing opposition. [The] last Summit appointed 
Kaberuka and his Terms of Reference are on alternative sources of funding.1238 
                                                          
1235 Interview with Professor Funmi Olonisakin, founding Executive Director, the ALC, London, April 11, 2016.i 
1236 Interview with Dr Abdel Fatou Musah, Director of Political Affairs, UNO to the AU, Addis Ababa, February 23, 
2016. 
1237 Interview with Ibrahima Kane, Head, AU Advocacy Programme, OSF, Nairobi, February 1, 2016. 
1238 Interview with Dr Abdel Fatou Musah, Director of Political Affairs, UNO to the AU, Addis Ababa, February 23, 
2016. 
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Obasanjo was commissioned by the Union to work out alternative sources of 
funding. We are yet to see results from that but we need our budget to come from 
the Union. Want operational 100 per cent, programme 75 per cent and peace 25 per 
cent.1239 
 
Look into Obasanjo’s panel on alternative funding, the people who argue most 
ferociously against it, mostly outsiders.1240 
 
The other is diversifying its partnerships. Africa/China, Africa/India, 
Africa/Middle East. To differentiate between those who’ve subjugated Africa from 
the colonial period on [and those] who don’t put conditions on partnerships with 
Africa. Is it sufficient? Don’t think so because no matter what China, India are 
doing, their primary drive is for markets. Cannot depend on outside forces for own 
development.1241 
 
 The fifth and final issue to address is to move with more alacrity towards continental 
integration: 
Why it is the countries approaching a minimum economy of scale are the most 
conflict-racked? Many countries at war today are the same countries at war during 
independence. The Congo. The Sudan. Somalia’s been at war since independence. 
Algeria. Egypt. Nigeria. Countries with promise, the human and material resources 
[to] serve as engine[s] of growth for the continent. Size matters. If won’t allow 
bigger countries to live in peace, you think will allow Africa to become one 
continent? 
It’s difficult to talk about one Africa today, with one approach. Except when 
the AU tries to channel a common position. But not common to Africans, just its 
leadership. Don’t see how soon we can realise the critical mass to develop a 
continental vision. 
If lose integration, difficult to implement ‘African solutions’. The most 
viable option is to bring about greater political and economic integration, backed 
by the will of the people. Is it possible? Yes. It is difficult? Yes. Because people 
like being big fish in small ponds. The faultlines at independence still manifest 
today, centripetal and centrifugal forces, being capitalised on at every turn and 
that’s going to continue until realise cannot go it alone. The whole drive from the 
OAU to the AU was this. That was a key, to have an integrated continent. 
Vulgarised, bastardised. The local accomplices still at play. The British, the French. 
                                                          
1239 Interview with Dr Khabele Matlosa, Head, DPA, AU, Nairobi, May 7, 2016. 
1240 Interview with Professor Funmi Olonisakin, founding Executive Director, the ALC, London, April 11, 2016. 
1241 Interview with Dr Abdel Fatou Musah, Director of Political Affairs, UNO to the AU, Addis Ababa, February 23, 
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That’s going to continue until Africa realises the stupidity of doing business as it 
does now.1242 
 
In conclusion, this chapter has explored and problematised the notion of ‘African 
solutions for African problems’. It has shown the different ways in which the AU’s 
intervention in Kenya’s electoral conflict of 2007-8 is understood as being an ‘African 
solution’ (or not). It has also explained the factors that lead, in practice, to a decision by 
the AU to intervene as well as the factors that ensure a member state agrees to such an 
intervention. It has outlined the objectives, model and advantages of such interventions and 
surfaced determinants of an intervention’s ‘success’ (or not) as well as measures of such 
‘success’. Finally, it also explored the evolving relationship between the AU and the UN 
as concerns conflict resolution in Africa.  
                                                          
1242 Interview with Dr Abdel Fatou Musah, Director of Political Affairs, UNO to the AU, Addis Ababa, February 23, 
2016. 
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7. Conclusion 
This chapter contains the conclusions of this thesis, referencing back to the original research 
questions and their hypotheses. It summarises the conditions under which supranational 
institutions decide to intervene and what provides leverage for such interventions—the key two 
conclusions here being the importance of a domestic base to legitimise and give real meaning to 
an external intervention, and the importance of domestic and international actors for regional 
actors’ interventions to both occur and ‘succeed’. In addition, this chapter critically analyses the 
nature and medium-to-long-term consequences of such interventions, noting that political 
settlements inevitably mitigate against addressing—in full—the proximate and structural causes 
of a(n electoral) conflict and accountability. It therefore challenges the notion of any ‘African 
solutions’ that continue to be predicated on political settlements. 
Taking the AU’s intervention in Kenya’s 2007-8 electoral conflict as a case study, the key 
or primary research questions had to do with determining the conditions under which 
supranational institutions intervene in member states, thereby limiting sovereignty, in order to 
realise their normative commitments, critically examining the nature and consequences of such 
interventions. Additional research questions had to do with determining what provides leverage 
in respect of such interventions. The hypothesis was that it was the combination of regional with 
international and domestic pressures that ensured the ‘success’ of the AU’s intervention through 
mediation. 
The secondary set of research questions had to do with critically examining the meaning 
of ‘African solutions for African problems’, as well as the intended and unintended impacts of the 
same. The hypothesis here was that, consonant with predictions of the ‘liberal peace’, the political 
settlement in the form of power-sharing itself, in the medium-to-long term, contributed to 
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undermining implementation of the KNDR agreements with respect to addressing proximate and 
structural causes of the violence—undermining democratic consolidation and mitigating against 
accountability. 
 
7.1 Conditions under which supranational institutions intervene in member states 
The allowances of the AU’s Constitutive Act—specifically those enabling AU intervention in a 
member state to pre-empt or end the commission of the international crimes of crimes against 
humanity, genocide and war crimes—have proven to provide a robust normative foundation for 
such intervention. 
 That said, these normative allowances alone did not explain the AU’s intervention through 
mediation in Kenya’s 2007-8 electoral conflict. A first additional—and critical, if not decisive—
factor was the AU’s political leadership at the time. That political leadership was still concerned 
about demonstrating the efficacy of those normative allowances—and addressing criticism of them 
(for example, with respect to the AU and Zimbabwe). The AU’s political leadership at the time 
also had the confidence of both sides of the political divide. A lack of confidence in the non-
partisanship of the EAC’s political leadership at the time also explains why the EAC effort to 
engage gained no traction, despite the EAC being the institutionally responsible REC under the 
subsidiarity on which the APSA is based. 
 A second set of additional—and equally critical—factors had to do with strategic 
considerations. The implications of Kenya’s deterioration were not just internal—they were sub-
regional (with, for example, transit trade to the hinterland being immediately affected by the 
nature, speed and spread of the post-elections violence). This catalysed sub-regional pressure for 
the AU, if not the EAC, to act decisively. Similarly, Kenya is of geopolitical importance to the rest 
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of the world, being, for example, an erstwhile leader in terms of security in the sub-region as well 
as host not only to the only global UN agency in the global South but also to the sub-regional 
operations of many Northern/Western transnational corporation subsidiaries. This catalysed 
pressure from the rest of the international community for decisive action as well. In turn, this raised 
the question of ‘ownership’ of any intervention—if the AU did not intervene, then the rest of the 
international community would, which was unpalatable to, in particular, the incumbent political 
party. 
 The final set of additional—and critical—factors had to do with internal dynamics. The 
balance of power internally was important. The outcome of the presidential vote was in question, 
with the incumbent claiming victory but the outcomes of the parliamentary vote put the political 
opposition ahead. This bolstered domestic appeals for intervention—domestic academic, civil 
society and private-sector constituencies understood that the situation was untenable as—questions 
about the integrity and legitimacy of the supposed outcome of the presidential vote aside—the 
incumbent would not be able to govern without concessions to the political opposition. This fact, 
in turn, bolstered the AU’s belief, shared by the rest of the international community, that 
intervention would, in fact, ‘work’. 
 
7.2 What leverage for such interventions? 
While understanding the conditions under which the AU intervened is important, of equal—if not 
more—importance is understanding what made the political protagonists in Kenya accept the 
intervention. For the political opposition, the answer is more obvious. The ODM understood the 
AU intervention as claim-recognition in respect of the supposed outcome of the presidential vote. 
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 For the incumbent, the answers are less obvious. The first answer has again to do with 
agency—political leadership, eventually, within the PNU. Kibaki, who re-assumed the presidency, 
was, in the end, concerned about both his legacy and his personal standing. More sober advice 
from trusted civil servants (as opposed to political party members and leadership) may have come 
into play.1243 Kibaki and the civil service were also concerned about Kenya’s standing—in the 
sub-region, the region and the rest of the world—Kenya having traditionally played a leadership 
role in the maintenance of security in the sub-region. 
 The second and initial set of answers has to do, however, with the disarray within the PNU 
occasioned by the nature, speed and spread of the post-elections violence following the 
announcement of the so-called presidential results and Kibaki’s dusk swearing-in. It became 
evident that the PNU’s initial scenario planning had been erroneous and there was no ‘Plan B’, 
particularly given both tensions within the security services (between, for example, the heads of 
the regular police and the criminal investigations) and their apparent inability to contain the post-
elections violence. 
 As the PNU became increasingly concerned about the ODM’s influence regionally and 
internationally, it finally began to see an AU intervention as preferable to intervention by the rest 
of the international community. AU intervention would be comparatively face-saving as well as, 
initially, being deemed more manageable (evidenced by the contestations once the AU intervention 
had begun on the language of the mediation, the nature of the political settlement and the division 
of ministerial portfolios). In this sense, the second set of answers has to do with the incumbent’s 
evolving strategic assessment of its options. 
                                                          
1243 One informant credits, in particular, the then Head of the Civil Service, Francis Muthaura. 
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 But the third—and most important—set of answers has to do with the pressure brought to 
bear on the PNU, interestingly and particularly from domestic constituencies. Politically, the post-
elections violence was perceived of as most affecting the PNU’s political constituency—the 
security services seemed unable to contain it and, worse, were ultimately charged with 
substantially contributing to it.1244 Economically, the political opposition’s protests of the 
supposed presidential outcomes initially took the form of economic sabotage (for example, through 
a short blockage of the port, blockages of the roads through the Rift Valley to western Kenya and 
the hinterland as well as uprooting of the railway tracks). The impact on Kenya’s private sector 
was immediate—and it was the private sector, of all domestic constituencies, that had the most 
access to and influence over the PNU. 
 As mentioned above, given the effects of transit trade, regional pressure for action was 
immediate and strong, leading to much attempted engagement with the incumbent by various 
regional leaders and regional leadership fora such as the Forum of Retired African Presidents in 
advance of the AU intervention. Pressure from the rest of the international community was also 
largely both consistent and immediate—with important Northern/Western bilateral and 
multilateral representatives providing, once the AU intervention had begun, the incentives and 
disincentives (or ‘carrots and sticks’) to see the AU intervention through. 
 What is of note with respect to this third set of answers is that domestic, regional and 
international pressures were, in the Kenyan case study, mutually reinforcing—with domestic 
pressures, to an atypical and unusual degree, providing the lead for regional and international 
pressures to follow. This confirms the research’s initial hypothesis that it was the combination of 
                                                          
1244 The report of the CIPEV noted that the majority of deaths during the post-elections violence were as a result of 
bullets and attributed the same to the security services. 
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regional with international and domestic pressures that ensured the ‘success’ of the AU’s 
intervention. 
 
7.2.1 Atypical and unusual leverage: the still insufficiently acknowledged role of domestic 
constituencies 
Both the AU and the philanthropic and diplomatic communities have been, rightfully, credited 
with ensuring the ‘success’ of the mediation. The AU’s choices for the mediation team ensured a 
more joined-up approach between the region and the rest of the international community than is 
often the case. The mediation team provided strategic guidance to shepherd the mediation to a 
conclusion (by, for example, making pre-emptive announcements to the public, moving the 
negotiation when necessary and, finally, negotiating solely with the Principals in the presence of 
a peer who had just taken over the political leadership of the EAC). 
 Beyond process, substantively, the AU and its mediation team were also well informed 
about the proximate and structural causes of the post-elections violence, beyond the electoral 
trigger. Kenya had recently completed the APRM process and one of the APRM team members 
joined the mediation team.  
For the philanthropic and diplomatic communities, the elections and ensuing conflict were, in 
a sense, the ‘final nail in the coffin’ of belief in the credibility of the supposed political transition 
of 2002. Despite steadily rising levels of economic growth post-2002, these actors were 
increasingly disappointed with the results of their post-2002 investments (in, for example, 
accountability). Given their questioning of the supposed presidential results and their alarm at the 
nature, speed and spread of the post-elections violence, they were ready to support the AU 
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intervention, particularly as they had confidence in the AU’s mediation team, the Panel of Eminent 
African Personalities headed by former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan. 
 The advocacy-oriented philanthropies invested in supporting the mobilisation and 
organisation of domestic constituencies—providing funding, for example, as well as facilitating 
civil society’s regional and international advocacy. The US, initially pro-PNU, changed its stance, 
arguably due to advocacy with the US Congress and Senate as well as analyses from American 
Africanists on Kenyan policy. In the end, the entire Northern/Western diplomatic community 
backed the AU intervention not just with financial and technical support to the Panel of Eminent 
African Personalities, but also with targeted (including individually) ‘carrots and sticks’ to see the 
mediation through. But both the philanthropic and diplomatic communities pegged their 
messaging and other efforts on demands and positions largely emanating from domestic 
constituencies. 
 In the immediate disarray following the announcement of the supposed presidential results, 
the dusk swearing-in of Kibaki and the ensuing post-election violence, Kenyan civil society 
provided the alternative leadership that the political protagonists could not. The umbrella KPTJ 
moved from publicly ‘breaking ranks’ by those from ethnicities deemed supportive of the 
incumbent to collating and analysing the data on both the elections and the patterns of post-
elections violence, making this data publicly available and advocating with the region and the rest 
of the world. The umbrella CCP publicly encouraged dialogue between the political protagonists 
and made the first invitations to regional leaders to engage. As the AU intervention got underway, 
the Women’s Consortium added its voice to the demands and positions on the table, and proved to 
have access to both sides of the political divide. 
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 The Kenyan private sector provided unprecedented national media access to the alternative 
leadership from civil society, with CKW focused more on the international media. The Kenyan 
private sector also convened Kenyan mediators and supported them in their formation of CCP. 
Kenya private-sector umbrella organisations also quickly provided their own analyses of what 
needed to happen to end the post-elections violence, publicly backing the mediation as well as 
providing it with its own demands and positions. 
 In summary, it was Kenyan civil society, including the women’s movement, and the 
Kenyan private sector that laid the ground for the AU intervention through engaging both the 
public at large and critical constituencies across the country, providing practical support to 
responders on the ground as well as religious organisations. Kenyan civil society also engaged 
political protagonists, although different umbrellas had varying degrees of access to either side, 
key regional figures (potential mediators as well as the AU and its mediation team), and the rest 
of the international community through increased advocacy with the local diplomatic community 
as well as in key capitals. 
Substantively, the alternative leadership provided ensured that data and analysis of both 
the elections and the patterns of the post-elections violence were publicly available, together with 
proposed solutions for the same. This, collectively, provided a narrative of events for the historical 
record, and to frame and fill out the mediation agreements—with content that addressed not only 
the electoral trigger, but also the proximate and structural causes of the post-elections violence. It 
also, collectively, provided a domestic anchor and legitimacy not only for the AU intervention but 
also for actions by the rest of the international community to see the mediation through. It also, 
over time, had the effect of softening the ‘hardliners’ on both sides of the political divide. 
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 It was also Kenyan civil society, including the women’s movement, and the Kenyan private 
sector that maintained domestic pressure for full implementation of the agreements reached under 
the KNDR—providing too a medium- and longer-term source of analyses and technical capacity 
for such implementation. 
 
7.3 A critical examination of the nature and consequences of such interventions 
The AU intervention in Kenya is deemed a ‘success’ because it contributed to stopping the 
violence by acknowledging that the presidential elections had been flawed, with the KNDR 
agreements eventually leading to the disbandment of the EMB and preparing the ground for reform 
(if not accountability), including of the electoral dispute-resolution mechanism. This, in turn, 
enabled a political settlement that went beyond accommodation of the political protagonists. The 
KNDR agreements enabled finalisation of the almost two-decades-long constitutional reform 
process, restoring separation of powers and checks and balances was well as—critically—
providing for devolution and guarantees for women’s political participation. The KNDR 
agreements also prepared the ground for conclusively addressing historical grievances, including 
dispossession from land, gross and systemic human rights violations and systemic discrimination 
by ethnicity. 
 However, implementation of various KNDR agreements proceeded with varying degrees 
of difficulty and, ultimately, yielded different results. Importantly in terms of lessening electoral 
temperatures, the Constitution of Kenya 2010 did not, in the end, provide for proportionality in the 
electoral system. Neither did it therefore provide a means to reach the target set for women’s 
political participation. 
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 With the benefit of hindsight, in terms of the process of the AU intervention, the selection 
criteria for the mediation team members were more implicit than explicit and the mediation team 
was provided with no terms of reference. While the gravitas and skills brought to the table worked 
and the mediation team had the flexibility to proceed as it saw fit, the ‘success’ it registered is thus 
neither necessarily guaranteed nor necessarily replicable. In terms of the substance of the KNDR 
agreements, time would tell that the ‘devil lay in the detail’, with the lack of specificity negatively 
impacting, for example, the formation, size, cost and effectiveness of the Grand Coalition 
Government. 
 More fundamentally, time would also demonstrate the problem with the model of the 
political settlement itself, which proved to be a ‘double-edged sword’ in the medium-to-long term. 
Not only did it effectively reward the incumbent and enable its entrenchment (as all previous 
political settlements in Kenya have done), but it diminished the political opposition, if not to the 
extent experienced during the one-party dictatorship. The lack of limitations placed on the mandate 
and duration of the Grand Coalition Government meant that all implementation of the KNDR 
agreements was subject to continual negotiation, and that the Grand Coalition Government failed 
to see itself as transitional. 
This continual negotiation meant, for example, that the Constitution of Kenya 2010 did not 
adopt a purely parliamentary system, introduce proportionality into the electoral system or adopt 
devolution as originally proposed. All of these were measures intended to lessen the political 
incentives for capturing the Executive and thus to reduce electoral temperatures. 
While institutional reforms of the electoral system, the security sector and the justice 
system took place, following yet another contested presidential election in 2013 (and the handling 
of the same by the new EMB and the new Supreme Court), public confidence in institutions is 
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again, in 2017,at a low. These institutional failures were arguably enabled by the fact that, going 
into the General Elections of 2013, there has still been no individual (criminal) accountability for 
electoral malfeasance in 2007 or for the post-elections violence of 2007-8. This failure to pursue 
accountability was justified on the basis of not destabilising the political settlement. Thus, as in 
the case of all Kenya’s previous political settlements, reform was chosen over accountability, in 
effect legitimising the use of violence for political ends (including by the security sector). A base 
for violence still exists too, given that the KNDR agreements on addressing unemployment, 
underemployment and the ‘youth bulge’ have always been weak. 
Political exclusion persists, as does the instrumentalisation of ethnic (deemed political) 
identity. Political leadership is still lacking and, over time, the alternative leadership provided by 
Kenyan civil society, including the women’s movement and the Kenyan private sector, has waned. 
Thus, elections remain a trigger for violence, given the new EMB’s failure to exercise 
independence1245 as well as the lack of consequences for Executive interference in the EMB and 
for fomenting political violence. Kenya is still fragile, with the potential to take a shorter time to 
implode and with less likelihood of political violence being stopped in the same way in the future. 
The moral of the story is that a political settlement can only ever be a means to an end, not an end 
in itself—regardless of who brings it about. Key questions for the future of the model of the 
political settlement, including within the AU, include how to limit the mandate and duration of 
resulting coalition governments to make clear their transitional role, and how to maintain the 
confluence of domestic, regional and international pressures to realise that transition. 
 
                                                          
1245 Towards the end of 2016, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), brought into being by 
the KNDR agreements, was disbanded following protests by the political opposition and a new and limited political 
settlement on its reconstitution. 
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7.4 Implications for ‘African solutions for African problems’ 
The conclusions of Chapter Five have to do with the lessons learnt from the AU’s intervention in 
Kenya’s electoral conflict of 2007-8. In comparison to a UN intervention, an AU intervention is 
preferable because it is less bureaucratic and therefore quicker, it is met today with less resistance 
than a UN intervention may be, and it can bring to the table more contextual knowledge. However, 
first, an AU intervention is not always as per the APSA, which clearly spells out that the relevant 
or responsible REC intervenes first. For interests within relevant or responsible RECs may be (or 
may be perceived as being) biased or partisan given that the RECs invariably include neighbouring 
member states. 
 Second, a single mediation process is important. And, as demonstrated by the Kenyan case 
study, the success of an AU intervention depends on the ground prepared by domestic 
constituencies and is also inevitably embedded in the global. An ‘African solution’ may be as 
much enabled by domestic constituencies as by the AU intervention itself. Also, an ‘African 
solution’ still depends on the rest of the international community not pulling in disparate directions. 
 Third, the efficacy of domestic constituencies’ leadership, data and analysis can ensure that 
more than a political settlement is agreed to—that not only triggers of conflict but also proximate 
and structural causes are addressed in agreements arising from an AU intervention. However, the 
mobilisation and organisation of those domestic constituencies needs to be sustained past the crisis 
point to ensure that those agreements are implemented in letter and spirit. When this organisation 
and mobilisation is not maintained, then what follows inevitably degenerates to serve solely the 
interests of the political protagonists involved. 
Fourth, reform of electoral, justice and security-sector institutions—inevitably part of a 
political settlement plus—is not enough. To ensure that these reformed institutions are indeed 
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credible, effective and independent in the medium-to-long term, (individual criminal) 
accountability for their past failures cannot be sacrificed to reform alone for the purposes of 
holding the political settlement together. The mantra of ‘sequencing’ peace and justice simply does 
not work—justice can be achieved only at the start, when political protagonists are still unsettled 
and have not yet re-entrenched themselves. Viable ‘African solutions’ need to take into account 
the fact that (individual criminal) accountability is still the ‘last frontier’. 
 Finally, political settlements can be only a means to an end. In and of themselves, they tend 
to weaken the political opposition, diminish checks on the Executive and not only sacrifice 
accountability but also distort or postpone genuine structural reform. 
 
7.5 (Re-)conceptualising ‘African solutions for African problems’ 
Chapter Six extrapolates from the AU intervention in Kenya’s electoral conflict of 2007-8, with 
references to other, more current AU interventions, to critically analyse (and problematise) the 
very notion of ‘African solutions for African problems.’ The AU’s intervention in Kenya has been 
widely hailed as a ‘success’ for the AU. It was, indeed, initiated and legitimised by the AU. 
Curiously, however, within the AU, it is seen by some as a Northern/Western intervention. 
The AU Panel of the Wise, the part of the APSA intended to lead preventive diplomacy efforts, 
had not yet been operationalised at the time of the Kenyan electoral conflict. The AU could not 
financially or technically support the AU’s intervention in Kenya (and some in the AU felt that 
support was unwanted). Neither could it provide the ‘carrots and sticks’ to make it work. 
Ironically, the factors that ensured support from the rest of the international community 
made the AU intervention work. The gravitas and stature of Kofi Annan as lead mediator ensured 
the North/West backed him and the rest of the Panel of Eminent African personalities financially, 
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technically and politically. He was not, therefore, beholden to the AU. And, despite his submission 
of regular reports to the AU, the AU became less engaged as the mediation unfolded. Finally, as 
the accountability process for the violence rolled out—moving from the proposed Special Tribunal 
in Kenya to the ICC—he took a stance different from that of the AU, pushed as the AU was by the 
incumbents in Kenya. 
Equally of interest is that, within Kenya too, the intervention was seen as ‘African’ not just 
because the AU had mandated it or because the Eminent African Personalities were all Africans, 
but because of the groundwork laid for it by domestic constituencies and the participation of 
domestic constituencies in ensuring acceptance of its process, substantive content and 
implementation. That said, the Kenyan case study still provides a basis from which to tease out 
responses to key questions as follows. 
 
7.5.1 What informs an AU decision to intervene and how does it intervene? 
A decision to intervene is made following assessment of analysis and intelligence from the CEWS 
under the APSA, (long-term) elections observation under the DPA, its satellite offices or external 
sources (including African and other civil society). Internally, leadership of both the AU and the 
AU Commission (AUC) matters, the latter given that the APSA’s design allows both the PSC and 
the AUC Chair to act on information arising from the CEWS. The AUC Chair, critically, 
determines whether, when a REC is faltering, the AU bolsters the REC’s effort or decides to 
intervene directly (through the AUC Chair’s office) or indirectly (through delegations of peers 
from the Panel of the Wise). 
Leadership also matters in terms of being able to utilise the normative and institutional 
basis provided by the Constitutive Act and the APSA’s design with full awareness of the historical 
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reasons for the existence of those norms and that design. Similarly, leadership matters in terms of 
being able to utilise the normative and institutional developments within the DPA, which, relative 
to the PSC, tends to see electoral processes as a potential trigger of insecurity not solely in and of 
themselves but also because of what proximate and structural grievances tend to come to the fore 
during electoral processes. 
 Externally, the country involved matters—its economic and geopolitical importance. The 
response of the sub-region matters—the economic and political impacts of a conflict not only 
within the country concerned but also across its borders, in its neighbouring states. The response 
of domestic constituencies also matters—civil society’s contacts with and ability to engage the 
AU. And, finally, the response of the rest of the international community matters—as does its 
alignment with the AU. 
 
7.5.2 What makes a member state accept an AU intervention? 
Evidently, the member state’s normative commitments and the potential consequences of non-
adherence to the same underlie acceptance or ‘consent’ to an AU intervention. But, as illustrated 
by the Kenyan case study, more political or strategic considerations matter more. These include 
the domestic acceptability of the face and leadership of the AU intervention, with a preference for 
peers deemed at least politically neutral. They also include a frank assessment of the balance of 
power internally by the incumbent (can it deal with the political opposition itself or not?) as well 
as a calculation of interests domestically by the incumbent (whether it thinks the AU intervention 
can be used to preserve itself with the least possible ceding of power). 
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 Finally, pressure matters—pressure from the sub-region, the AU and the rest of the 
international community. This is in addition to pressure from domestic constituencies, not so much 
civil society but more the incumbent’s political constituency and, particularly, the private sector. 
 
7.5.3 Objectives of an AU intervention and measures and determinants of its ‘success’  
As mentioned above, the AU intervenes on the basis of subsidiarity, ceding to the relevant or 
responsible sub-region first. If the relevant or responsible REC does not work, the AU can then 
intervene directly through the offices of the AU and AUC Chairs or indirectly, in a face-saving 
manner through the use of peers within the Panel of the Wise. The AU is non-directive with respect 
to an indirect intervention, leaving the peers to exercise their own discretion although it will sign-
off on what the peers accomplish. Preventive diplomacy is preferred to military interventions—
however, relative to the UN, the AU prides itself on being militarily able to achieve the peace and 
not just hold it (this is particularly true of the REC of the ECOWAS). 
 The objectives of an AU intervention are basic: to stop any fighting and restore peace and 
stability. Triggers must be addressed, through political settlements, the core of any agreements 
reached, with proximate and structural causes, if addressed at all, going into the detail. 
Accountability is seen either as leverage to get to a political settlement or as something to come 
‘later’—the assumed necessity of ‘sequencing’ peace and justice has become a truism. 
 Arising from the objectives above, an AU intervention is considered ‘successful’ if, in a 
given conflict, escalation is forestalled and violence is ended. Achieving a political settlement is 
the key ‘success’ measure—seen more as an end in itself than as a means. But, a political 
settlement addressing more than the trigger is a higher measure of ‘success’—although seeing 
implementation of a ‘political settlement plus’ through to the end, fully addressing proximate and 
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structural causes of conflict, is rarely within the AU’s remit. It if were, greater attention would be 
paid to limiting the reform and temporal mandate of any coalition government or government of 
national unity arising from the political settlement. In effect, this involves clarifying from the 
outset that any government arising is purely transitional in nature. 
 There are two most important determinants of an AU intervention’s ‘success’. The first of 
these is the initial balance of power domestically between the incumbent and the political 
opposition. Second is the general sentiment of the population, expressed through independent 
organisation and mobilisation of civil society, including the women’s movement, and the private 
sector. 
Another key determinant of an AU intervention’s ‘success’ is whether the AU can wholly 
occupy the intervention space, ensuring (as in the Kenyan case study) a ‘single mediation’. This 
requires agreement and interest alignment between the relevant or responsible REC, the AU and 
the rest of the international community on both analysis of the conflict situation and how best to 
address it. Achieving this agreement and interest alignment is now more explicitly taken up by the 
AU. It can, with the relevant or responsible REC, engage it, displace it or take over from it. With 
respect to the rest of the international community—specifically the UN—efforts are still underway 
on evolving institutional arrangements for information-sharing, common analysis and assessing 
the comparative advantage of intervention by either party. These efforts are, however, still difficult 
given lack of full agreement on the primacy of the AU or UN (and still often varying interests of 
the UN Security Council’s permanent members). 
The AU’s position is that it has primacy over any African conflict situation given the 
history of inappropriate UN responses (or, even, lack of responses). It sees its expanding role as 
fully in line with Chapter 8 of the UN Charter, despite the mandate given to the UN Security 
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Council under Chapter 8. But the relationship between the AU and the UN with respect to peace 
and security on the continent has changed over time, with the AU intervention in Kenya being 
viewed by both sides as the first fully aligned intervention, bringing about a new understanding 
between the two institutions and better practice in conflict situations on the continent that have 
arisen since. New institutional arrangements are still being worked out for a new framework 
agreement formally announced in April 2017, including on joint horizon-scanning, capacity-
building, technical support and, as has happened at least once before, financial contributions to 
AU interventions from assessed contributions of African member states to the UN under the logic 
that the AU is assuming part of the UN’s previous role. (‘Burden-sharing’ in this way is one of the 
financing proposals currently on the table, even after the 2016 decision to fund the APSA through 
a tax on all African imports.) 
The improvement in working relationships over time has been aided by the presence of UN 
Security Council permanent member missions to the AU in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the seat of the 
AU, and better direct bilateral relationships. That said, UN Security Council reform (through the 
addition of one or two African permanent members) remains a demand from the AU, and 
trickledown of agreements at the highest levels of the AU and the UN through their respective 
Secretariats and relevant agencies is still not always easy. 
 The final critical determinant of an AU intervention’s ‘success’ is the sustained 
commitment of the protagonists to the political settlement (plus), the mediators (through, as in the 
Kenyan case study, medium-to-long-term monitoring of implementation) and of all sources of 
pressure—domestic, regional and international—on the protagonists over time, beyond the 
immediate political settlement. 
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7.5.4 Advantages of and challenges to realising ‘African solutions for African problems’ 
The advantages of an AU intervention, illustrated, for example, in the Kenyan case study, include 
not just its African ‘face’, but what lies (or is assumed to lie and sometimes does) behind that 
African ‘face’—from knowledge of relevant languages to understanding of the political culture. 
An AU intervention increasingly lends itself to better acceptance by the political protagonists, 
given their expectations of empathy and higher contextual knowledge. The ever-expanding pool 
of respected ‘senior’ Africans now available able to front and lead AU interventions also lends 
itself to easier convening for deployment into given conflict situations. And, should preventive 
diplomacy not work, the AU (and its RECs, particularly ECOWAS) are more ready to move to 
military intervention to gain rather than simply hold the peace.  
 That said, despite the normative allowances for AU intervention under Article 4 of the 
Constitutive Act, it is clear that achieving consent to an AU intervention remains both something 
the AU feels it must do as well as something that is still difficult to do. For interpretation of the 
conditions enabling intervention under Article 4 is not yet one of pure evidentiary standards of 
proof but one of political considerations. In addition, there are still internal conflicts about 
applicable norms and which norms have precedence within the AU—those pertaining to 
acceptable political behaviour under the DPA still being relegated below those pertaining to peace 
and security under the PSC. 
 The AU’s leadership has also changed since the transition from the OAU to the AU—with 
peer solidarity amongst the current AU leadership posing more of a problem today in hindering 
decisive AU intervention than it did before (up to the time of the AU intervention in Kenya). The 
subsidiarity on which the APSA is based is increasingly proving a challenge too, given the often 
evidently divergent interests of neighbouring states within the relevant or responsible REC. 
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 The choice of mediators, and their given histories in a particular member state, can also 
prove problematic. On one hand, those with histories in the given state can bring more contextual 
knowledge to the table. But, on the other hand, they can also be perceived as (or accused of being) 
not being politically disinterested when they have their own, independent analysis of the conflict 
situation at hand, or stronger affinities, historical or not, to one or other of the political protagonists. 
That said, if the mediators selected have no history in the given member state, it can be easier for 
the political protagonists to manipulate them. 
 Divergent interests of the rest of the international community—particularly those with 
leverage or ‘carrots or sticks’ over the member state in question—can also pose challenges. This 
is especially so when the political protagonists themselves have unclear political interests or 
political preferences they are unable or unwilling to articulate in the context of an AU intervention. 
The use of populism to oppose demands for accountability is a growing problem. This is especially 
so when the role of domestic constituencies for whom accountability is critical is invisibilised. In 
addition, while domestic constituencies prepare the ground for an AU intervention, providing 
pressure as well as substantive inputs, their capacities to do so are varied across the continent—
particularly in protracted conflict situations in which they may be (and often are) directly repressed 
and targeted by incumbents. 
Finally and perhaps most importantly, an AU intervention’s ‘success’ continues to be seen 
primarily in terms of achieving a political settlement that de-escalates and ultimately ends 
violence. But the power-sharing that is at the heart of most political settlements has become 
formulaic. In the medium-to-long term, it undermines democratic principles, particularly that of 
electoral competition. It avoids the difficulties of addressing electoral processes and outcomes that 
do not maintain the integrity of the vote and, in fact, incentivises violent electoral contestation, 
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particularly when it sacrifices accountability to reform. The ‘sequencing’ of peace and justice, now 
also formulaic, simply doesn’t work. And, as the political settlement does not necessarily address 
the proximate and structural causes of conflict beyond the trigger, it is ultimately not sustainable, 
leading to relapse at the next electoral process, depending on the duration of the intervention. Thus, 
more militarised responses may be what’s called for next, as the objectives and ‘success’ measures 
of preventive diplomacy prove themselves simply too slight in the longer term. This supports the 
original hypothesis that, consonant with predictions of the ‘liberal peace’, the political settlement 
in the form of power-sharing itself contributes to undermining implementation of agreements 
under the political settlement, in turn undermining democratic consolidation and mitigating against 
accountability. 
 
7.5.5 Final thoughts on ‘African solutions for African problems’ 
The notion of ‘African solutions for African problems’ arose as a reaction to the North/West 
choosing whether, when and how to engage in African conflict situations, particularly pending UN 
Security Council reform. In practice, articulation of this idea has proactively (rather than 
reactively) highlighted the need to utilise knowledge and understanding of the region through 
devices such as the use of respected, ‘senior’ African personalities, mandated and legitimised by 
African institutions, to increase the acceptance, legitimacy, ownership and depth/substance of 
interventions, including re-imagined or re-invented ‘traditional’ African institutions. 
 Distinguishing features of ‘African solutions for African problems’ have indeed been speed 
(even if willingness to stay engaged beyond the immediate crisis point still varies), reliance on 
preventive diplomacy in the first instance but a readiness for peace-enforcement if preventive 
diplomacy fails, and more intentional drawing upon and use of the citizenry in such preventive 
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diplomacy. However, the objectives and measures of ‘success’ of this approach—particularly that 
of the political settlement between political protagonists—cannot be said to be specifically 
‘African’. They are, in fact, universal and as prone in Africa as elsewhere to common limitations. 
These include: regression; a lack of clarity on how to address new conflict risks (such as those 
posed by ‘uncivil society’ or armed groups without an interest in engagement); and a failure to 
address accountability for all who instrumentalise violence to achieve political ends. 
 Questions arising for the AU include that of confronting the nature of leadership—bottom-
up as well as top-down—through according as much attention to the AU’s democratic architecture 
as to its APSA. They also include addressing the APSA’s design problems—the challenges in 
practice of reliance on the principle of subsidiarity and critically assessing the comparative 
experiences of the RECs. Another key question is how to diversify and diminish the AU’s 
continued reliance on external financing—through realising proposals on the table for internal 
resource-mobilisation and continental integration. Beyond improving institutional functioning and 
independence, however, is the more fundamental challenge—that of addressing the problems 
inherent in the political settlement. 
This concluding chapter has referenced back to the original research questions and their 
hypotheses. It has summarised the conditions under which supranational institutions decide to 
intervene, and outlines what provides leverage for such interventions. The two key conclusions 
here are the importance of a domestic base to legitimise, anchor and give real meaning to an 
external intervention, and the importance of domestic and international actors for regional actors’ 
interventions to both occur and ‘succeed’. This chapter has also critically analysed the nature and 
medium-to-long-term consequences of such interventions, noting that political settlements 
inevitably mitigate against addressing—in full—the proximate and structural causes of a(n 
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electoral) conflict and against ensuring accountability. It has therefore challenged the notion of 
any ‘African solutions’ that continue to be predicated on political settlements.   
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